“SIRC conducted a study in 2013-2014 on CSIS Operational Support and its Use Overseas, which examined the Service’s use of firearms in DOEs. Among its findings and recommendations, SIRC’s draft study noted that it was unable to conclude whether CSIS had adequately informed your predecessor of its use of firearms to DOEs outside of Afghanistan, and recommended that CSIS comprehensively justify to you its operational posture in DOEs, including the use of firearms”
Discussion:
SIRC has highlighted some of its findings re: CSIS firearms in DOEs here: http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/2013-2014/sc2-eng.html
In 2010, CSIS acknowledged publicly that its intelligence officers could carry firearms in dangerous operating environments overseas.
That same year, SIRC undertook a review of CSIS’s decision-making overseas, which included its use of firearms within Afghanistan. At the time, the Committee found that there were strong measures in place to ensure proper training, accreditation and conditions under which firearms could be used. However, SIRC expressed caution about CSIS’s possible future decision to use firearms outside of Afghanistan. The review concluded with a recommendation that, should CSIS expand its use of firearms abroad, it should be done “after consultation with, and approval of, the Minister of Public Safety.”
SIRC found that CSIS’s new procedures provide improved direction to employees regarding their roles and responsibilities under the Service’s firearms program, but there appears to be a disparity between policy and its practical application by employees. Furthermore, SIRC learned that not all employees who should have a sound understanding of CSIS’s firearms program had knowledge of the policies or protocols. SIRC also found an instance where CSIS was not strictly following its own protocols on firearms. In light of these observations, SIRC impressed upon CSIS that its policy and protocols must be followed in the strictest possible terms, or be clearly written to indicate where there is latitude for interpretation.
SIRC also noted that CSIS’s policy on firearms fails to adequately address the issue of an employee’s liability, civil or criminal, under the laws of a foreign country and whether any mechanisms for immunity could be explored or what position the Government of Canada would take on helping to extract an employee from a certain situation. There is also no adequate advice on what course of legal action would be pursued domestically if an employee was believed to have acted negligently within a foreign environment, and consideration is not given on the extent to which certain types of firearms can be regarded as “defensive weapons.” Finally, there is also a lack of adequate advice on possible legal implications for Canada under international law.
In order to improve CSIS’s management of its firearms program, SIRC recommended that CSIS develop better guidelines on the sourcing and purchasing of weapons within dangerous operating environments, create a clear responsibility centre for the firearms program and obtain updated legal advice related to the reasonableness and necessity of carrying firearms within dangerous operating environments.
It remains unclear what other areas are defined as DOEs outside of Afghanistan; and where else firearm use is permitted for CSIS employees.
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Other resources: “Undercover CSIS Agents Carry Guns in Foreign Flashpoints”
“Ottawa's spies are carrying guns in Afghanistan, a new practice for the clandestine civilian agents who are not authorized to bear arms inside Canada.”
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Document Synopsis: “The Service initially declined to provide a copy of the 2014 Memorandum regarding a SIRC study that examined CSIS’s use of firearms in dangerous operating environments (DOEs). Following several bilateral discussions, the Service subsequently provided a copy as an exception to this long standing agreement.”
“SIRC conducted a study in 2013-2014 on CSIS Operational Support and its Use Overseas, which examined the Service’s use of firearms in DOEs. Among its findings and recommendations, SIRC’s draft study noted that it was unable to conclude whether CSIS had adequately informed your predecessor of its use of firearms to DOEs outside of Afghanistan, and recommended that CSIS comprehensively justify to you its operational posture in DOEs, including the use of firearms”
Discussion:
SIRC has highlighted some of its findings re: CSIS firearms in DOEs here: http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/2013-2014/sc2-eng.html
In 2010, CSIS acknowledged publicly that its intelligence officers could carry firearms in dangerous operating environments overseas.
That same year, SIRC undertook a review of CSIS’s decision-making overseas, which included its use of firearms within Afghanistan. At the time, the Committee found that there were strong measures in place to ensure proper training, accreditation and conditions under which firearms could be used. However, SIRC expressed caution about CSIS’s possible future decision to use firearms outside of Afghanistan. The review concluded with a recommendation that, should CSIS expand its use of firearms abroad, it should be done “after consultation with, and approval of, the Minister of Public Safety.”
SIRC found that CSIS’s new procedures provide improved direction to employees regarding their roles and responsibilities under the Service’s firearms program, but there appears to be a disparity between policy and its practical application by employees. Furthermore, SIRC learned that not all employees who should have a sound understanding of CSIS’s firearms program had knowledge of the policies or protocols. SIRC also found an instance where CSIS was not strictly following its own protocols on firearms. In light of these observations, SIRC impressed upon CSIS that its policy and protocols must be followed in the strictest possible terms, or be clearly written to indicate where there is latitude for interpretation.
SIRC also noted that CSIS’s policy on firearms fails to adequately address the issue of an employee’s liability, civil or criminal, under the laws of a foreign country and whether any mechanisms for immunity could be explored or what position the Government of Canada would take on helping to extract an employee from a certain situation. There is also no adequate advice on what course of legal action would be pursued domestically if an employee was believed to have acted negligently within a foreign environment, and consideration is not given on the extent to which certain types of firearms can be regarded as “defensive weapons.” Finally, there is also a lack of adequate advice on possible legal implications for Canada under international law.
In order to improve CSIS’s management of its firearms program, SIRC recommended that CSIS develop better guidelines on the sourcing and purchasing of weapons within dangerous operating environments, create a clear responsibility centre for the firearms program and obtain updated legal advice related to the reasonableness and necessity of carrying firearms within dangerous operating environments.
It remains unclear what other areas are defined as DOEs outside of Afghanistan; and where else firearm use is permitted for CSIS employees.
----------
Other resources: “Undercover CSIS Agents Carry Guns in Foreign Flashpoints”
“Ottawa's spies are carrying guns in Afghanistan, a new practice for the clandestine civilian agents who are not authorized to bear arms inside Canada.”
In the Arar inquiry final report, Justice O’Connor observed: “There is no guarantee that a recipient of information to which a caveat is attached will honour that caveat. The system is based on trust and caveats are not legally enforceable. However, the ability and willingness of agencies to respect caveats and seek consent before using information will affect the willingness of others to provide information in the future – a significant incentive for agencies to respect caveats” [Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services in Canada, 2006) 49, in Forcese, NS Law, 482].
]]>Document Synopsis: CSIS tells foreign agency that if they deem some form of legal action is warranted against a Canadian citizen present in their country, CSIS trusts that the individual will be treated fairly in accordance with international conventions, due process, and access to Canadian diplomatic personnel if requested. If the foreign agency wants to detain or prosecute a Canadian citizen based on information that originated from CSIS, CSIS requests that the foreign agency consult CSIS first.
In the Arar inquiry final report, Justice O’Connor observed: “There is no guarantee that a recipient of information to which a caveat is attached will honour that caveat. The system is based on trust and caveats are not legally enforceable. However, the ability and willingness of agencies to respect caveats and seek consent before using information will affect the willingness of others to provide information in the future – a significant incentive for agencies to respect caveats” [Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services in Canada, 2006) 49, in Forcese, NS Law, 482].
Document Purpose: To provide a tool to CSIS’s employees to ensure that they comply with international and Canadian legislation and that decisions to proceed or not with the use of specific information/information exchange “are made at a level commensurate with the possibility that” (1) the information to be used may have been obtained through the use of mistreatment of individuals or (2) the exchange may result, directly or indirectly, in the mistreatment of individuals.
This Directive applies to to information sharing with ALL foreign entities, is guided by the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011)Document Analysis:
Foreign Arrangements Philosophy (one of the few unredacted parts of this doc): CSIS generally enjoys strong relations with all of its key foreign partners. “Our international image as a viable and non-threatening partner generates a large number of requests for assistance from traditional and non-traditional partner services.”
Statistics – Section 17 Foreign Arrangements
1984 (at transition from RCMP) – CSIS inherited 162 arrangements in 107 countries
92-93 – 194 arrangements in 121 countries
97-98 – 214 arrangements in 128 countries
02-03 – 237 arrangements in 134 countries
04-05 253 arrangements in 142 countries as of October 18, 2004
CSIS does not publicly disclose the agencies it has foreign arrangements with.
CSIS arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies have increased significantly over the years, indicating that CSIS has arrangements with multiple intelligence agencies of various countries, and likely international organizations of states.
“Preoccupation with maintaining necessary intelligence arrangements go a long way a considerable distance in explaining much Canadian government secrecy – the mere chance that disclosure of an ally’s secret would impair intelligence sharing is a considerable source of concern for security officials” (Forcese and Roach, 143).
CSIS told a Federal Court in 1996 that the information it receives is “invariably provided in confidence and on the explicit or implicit understanding that neither the information nor its source will be disclosed without prior consent of the entity which provided it.” This principle is widely recognized within the policing and security intelligence communities (Forcese, NS Law, 482).
In emergency circumstances, CSIS can cooperate with foreign intelligence organizations where no arrangement exists. If the Minister is unavailable to approve an arrangement, the Director can undertake “whatever exchanges or cooperation are necessary” to address such an urgent requirement.
Records relating to foreign arrangements will be maintained.
Document Purpose: Provides questions to consider for use of information that could be derived through mistreatment or torture (how to ensure this is not the case) such as:
Document Synopsis:
“The Service cannot simply rely upon anecdotal information or personal relationships that may exist between special liaison officers and security officials in foreign countries. The Service must always ask what the motivation is of the person who is providing the information. This is particularly the case when countries have poor human rights records, and may be more interested in maintaining a relationship w/ the Service than actually providing truthful information as to the human rights conditions in that country”
“To establish that information was obtained by the use of torture required more than just pointing to the poor human rights records of a given country” (Justice Blanchard – in relation to Mahjoub’s Security Certificate, June 2010).
The Information Sharing Evaluation Committee renders decision re: whether intelligence should be used or not.
International Law Safeguards: International law guards against extreme forms of interrogation. Two broadly ratified international treaties include the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment. The ICCPR Article 7 says that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) includes more detailed prohibitions (Forcese, NSL, 187).