2
10
78
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/7f67919812545693b215086d582f1a0a.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=vgL4HVi-LPHS2ViBuqSXRB15Q%7EPa4XFopMi1PHzAG1Y0b4NI8M7QDwS-vU%7ErtW1JqfBzJqwEoabwipFHk4uQRcfrMfaulSprFAj9uRysKFQgIjZIj7O4keLQT5zM1-0CUUvn7OAG2DeLg-Q%7EEgl5-DnN6xIj4guOrRCiXQnbeMxF1sH%7ELAOaOEs8MAjZjtLYhGwXO4tbSCkafkx3kUkSUlyxrMdMSL8ezVq8UoW7g7Qvy0F6QevETEkZHGFh4w0Qo4gZGvqr87qwFqE4uO2JnVAx90h%7EVyM2rSjgSRt%7EjORSHKXS4TXYsBZ0cQghm7g0vhHJOwUS%7E8ia-AoFxNSLEA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
e09db28b935a4b1ef0fc26918612d29e
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/bfd50bec21b7a301acc82d36a79cfea7.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=N1GnMrnk1M515ickmGBgQ5vBDUarW-vz4DRnCbIM2aqYG0F-v2V38UGxIl4uoH3z6y0ZVNQ-pirzF6sDtcjUiNTcElcgFpQBgnyIjJwDMDJrb7P26SRBQ38Szrh6yL2Ax57bvpVezP7JnvOT8P2y5tTAssCsyx%7E4GR1EwYbUK5%7EEoHQEJplFqmtezZNA1F4gTtibAL%7Ex0b6Efl%7EGuq62MSaU-U%7ES2J5wyQ-6xf67RUOqnPVR4DH9U8EZNMLLaQkK4v7XvoZQL8gGOQWEfdmv5YswjxvTqf2DtB8qaPvl3eVCtFAXMTfHmpqhz%7EeU7D45X9jhmUTe9mRXMSqDd3d%7EfA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
071dfe26df73a6730fe8333ff6b39d7c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS Information Sharing Evaluation Committee Document
Subject
The topic of the resource
Information sharing
Description
An account of the resource
This document describes the structure of the internal CSIS committee charged with making decisions on whether to share information with foreign entities where there is a risk of torture or maltreatment. Also included is a 2011 letter from the minister of public safety to the CSIS director that reproduces the 2011 Ministerial direction on information-sharing and then a flow chart showing how decisions are to be made.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP CSIS 117-2014-386
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2011
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/457bb9e89c4ee10aae79e941a40a2b06.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=FwOJPijt5pTc-PxNSb9wSOQsQS74V6nAZhyFGVjmKUM6vvxVynPxj%7E7xD89n9W6Zyb7CRmitSyTp1h6UZc4XA21YrLbi%7ErGBzQTnN7tfb1BWlsObfuPqi-tuWhBzVg5NVkfcFosrfxwlcRirfa5HlVvBoi8M4tD9tD2jztk2QhQ1uGlSQwgWRMC4C-DTYkJLfGkxSty6bgD8wdEv51qPVi4Gd9iTLWQYvvGRzO2gkMRGxK630RBENU7kRAdrMiBUjVHlmzd1G1tt6Vohx8HrGSCJavrwsQ48EJgBoKXH%7E9z%7EnuCO%7ERCUJHjZsfQwmCPtDK24wEU%7Emf2xy0XRNabyVw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
2d2a4dd91bd9c99f152ca1a1283faa35
PDF Text
Text
SECRET
MEMORANDUM TO DIRECTOR GENERAL, POLICY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE CHALLENGES
ISSUE:
To advise of existing challenges when intelligence is relied upon in support of criminal, administrative
and civil proceedings.
BACKGROUND:
Proceedings are guided by key principles which require consistency with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and respect for the Rule of Law. In accordance with the Charter ofRights and Freedoms,
Canadians expect, and are generally guaranteed, procedural fairness, including open courts and
transparent decision-making. There is, however, recognition that the Government has to protect sensitive
sources, capabilities and techniques, as well as its relationships with foreign partners, in the interests of
national security. The following mechanisms were created to enable the Government to protect sensitive
information. Further details on these mechanisms are available in Annex 2.
•
S.38 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA): Sets out a framework to reconcile, where possible, the
Government's dual obligation of protecting national security and prosecuting the accused.
Proceedings for which s.38 CEA is applied result in bifurcation of the Courts. For example, criminal
proceedings are heard by trial judges in the provinces and s.38 CEA proceedings are heard in the
Federal Court.
•
S.18.1 of the Canadian Security Intelligence (CSIS) Act: Amongst other things, Bill C-44 amended
the CSIS Act, with s.18.1 prohibiting the disclosure of the identity of a CSIS human source (or
information from which it could be inferred), with very narrow exceptions.
•
Division 9 of IRPA: Strengthens the Government's ability to keep those who pose a threat to the
safety and security of Canada from entering and/or permanently residing in the country. Unlike s.38
CEA, sensitive information may be protected and relied upon under Division 9 of IRPA.
•
Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act (PITA), Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) : Sensitive information may
be considered and protected if its disclosure could be injurious to national security or endanger the
safety of any person. While sensitive information may be withheld, the subject of the administrative
decision would receive a summary of the information used to make the decision.
DISCUSSION:
Despite mechanisms to protect sensitive information, litigation involving issues of national security often
results in lengthy legal processes that are resource intensive and that jeopardize national security through
the production and disclosure of sensitive information.
Beyond the considerable financial resources required to support these cases, the production and disclosure
of sensitive information also entails a substantial risk to national security. While the aforementioned
provisions provide for the protection of classified information in s.38 CEA proceedings, the Court may
decide that disclosure is required if the public interest outweighs its protection. As a result, numerous
disclosures have and continue to be made concerning CSIS investigative interests, tradecraft, human
Page 1 of2
�SECRET
source operations and information provided by foreign partners. These disclosures negatively impact
CSIS operations and adversely affect Canada's national security interests.
In criminal proceedings, CSIS may, after charges are laid, be required to disclose classified information
when information is deemed relevant under the Stinchcombe 1 standard of disclosure, as well as when it is
held by CSIS as a third party, is 'likely relevant' to an issue and an application for disclosure has been
made. CSIS may also be required to disclose such information when it is determined that, as part of a s.3 8
CEA proceeding, a balancing of public interests favours disclosure. Reliance on CSIS information as
evidence in criminal proceedings will either result in public disclosure of that information or its
protection, ultimately weakening the Government's ability to continue the proceedings or, in some cases,
pursue charges.
Litigation also has the potential to adversely impact the Government's national security policy objectives
and ability to effectively administer and enforce laws. For instance, where no specific regime is in place
(e.g. Investment Canada Act, listings, exports, etc.), a wide range of administrative decisions must rely on
s.38 CEA to protect sensitive information. If protected, that information may not be relied upon,
weakening the Government's ability to defend its case. In addition, while sensitive information may be
relied upon under Division 9 of IRPA, disclosure obligations from past decisions have rendered these
proceedings complex, lengthy and costly while also requiring CSIS to produce an unprecedented amount
of sensitive information to the Court and special advocates.
Finally, in civil proceedings, the Government does not have control over the civil suits it is brought into.
Once brought into a proceeding, the Government, when it is unable to rely on undisclosed CSIS
information to mount its defence, must choose between settling the case or disclosing sensitive
information. Notwithstanding the damage to the Government's reputation, this also has significant
monetary implications for the Government.
CONCLUSION:
Intelligence and evidence has also been included in forthcoming consultations on national security issues
and the related Green Paper. Public feedback resulting from these consultations may assist in guiding
reform on the issue, particularly as it relates to maintaining balance between trial fairness and the
protection of national security information.
The above processes do not include immediate solutions to issues associated with intelligence and
evidence. As such, to mitigate such issues, the Service has, with its partners, created a whole range of
prpcesses to protect classified information that may be used to inform enforcement actions. For instance,
the One Vision framework for cooperation between CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) was enhanced to avoid inadvertent disclosure ofCSIS information to RCMP. This, given that
information shared with the RCMP may appear in their case files, judicial authorisations and disclosure
packages to the Court as part of criminal prosecutions, ultimately becoming subject to disclosure
obligations.
I In criminal cases, the accused has a constitutional right to full and complete disclosure of the Crown's case. The Crown is
therefore obliged to disclose all relevant (or, not clearly irrelevant) information in its possession.
Page 2 of2
��o To provide an overview of key issues related to the increased demand for eSls
to produce and/or disclose intelligence in support of administrative, civil or
criminal proceedings.
�o CSIS collects information and intelligence
•
•
•
threshold for investigation: reasonable grounds to suspect
rely on sensitive sources and methods, foreign partner information
complex, inter-related investigations
o Mandate to advise government, and to provide security advice and assessments
•
CSIS intelligence informs or is relied upon by GoC in support of administration or
enforcement of laws, including criminal investigations
o Increased cooperation between departments has resulted in an increasing number of
proceedings involving CSIS information
o Sheer number of proceedings, coupled with expanded disclosure obligations jeopardizes
the integrity of CSIS operations and ultimately, the ability of CSIS to fulfill its mandate
�o The goal is to achieve successful outcomes in the administration and enforcement of
Canadian law in a manner that:
• respects the principles of fundamental justice
• protects sensitive sources and techniques, as well as relationships with foreign partners
o Currently rely on a number of mechanisms to manage intelligence in civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings
• Canada Evidence Act (s.38), CSIS Act (s.18.1), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(Division 9), Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act and Secure Air Travel Act
o Each regime is unique. Key distinctions include:
• Bifurcation (Protection of intelligence versus protection and reliance on intelligence)
• Balancing of injury against public interest versus no-balancing
�o Where no other mechanism exists, Section 38 of the CEA is relied upon
• if Federal Court judge determines injury outweighs public interest in disclosure,
intelligence is protected, but may not be relied upon by the trier of fact
o Bifurcation and balancing pose a number of challenges.
• bifurcated process is costly and significantly delays document production
• balancing of national security and public interest creates uncertainty
• if protected, weakens Government's ability to defend its case; undisclosed
information not seen the trial judge, weight given to summary not certain
• if ordered disclosed, must choose to either publicly disclose classified
intelligence or withdraw case/settle
�CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
o No Government control over the number of new civil suits
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
D Extensive disclosure obligations; few exceptions to the accused's right to know the case
against them (innocence at stake)
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
D Where no specific regime in place, judicial review of wide range of administrative
decisions must rely on CEA; not a robust system for the administration of laws
�o Division 9 of IRPA allows for the protection of and reliance on intelligence in determining
the admissibility of foreign nationals to Canada
• relies on open and closed proceedings
• all information disclosed in closed proceedings, including to special advocates (SAs)
• no balancing; if judge injurious to national security, information is protected
o Notwithstanding amendments, regime continues to face challenges
• disclosure obligations from past decisions result in complex, costly and lengthy
proceedings
• unprecedented amount of classified information disclosed to the Court, SAs, defence
o
• one certificate withdrawn (Charkaoui), ongoing appeals to Supreme Court
�~
CSIS carefully manages disclosure to partners and continues to adapt internal
protocols (One Vision,
)
o Series of legislative initiatives
• Bill C-44: Class privilege for human sources
• Secure Air Travel Act, Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act: specific provisions for judicial
review and appeal, to permit judges to rely on and protect classified information
o Actively engaged in policy work led by the Department of Justice to develop
proposals for reform (civil, criminal and administrative)
�o CSIS continues to work closely with partners to support the effective administration and
enforcement of laws, notwithstanding the significant risks associated with public
disclosure of CSIS intelligence and methods
o Would welcome opportunity to bring forward proposals for reform
��o To provide an overview of key issues related to the increased demand for CSIS
to produce and/or disclose intelligence in support of administrative, civil and
criminal proceedings.
�o CSIS collects information and intelligence
•
•
•
threshold for investigation: reasonable grounds to suspect
rely on sensitive sources and methods, foreign partner information
complex, inter-related investigations
o Mandate to advise government, and to provide security advice and assessments
•
CSIS intelligence informs or is relied upon by GoC in support of administration or
enforcement of laws, including criminal investigations
o Increased cooperation between departments has resulted in an increasing number of
proceedings involving CSIS information
o Sheer number of proceedings, coupled with expanded disclosure obligations jeopardizes
the integrity of CSIS operations and ultimately, the ability of CSIS to fulfill its mandate
�o The goal is to achieve successful outcomes in the administration and enforcement of
Canadian law in a manner that:
• respects the principles of fundamental justice
• protects sensitive sources and techniques, as well as relationships with foreign partners
o Currently rely on a number of mechanisms to manage intelligence in civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings
• Canada Evidence Act (s.38), CSIS Act (s.18.1), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(Division 9), Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act and Secure Air Travel Act
o Each regime is unique. Key distinctions include:
• Bifurcation (Protection of intelligence versus protection and reliance on intelligence)
• Balancing of injury against public interest versus no-balancing
�o Where no other mechanism exists, Section 38 of the CEA is relied upon
• if Federal Court judge determines injury outweighs public interest in disclosure,
intelligence is protected, but may not be relied upon by the trier of fact
o Bifurcation and balancing pose a number of challenges.
• bifurcated process is costly and significantly delays document production
• balancing of national security and public interest creates uncertainty
• if protected, weakens Government's ability to defend its case; undisclosed
information not seen the trial judge, weight given to summary not certain
• if ordered disclosed, must choose to either publicly disclose classified
intelligence or withdraw case/settle
�CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
o No Government control over the number of new civil suits
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
D Extensive disclosure obligations; few exceptions to the accused's right to know the case
against them (innocence at stake)
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
D Where no specific regime in place, judicial review of wide range of administrative
decisions must rely on CEA; not a robust system for the administration of laws
�o Division 9 of IRPA allows for the protection of and reliance on intelligence in determining
the admissibility of foreign nationals to Canada
• relies on open and closed proceedings
• all information disclosed in closed proceedings, including to special advocates (SAs)
• no balancing; if determined injurious to national security, information is protected
o Notwithstanding amendments, regime continues to face challenges
• disclosure obligations from past decisions result in complex, costly and lengthy
proceedings
• unprecedented amount of classified information disclosed to the Court, SAs, defence
o
• Lengthy litigation process, certificates nullified (Charkaoui) or deemed unreasonable
(Almrei) resulting in ongoing civil proceedings
,
1
t"
�o CSIS carefully manages disclosure to partners and continues to adapt internal
protocols (One Vision,
)
o Series of legislative initiatives
• Bill C-44: Class privilege for human sources
• Secure Air Travel Act, Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act: specific provisions for judicial
review and appeal, to permit judges to rely on and protect classified information
o Actively engaged in policy work led by the Department of Justice to develop
proposals for reform (civil, criminal and administrative)
�o CSIS continues to work closely with partners to support the effective administration and
enforcement of laws, notwithstanding the significant risks associated with public
disclosure of CSIS intelligence and methods
o Would welcome opportunity to bring forward proposals for reform
�Date:
Classification:
Agency:
June 2, 2016
Unclassified
CSIS
INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE
ISSUE: Why is intelligence appearing in judicial proceedings? What are issues associated with
the reliance on intelligence as evidence? Are there not existing authorities that protect the
release of sensitive information?
• As the Service's mandate is to investigate threats to the security of
Canada and provide related advice to the Government of Canada,
CSIS frequently shares threat-related information with other
government departments.
• CSIS information may therefore inform or be relied upon by the
Government in support of the administration or enforcement of laws.
• The result, however, is that CSIS intelligence is often drawn into
public proceedings - civil, criminal or administrative.
• The intent is to protect national security information while ensuring
decision-makers have access to relevant information.
• If released publicly, sensitive information like this could compromise
intelligence operations, the safety of CSIS sources, CSIS capabilities
and techniques and Canada's relationships with foreign partners.
• It is therefore essential for the Service to protect this information
against public disclosure using available legal tools, as appropriate.
IF PRESSED ON EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE
INFORMA TlON:
• A number of mechanisms are relied upon to manage sensitive
information in legal proceedings.
• Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for the protection of
sensitive information when national security is at risk.
• The CSIS Act was recently amended to include s.18.1, which provides
greater protection for human sources.
• Under Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, sensitive
information may be protected and relied upon to prevent those who pose
a threat to the safety and security of Canada from entering and/or
permanently residing in the country.
• Under the Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act, sensitive information may be
protected and considered during judicial review of our Minister's decision
to refuse or revoke a passport for national security purposes, or during
appeal of the decision to cancel a passport for those purposes.
• Sensitive information may also be protected and considered under the
Secure Air Travel Act, when individuals appeal the Minister's decision to
add persons to Canada's "no-fly list" or to direct air carriers to deny
transportation or perform additional screening of a person.
• When the Service's sensitive information is ordered to be disclosed, CSIS
�must weigh the operational cost of disclosing such information against
the benefit of a potential prosecution.
• A decision to withdraw information could put the case in jeopardy.
�Date:
Classification:
Agency:
" -Committee Note
INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE
March 8, 2016
Unclassified
CSIS
. ',. :
:i'''
t.l
~
-'"
,..,
ISSUE: Why is intelligence appearing in judicial proceedings? What are issues associated with
the reliance on intelligence as evidence? Are there not existing authorities that protect the
release of sensitive information?
• As the Service's mandate is to investigate threats to the security of
Canada and provide related advice to the Government of Canada,
CSIS frequently shares threat-related information with other
government departments.
• The intent is to protect national security information by ensuring
decision-makers have access to relevant information,
• The result, however, is that CSIS intelligence is drawn into public
proceedings - civil, criminal or administrative.
• If released publicly, this information could compromise: intelligence
operations, the safety of CSIS sources, CSIS capabilities and
techniques and Canada's relationships with foreign partners.
• It is therefore essential for the Service to protect this information
against public disclosure using available legal tools, as appropriate.
IF PRESSED ON EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE
INFORMATION:
• Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for the protection of
sensitive information when national security is at risk.
• The CSIS Act was also amended to include s.18.1, which provides greater
certainty in relation to the protection of the identity of human sources.
• When the Service's sensitive information cannot be protected, the
Service must make a decision as to whether or not that information
should be withdrawn from the case. In doing so, it must weigh the
operational cost of disclosing such information against the benefit of a
potential prosecution.
�Dale:
Classificalion:
Agency:
.. . .
:.
~,
.:
.
~
-"
March 7, 2016
Unclassified
CSIS
.
INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE
I
ISSUE: Why is intelligence appearing in judicial proceedings? What are issues associated with
the reliance on intelligence as evidence? Are there not existing authorities that protect the
release of sensitive information?
• As the Service's mandate is to investigate threats to the security of
Canada and provide related advice to the Government of Canada,
CSIS frequently shares threat-related information with other
government departments.
• The intent is to protect national security information by ensuring
decision-makers have access to relevant information,
• The result, however, is that CSIS intelligence is drawn into public
proceedings - civil, criminal or administrative.
• If released publicly, this information could compromise: intelligence
operations, the safety of CSIS sources, CSIS capabilities and
techniques and Canada's relationships with foreign partners.
• It is therefore essential for the Service to protect this information
against public disclosure using available legal tools, as appropriate.
IF PRESSED ON EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE
INFORMA TION:
• Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for the protection of
sensitive information when national security is at risk.
• The CSIS Act was also amended to include s.18.1, which provides greater
certainty in relation to the protection of the identity of human sources.
• When the Service's sensitive information cannot be protected, the
Service must make a decision as to whether or not that information
should be withdrawn from the case. In doing so, it must weigh the
operational cost of disclosing such information against the benefit of a
potential prosecution.
�~ate :
Clualfication:
Agency:
February 23, 2016
Uncl8ssified
CSIS
INTELLIGENCE TO EVIDENCE
ISSUE: Why is intelligence appearing in judicial proceedings? What are issues associated with
the reliance on intelligence as evidence? Are there not existing authorities that protect the
release of sensitive information?
IF PRESSED ON INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE
• As the Service's mandate is to investigate threats to the security of
Canada and provide related advice to the Government of Canada,
CSIS frequently shares threat-related information with other
government departments.
• The intent is to protect national security information by ensuring
decision-makers have access to relevant information,
• The result, however, is that CSIS intelligence is drawn into public
proceedings - civil, criminal or administrative.
• If released publicly, this Information could compromise: intelligence
operations, the safety of CSIS sources, CSIS capabilities and
techniques and Canada's relationships with foreign partners.
• It is therefore essential for the Service to protect this information
against public disclosure using available legal tools, as appropriate.
IF PRESSED ON EXISTING AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE
INFORMA TION:
• Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for the protection of
sensitive information when national security is at risk.
• The CSIS Act was also amended to include s.18.1, which provides greater
certainty in relation to the protection of the identity of human sources.
• When the Service's sensitive information cannot be protected, the
Service must make a decision as to whether or not that information
should be withdrawn from the case. In doing so, it must weigh the
operational cost of disclosing such information against the benefit of a
potential prosecution.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS Intelligence-to-Evidence memorandum and powerpoint deck
Subject
The topic of the resource
Operational policies
Description
An account of the resource
CSIS internal memo and powerpoint deck describing its view of the legal issues surrounding the process of using intelligence for evidential purposes in court proceedings.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP CSIS 117-2016-125
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
Unknown
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/31e54d46676ceac0fa2a87a05a323cde.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=k2RbSwgagWzuq1gl68YYKZtZ4rZNPoLeCgaSXDM39Ia6fpVrp17bejIUDByWYZzwcCY2YJkR369%7EbT0N3iP22Tz5Yegna-mCl9K8SHamJcFUKkQh%7E%7EYoMRGsyzMLKhRshzt4SP6TDKgzfxNBji2VwHhc34NCjbvGzk6mJo5MKRRYzqml-4Vw5z8cgpyYMQzhGC%7EHzbnh2CwortFYrZ8fgpQs-cLDa0dNfGc861cEwJdGG3qmnzPjTrtjpagS-eOD2d3GifsTpm6xYPHvVg615OhTpbCMQg4RZVjfSZOlhjb2SQ285El-SusphwzwrpgwjG2w9AuIYRxPu1L8kgKW2Q__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
31509d3d5dbacb8cb46261af55a39f6c
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/bfe2bda4aff595aede4339c937f2f47f.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=Z1eDyCk2fvUgkPomB%7ERMyajbovnQKq6sObiIvl2L6KIUhTkTs%7EJjoWuDhQaqUIVLSDww4Y9zFN2%7EQVtIsHLNYVf6JYViN3Bo707MRZMpt9yNSXpARtzCjxHt3IB2HPXRcZtGX7z2wug%7Ey-XdkQEYEN7rs011dspOmZBsWoXUPyu2PyzjcEMw70OCcVY7nopzvZCjW42oX6h4ODQTehZwJdVU-A7aEprWH3JYREv4Mm7PG12lvQFZeV%7E5gjHSf7mE5yD%7EEEXq2nytXjzZ29miocuPV-N8GRhfUh0x%7Ex6ddTA9ai7PF-LJQRpxK%7EBAnC9-ObzOjsT3hB8fnW9HbvjuAQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
73a669cb9cc66f4b28a77216d03d2ddc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS memos re new Ministerial direction on CSIS Section 17 Liaison Arrangements w/ Foreign Govts
Subject
The topic of the resource
Information-sharing
Description
An account of the resource
<strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Memo to get the Minister’s approval for the new Ministerial Directive which includes guidelines for managing CSIS’s foreign liaison arrangements (Dec. 2001). Prior to the MD guidelines, CSIS needed to consult with DFAIT/officially request Ministerial approval when seeking to enhance level of cooperation/exchanges w/ agencies with which CSIS has Section 17 Liaison Arrangements. After the new MD, the Director has authority to approve requests to enhance the level of cooperation between CSIS and foreign agencies (subject to any conditions imposed by the Minister).
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong>Contains MD; Annex D; Appendix 1 (Standards and Guidelines for Establishing a Foreign Arrangement); and Annex F (Joint Operations, Operational Assistance and Investigative Activity Outside Canada) which includes guidelines for joint operations within and outside of Canada. It highlights that CSIS investigative activity outside of Canada will: conform to the CSIS Act, hold potential benefit for Canada and its national interests, and be considered for its impact on Canadian foreign policy interests.</p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2001
CSIS
Foreign cooperation
information-sharing
Section 17 Arrangements
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/ea8694ed26da29a9d43d6161ac692f66.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=ZCZ6m8zv6ZerUjRwWQbXMFyvg82C-Ik8RxTLk8QZcnpT45QqjoaTHOh4umNLVHAIxAFE6-X9-QCirqkOd3mAkJikpnr0Wo5QsPa0jwZp8sl0C6IH1NSq4Swg4kRT1b1BhfIKq8j%7EQMwpbd%7EfQkZJbUBpbL15fhKPUXzpyl1IR-frJchiQeBaeR2ez4wm%7EALxCG-esTLES4Axw7Mm2BSb7AodZgWwvSq%7EOstMhPsQQT9-eE0krvUnRtXqU5lISoNcL9uhkK1nmftI6%7E2WJDQs-Nah4BxJ5S0FcDCwpSqSMwjfq9Gjxfrt6wHfR6qW-tx%7EyO2jF%7E2CA3sUeVS%7EW%7E9PfA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
ba008d6ad1b03b71cb864b8fb7092e12
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ministerial directions
Subject
The topic of the resource
Directions issues by ministers to security agencies.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing (2009)
Subject
The topic of the resource
Information-sharing
Description
An account of the resource
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Protocol for CSIS to share information with foreign agencies and governments.<br /><br />This document seems now to have been superseded by the 2011 ministerial direction on information-sharing.</p>
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Pursuant to section 17 of the CSIS Act and in accordance with existing Ministerial Directives, CSIS may be authorized to enter into formal information sharing agreements with foreign agencies, <span style="text-decoration:underline;">including those </span>that are generally recognized as having poor human rights records. CSIS is directed to <span style="text-decoration:underline;">not knowingly</span> rely on information derived from torture, and take <span style="text-decoration:underline;">reasonable measures </span>to reduce the risk that its actions could promote or condone torture.</p>
<p><em>CSIS’s review body, the SIRC, reported in its 2004-2005 annual report that at least one of the CSIS foreign arrangements that it audited “did not provide an adequate analysis of potential human rights issues.” It objected to CSIS’s claim that it “ensures” that information exchanged is not the cause or product of human rights abuses….the Service is rarely in a position to determine how information received from a foreign agency was obtained. As Mr. Elcock stated to the Arar Commission, when it comes to information that may have been the product of torture, “the reality is in most cases we would have no knowledge that it was derived from torture. You may suspect it was derived from torture, but tat is about as far as one will get in most circumstances” [Canada, SIRC, Annual Report 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005) in Forcese, NS Law, 487].</em></p>
<em>Justice O’Connor’s recommendation at the Arar Inquiry was that “Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications. Information received from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability” (Forcese, NS Law, 488).</em>
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
Unknown, but likely late 2000s.
CSIS
Foreign cooperation
information-processsing
information-sharing
Mistreatment
Torture
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/1c3bd0b8027deaee066d46ccf626fada.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=KuVV3ukzO6AMABiSRIY7P5GD3%7EYDNXKKmkPOqhTfofT-GdbTjy7OViqryJwrMSwLlYZV4DZQ9rTNBX6vPRhPAkvBciU0xhZDl2agClTTH%7E%7EMfVm0fqkpxsYdbb1buLY6AlGPMCv7FwzhK-S%7ET5YNNoH3dG59rKFfjpAYlNaZ0xGzSKZUYOOxy1V7YAVpekyTX5oSoB5gNZOTy6QEc6uB6ymrTq3V1Zh0qeSnYMhsI2QwFOliyqOQXbOUlfhqhMjwqx3s48a8-GezsjCAY-UdC%7EpnoIN46cCIU4R0Ezqrop2mgu3non1XdO-12-zdbvTt5ilFkQdel5NoSjZc-n78Ow__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
bd15d0c546fdfd279f885402cefed1eb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-100 Targeting, Section 12
Subject
The topic of the resource
Operational policies
Description
An account of the resource
To state the principles and directives governing the approval process for an initial request, renewal, upgrade, downgrade or a termination of a targeting level pursuant to the CSIS Act. Targets can be persons, groups or organizations, and issues or events
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2010
CSIS
Operational policies
Operations
Targetting
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/cf0e260e4a75611d438c35ee6943ea1e.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=HS6Zwio5dMvuShCNGyu2SIgdOONjkzRllu5-SKFHtyJZC3hlnp7WGwvee2-9r9EHpLpL4Lneo7PFHrYBnQD9ilHm1ZlCV1%7ESMK0PCv7PTbUWvbrnjiXkzFi4Tvrcq20wZ%7EEWwb3uJxYZ-sdTAFewp7GOHv7SWyKKVLzGA2GY7bQZ%7EUNQEz7rUl6KF9GQ43HxdNKEyQqQ8kiq5axRQt6PU36PVF1T37sVM5Sy%7E4WpB%7EMAISf96rQReLy4E-O5nMm7j71xWCOr5-vvwk43635k8vnKSChK%7EDhtAiocqlXcBp%7Eju0Cks3%7EaypAaTHJatzqYC9vgksraWyCZD3ce6ULZIQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
eba3c0397359f0920628c88b7274d3d6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-219, Warrant Acquisition (Section 16) (c. 2006)
Subject
The topic of the resource
Surveillance
Description
An account of the resource
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Policy deals with the assistance provided by the Service, pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the <em>CSIS Act</em>, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of National Defence <span style="text-decoration:underline;">in the collection of foreign intelligence</span> within Canada relating to Canada’s defence or international affairs.</p>
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
C. 2006.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
CSIS
foreign intelligence
surveillance
warrants
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/3e8ac1bf63bcc716adabba48907c387f.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=OiSNAzxUGygIGX45LWxxTdIaslkb%7ESzF7qDUyQdAwTj37hfL69bhhhScEVT7R6ONavFZeCkXq6O5JCZOirX3uusine2YNO71SEFN6OqEpdSTJxvrkZl20lwJZM8Auy%7ECIsqeiYob4ybmTEMP0xwRa7DiatAYYhsIcvxov-vemKkO8zfdxuLFW5XPG9BciZ1TKe7fwrrqNlC3yyTsm4%7EjhGgHhqWjEmr8VHkAUCmiNRLEKKdjlJv2eUwdZDRCiGf2L6G47qqSX4VSNAzH2WwhRWnQ8A9EW7cxb1cQ3GSbvxmdUhOAUD5TP1ZwUfUWOOJMcQ9JsHfb8TSn7cbxIACm%7EQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
f43edfd6e7617c4bab072972185f824f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-221, CSIS Processing of Information and Communication Collected Under Warrant – Section 16 (2006)
Subject
The topic of the resource
Surveillance
Description
An account of the resource
<p><strong>Document Purpose:</strong> Policy deals with the processing of information and communications collected by CSIS and processed by CSE.</p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2006
CSE
CSIS
foreign intelligence
information-processsing
information-sharing
surveillance
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/1bbb64bdaeba44f4dec03dafa913b53b.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=fDpWuq1HjEXuLPl2mhxV469JT35Mh4Ae8m%7EbSiewf7Ud45t-uecLVB9rJfiF6diz7S66ozjKGxEKFfe2rltJ3tviDj6xHXIzvlG0lW6FR0XfzAQWdT52uf7aDYnB2ZZoINcBfofxKLWZqD9DDOEuB%7E2WhAx4BA8YTxJXp0IJc2rt0e1V86oFIn80VBZ5uHIZHOZDEzUkkTQ5tVUxQpR3oKn-XgA8A8YYF1OBivYSBw5vjSHSG77GrfSauW0u3q3Lm6lcsH9nlnOcIh4ZxScu4oZ1Q-Hj5Yr%7EfRKm%7Es6P8vsS2M7b5llO747sQxeKYlPgnAkfL8p6BR27udtO3j5WCw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
d9a69252dd825696f9300e9d4d55d5f3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-402 Section 17 Arrangements with Foreign Governments and Institutions (2005)
Subject
The topic of the resource
Information sharing
Description
An account of the resource
<strong>Document Purpose</strong>: to provide direction for obtaining a foreign arrangement with a foreign government, institution, or international organization for the purpose of enabling CSIS to carry out mandated activities under the CSIS Act.
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Guidelines for foreign arrangements generally establish that:</p>
<p>- Arrangements must be compatible w/ Canada’s foreign policy</p>
<p>- Arrangements are in the interests of Canada’s security</p>
<p>- Arrangements with foreign countries or organizations will only be considered where there is a definite requirement to protect Canada’s security.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Includes OPS-402-1 Standards and Guidelines for Establishing a Foreign Arrangement <strong>(June 6, 2005)</strong> – states that where there is a requirement to enter into a foreign arrangement under Section 17 of the CSIS Act, a request must be submitted to the Director General Foreign Liaison and Visits (DG FLV). Guidelines include (unredacted): describing the rationale for proposed arrangement, assess internal political situation and respect for human rights (by looking at the human rights record of a country and any abuses by security or intelligence organizations).</p>
<p>Section 17 of the CSIS Act:</p>
<p><strong>Cooperation</strong></p>
<p><strong>17</strong> <strong>(1)</strong> For the purpose of performing its duties and functions under this Act, the Service may,</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(a)</strong> with the approval of the Minister, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(i)</strong> any department of the Government of Canada or the government of a province or any department thereof, or</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(ii)</strong> any police force in a province, with the approval of the Minister responsible for policing in the province; or</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(b)</strong> with the approval of the Minister after consultation by the Minister with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof or an international organization of states or an institution thereof.</p>
<p><strong>Copies of arrangements to Review Committee</strong><strong>
</strong></p>
<p><strong>(2)</strong> Where a written arrangement is entered into pursuant to subsection (1) or subsection 13(2) or (3), a copy thereof shall be given forthwith to the Review Committee.</p>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2005
CSIS
Foreign cooperation
information-sharing
Liaison arrangements
Section 17 Arrangements
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/cf75fb37ce3f064ca32b43404dfd230f.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=EV1j14Br6lHxtd8GBegKiNJ7Bvss1IzoPPDkTHp-62MKDOHrWy9y2fnLcZMmDwkljF5qJUAvUFmA7vcur2Sphl-pZD22x3IW06SYCtFdcLmSOKS%7Erlw8P476DL2K3PyJM5wUAuQP4QvbHVtBU-yqe8I3Y8%7E3J2Kj-1tAQmog%7EquZZLYbbNKTWgk1zStq9uB4bn5Tsp9%7EQju%7EWf2m2LRS0Mpk-nnFp2by0q66A5ZnyufEml69vtKDsyragi931mMURBRKw3jKeOr6oImW7TLHKArbta9xJMJFX48z9V9m0PwMQyQnHP4VkEZb%7EaH0uVfSE%7EhvCrdD1jCSmpdMk-4FKw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
bd7295763ce466526e3be4446efec61b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-501 Operational Reporting
Description
An account of the resource
To provide direction for reporting through various phases of the intelligence cycle.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2010
Subject
The topic of the resource
Operational policies
CSIS
Intelligence cycle
Operational policies
Operations
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/783e2d49b0556462bc004567391d916c.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=ucqxRn-oN6qsGwgXl7Tpdk9jEKe5J%7EkJz49TgqDdGTtyDjxjefeAx%7EnTz2oWTAJqzPC5OvyFSOnHop2SBreCLA7v5Gs%7E5NHz%7E23T62VdaaJE62Irz8yQP68vXdaPAIKNhi38u8B5AyIGyhRgV4ZtETrKvNZigqmikKpw%7Ev5rsvYQHTDBi9yL5MPjDmbVtmK5nudgpaJS27C2TvB2z48o6Xx7pDb6aEb4Q8PJN0Sw4zkKqJSrwnQo5n32Uu6eFVE7IPmYLzqK1ika5Lgd-49ReDZhvejY5KDzgOS9aHIDr7gJhbycCT7iZ5K69vtnIzYgs3aw1EibG02%7E8TsSrQ2R8g__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
968303994f0167180d9b64ecb793cd2e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational polices and procedures
Subject
The topic of the resource
Documents related to agency operational policies and procedures.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
CSIS OPS-504 Special Events
Subject
The topic of the resource
Operational policies
Description
An account of the resource
Ensure that CSIS meets its mandate re ‘special events’.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2006
CSIS
major events
Operational policies