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RE PO R T
o f t he
R O Y AL COMM I SS ION
O N S E C URI T Y
(Abridged)
�REPORT
of th e
ROYAL COMMISSION
ON SECURIT Y
(Abridged )
PROPERTY OF PROPRIET8 DU
PRIVY CO(JNCIL OFFIC
E
BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVt
L IBRARY
BIBLIOTH 8 QU E
June 1969
�© Minister of Supply and Services Canada 197 7
Available by mail fro m
Printing and Publishing
Supply and Services Canada
Ottawa, Canada K 1 A OS9
or through your bookseller .
Price : Canada : $2 .75
Catalogue No . 21-1966-5
ISBN Other countries : S3 .30
Price subject to change without notice .
Ottawa, 1969
Reprinted 1977 .
�Ottawa, September 23rd, 1968 .
TO HIS EXCELLENC Y
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCI L
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENC Y
We, the Commissioners appointed as a Royal, Commission in accordance
with the terms of Order in'-Council P .C . ..1966-2148 of 16th November 1966
to inquire* into and report upon the operation of Canadian secu rity methods
and procedures,
BEG TO -SUBMIT TO . OUR EXCELLENCY
THE _ACCOMPANYING REPOR T
CHAIRMAN
r~+
MEMBER
MEMBE R
Iii
�NOTE
The Report of the Royal Commission on Security as originally
submitted to the Governor in Council in October 1968 included
some material which in this published version has been omitted
or amended in the interest of national security . These changes
are of small significance in the context of the Report as a whole,
and the Royal Commissioners agree' that they do not affect the
substance of the Report or its recommendations .
iv
�CONTENTS
PAGE
Letter of Tran smittal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . iii
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
I INTRODUCTIO N
Terms of Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nature of Inquiry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II SECURITY REQUIREMENTS' AND RESPONSE S
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Communism and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Quebec Separatism and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Canada and Her Allies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Security Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III ORGANIZATION FOR SECURIT Y
Present Canadian Structure
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Policy-Making and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Departments of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
Shortcomings and Alternatives .
Policy-Making and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations and Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Departmental Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
13
14
16
16
18
24
IV SECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUA L
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . :•. . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acquisition of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reporting of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Review Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
29
33
34
38
V IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY
Present Procedure s
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Classes of Immigrants . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . .
Security Screening of Immigrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deportation and Appeal Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comments and Alternatives
Data and Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rejection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Applicants in Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deportation and Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aliens Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V
45
45
47
49
49
51
53
53
54
�CHAPTER
PAG E
VI CITIZENSHIP, PASSPORTS AND VISIT S
Present Citizenship Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Citizenship and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Existing Passport Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . .
Passports and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Certificates of Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exchanges of Visits with Communist Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55
56
58
59
61
61
VII SECURITY OF INFORMATION AND PHYSICAL SECURIT Y
Security of Information
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Documentary Security and Classification Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Declassification Programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Handling of Classified Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Official Secrets Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administrative Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physical Security
65
68
73
74
74
79
Buildings and Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Technical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
VIII EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENC E
External Affairs and the Foreign Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . 83
National Defence and the Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Release of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9
IX INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Present Organization . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Shortcomings and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Personnel Security in Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Training of Company Security Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . 97
Documents, Visits and Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8
X SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
XI RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
APPENDICES
"A" COMMISSION AND ORDER IN COUNCIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7
"B" SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Published Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Official Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
"C" ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS OF CANADIAN OFFICIAL
SECRETS ACT (R .S .C . 1952, c. 198) ; EXTRACTS FROM
ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS OF CANADIAN FORCES
REORGANIZATION ACT (S .C . 1966-67, c . 96) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2
vi
�I. INTRODUCTIO N
Terms of Referenc e
1 . The Royal Commission's terms of reference . required us "to make
a full and confidential inquiry into the operation of Canadian security methods
and procedures and, having regard to the necessity of maintaining (a) the
security of Canada as a nation ; and (b) the rights and responsibilities of
individual persons, to advise what security methods and procedures are most
effective and how they can best be implemented" . Copies of the Commission
and the Order in Council (P .C . 1966-2148 of 16th November 1966) are
attached as Appendix "A" to this Report .
2 . Interpreted broadly, these terms of reference would have required us
to examine the whole range of problems and procedures concerned with
the security of the state, from defence against armed attack to protection
against crime . However, on the basis of our understanding of the circumstances in which the Commission was established we have interpreted the
phrase "security methods and procedures" more narrowly, and have limited
our inquiry to those procedures concerned with the protection of information
the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause injury to the interests of
Canada or her allies, and the protection of Canada against the activities
of subversive organizations and individuals .
3 . On the . other' hand, a too narrow interpretation of our terms of
reference would have caused us to confine our attention only to methods
and procedures and to remain unconcerned with more general questions of
concept, policy and organization . Defence against threats to security is a duty
and responsibility of a state- comparable in meaning and relevance with
defence against armed attack and insurrection . Security procedures however
may touch closely upon the fundamental freedoms of individuals ; in a
democratic society they must be shown to be necessary and must operate
within the-framework of a scrupulously formulated and consistently enforced
policy . With these considerations in mind we have also examined the general
nature of the threats we face, and the basic concepts and policies which
should guide our security posture, as well as the type of organization most
appropriate for the implementation and monitoring of these policies .
1
�4 . The more precise definition of our areas of concern is a matter of
considerable linguistic and legalistic complexity . However, security procedures
are not necessarily related to the detection and prosecution of illegalities,
where precise legal definitions would be of central importance, but are mainly
concerned with the collection of information and intelligence, with the prevention and detection of leakages of information and with protection against
attempts at subversion . For this reason we have been able to avoid too deep
an involvement in definitional discussion ; the following paragraphs are
merely intended to delimit our areas of interest by means of example and
exclusion .
5 . The state has a clear right and a duty to protect certain informationsome defence information, for example-which must remain secret if danger
to the state is to be avoided . What is perhaps not so evident is that the
state must also in certain circumstances be concerned, in the context of security, with information in the public domain . This is a contentious area . Consider
on the one hand the case of a Canadian resident who passes to an official of
a foreign embassy, not knowing that this official is a member of the intelligence service of the country concerned, a photograph of a Canadian city .
This photograph is unclassified information which could conceivably be used
for purposes prejudicial to the safety of Canada, but it would be difficult
to suggest seriously that a single such act of transmittal should be a matter
of concern to the security authorities . On the other hand, the collection,
collation and communication to a similar official because of ideological
sympathy or for monetary reward of unclassified information about (say)
governmental procedures and personalities, or of information about births
or burials that could be used to establish false identities, are clearly activities
with security implications, whether or not they are judged to be illegal . We
have taken the view that our terms of reference required us to give consideration to the whole range of such activities where the interests of the state are
involved . We have however excluded from consideration the safeguarding
of information which is not of direct concern to the government, and thus,
for example, the general problems posed by industrial espionage in the
private sector .
6 . The area of subversion involves some even more subtle issues, and
the range of activities that may in some circumstances constitute subversion
seems to us to be very wide indeed : overt pressures, clandestine influence,
the calculated creation of fear, doubt and despondency, physical sabotage or
even assassination-all such activities can be considered subversive in certain
circumstances . Subversive activities need not be instigated by foreign governments or ideological organizations ; they need not necessarily be conspiratorial or violent ; they are not always illegal . Again fine lines must be drawn .
Overt lobbying or propaganda campaigns aimed at effecting constitutional
or other changes are part of the democratic process ; they can however be
subversive if their avowed objectives and apparent methods are cloaks for
undemocratic intentions and activities . Political or economic pressures fro m
2
�domestic or foreign sources may be subversive, particularly when they have
secret or concealed facets, or when they include . attempts to influence
government policies by the recruitment or alienation of those within the
government service or by the infiltration of supporters into the service .
7 . We have been unable to trace in any legal or other references or
to devise ourselves any satisfactory simple definition of "subversion" . Perhaps
the most that can usefully be said is that subversive organizations or individuals usually constitute a threat to the fundamental nature of the state or the
stability of society in its broadest sense, and make use of means which the
majority would regard as undemocratic . At this stage we can do no more
than state that we have in our inquiry borne in mind the whole range of such
activities and the application of security procedures to them . We have
however excluded from consideration the threat to stability posed by so-called
"organized" crime, although there are clear analogies between the methods
used for defence against large-scale and international criminal orgnizations
and those used for protection against espionage and subversion .
Nature of Inquiry
8 . Our terms of reference required that our proceedings should be held
in camera, and that we should take "all steps necessary to preserve (a) the
secrecy of sources of security information within Canada ; (b) the privacy
of individuals involved in specific cases which may be examined ; and (c)
the security of information provided to Canada in confidence by other
nations" . We were also required to "follow established security procedures
with regard to . . . the handling of classified information at all stages of the
inquiry" . We decided that formal or quasi-judicial hearings would be inappropriate for the sensitive topics and subjective views we, should find . it
necessary to consider . Accordingly we based our inquiry .upon a series of
informal meetings, without benefit of counsel, with Canadian Ministers . and
ex-Ministers of -the Crown, and officials and ex-officials of the Canadian
Government . In response to advertisements in the national press we received
a number of briefs and submissions from interested organizations and private
individuals, and we held similar informal meetings with representatives of
some of these organizations and with some individuals . In all the Commission
held 175 meetings, and heard some 250 persons . No verbatim records of our
meetings were retained, but memoranda of significant points were prepared .
In addition, of course, the Commission received briefs, submissions and
documentary material from government departments and agencies, and had .
access to relevant governmental files ; some such material was received on
condition that it be returned to the originators . A selected bibliography of
the published material we found relevant is attached as Appendix "B" .
9 . Where the files we saw concerned personnel security, we took the
view that we were investigating an organizational structure and a procedural
system rather than inquiring into the disposition . of given cases, and we
3
�referred to individual cases only as examples of methods and procedures .
We have retained no records of the names of persons who were the subjects
of these cases, or of identifiable details of the cases . Similarly, we have in
our Report avoided providing detailed and specific examples of tactics,
methods, successes or failures in the areas of espionage and subversion .
10 . Members of our staff prepared reports upon the security policies, operations and activities of a number of Canadian government departments, and
upon certain aspects of Canadian and British law relating to security . We
also commissioned the preparation of two legal studies under contract, one
concerned with the United States Federal Loyalty-Security Program, and the
other with the legal status of security procedures in France .
11 . We wish to thank all those who have contributed to this inquiry, and
thus to this Report . Security is a contentious and ambiguous subject, and in
some areas a distasteful one . Our task has been made easier by the ready
cooperation of government officials and others . In particular we are grateful
to the officials of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Privy
Council Office and the Department of External Affairs . To our own staff,
we extend special thanks . Their unfailing courtesy and cheerfulness made our
task more pleasant . In particular we would pay tribute to our Secretary, Mr .
Kevin O'Neill, and our Research Director, Mr . Jack Trotman . Their wise
and practical handling of the many sensitive matters that arose during our
inquiry and their devoted interest made a tremendous contribution to our
work . Major Andre Lemieux's -administrative and security arrangements were
efficient and most helpful .
12 . Finally, we have become convinced that effective security arrangements
must have a firm basis in public awareness and understanding, that the level
of parliamentary and public debate on these subjects would be considerably
improved if more information were made available, and that a good deal of
information could in fact be made available without detriment to the public
interest . For these reasons, we feel that the government should make public
as many of the arguments and recommendations contained in this Report as
may in its opinion be revealed without damaging the public interest .
4
�II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSE S
General Considerations
13 . The requirement for security procedures is based primarily upon the
state's responsibility to protect its secrets from espionage, its information
from unauthorized disclosure, its institutions from subversion and its policies
from clandestine influence . There has been no period in history when attempts
at activities of these kinds have not been undertaken ; such attempts-successful or unsuccessful-are taking place now, and will undoubtedly continue to
take place in one form or another as long as international relationships are
based upon the existence of nation states . In order to carry out its responsibilities the state must make arrangements to determine the nature and extent of activities of this kind which exist at any given time, and to take such
preventive or defensive measures as may be possible and appropriate .
14 . From detailed estimates that have been made available to us by the
RCMP and other concerned departments of government, it seems clear that
the main current security threats to Canada are posed by international communism and the communist powers, and by some elements of the Quebec
separatist movement . The most important communist activities in Canada are
largely directed from abroad, although domestic adherents of and sympathizers with communism pose considerable problems in themselves ; the separatist
movement is primarily of domestic origin, although there has been some
indication of foreign involvement . Threats (particularly of espionage) from
non-communist countries may exist from time to 'time,'but seem at present
to be of minor importance .. Fascist organizations do not now pose a significant threat, as their power base is non-existent and their activities limited .
Communism and Securit y
15 . Although it is true that we face a more complicated and fragmented
communist world than we did .at the time . of Gouzenko's defection nearly
twenty-five years ago, none of the evidence we have heard . suggests to us that
recent developments have led to any significant changes in the adversary
relationship that continues to exist between the communist powers and the
west in terms of intelligence and subversive operations and security defences .
Canada remains the target of subversive or potentially subversive activities ,
5
�attempts at infiltration and penetration, and espionage operations conducted
by communist countries ; and, in addition, Canada can be used as a base for
operations against other countries, and especially against the United States .
We realize of course that the present fragmentation of the communist world
is such that there is no certainty that the intelligence policies of all these
countries constitute a monolithic whole . We are not concerned however with
detailed political analysis, and in the context of the problems we are considering we think the methods and objectives of these countries are sufficiently
similar to justify our using the admittedly simplistic terms "communism" and
"communist" .
16 . The communist powers conduct espionage and subversive operations
through officials of communist missions, through so-called "illegal residents"
(persons unassociated with official representation and living here illegally,
probably under false identities), through members of the communist parties
in Canada, both overt and underground, through communist sympathizers
of various kinds, and through those who can be compromised, blackmailed
or subverted . The communist intelligence services are supported by large
resources, and their techniques are modern, sophisticated and effective .
17 . Apart from their use of communist adherents and sympathizers in
Canada, it is particularly important to an understanding of security procedures
to realize that there is abundant evidence that the communist powers, in their
search for agents, are prepared to make use of compromise, character weakness and duress . By these means they exploit contacts amongst members of
the Canadian public service at home and abroad, industrial workers and
executives, members of emigre and ethnic groups, university faculty members
and students and those who travel between Canada and communist countries .
The communists have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to recruit support
by playing on all types of human weakness or difficulty .
18 . The forms of communist subversive activity in Canada are varied,
ranging from efforts to develop front organizations to attempts to subvert,
individuals in government, the mass media, the universities, the trade unions,
emigre and ethnic groups and political parties . Such activities are assisted by
the fact that the communists are able to exploit and exaggerate existing
elements of social unrest and dissent concerned with a variety of appealing
causes . Some facets of these operations are worthy .of special mention . First,
activities in universities and trade unions appear at present to be of special
significance . Half the population is under twenty-five and activities in the
universities will have a considerable effect on the national climate of opinion
in future years . As far as the trade union movement is concerned, there is
a long history of attempts by the Communist Party to assume control at local
levels and to take all possible measures to influence national policies ; these
attempts are usually, but not always, frustrated . Secondly, efforts to influence
immigrants from some Western European countries with large communis t
6
�parties have recently increased . Thirdly, certain communist countries which
have emigre groups in Canada have embarked on an extensive programme
to establish liaison with, these communities, a programme in which the intelligence services of the countries concerned appear to be playing an important
role . Fourthly, there has been some resurgence of activity by certain communist front groups ; communist influence also remains significant in a number
of non-communist peace groups, and in "friendship" societies linking Canadians with the communist countries . Fifthly, although the Trotskyist movement in Canada is very small in size ; its militancy and skill give it greater
potential influence than its strength would indicate .
19 . As far as espionage is concerned, we have received enough information
and examined enough case histories to make it clear that in addition to those
activities which have been uncovered, other active operations almost certainly
remain undetected, many of them probably conducted by "illegal residents" .
Military information appears to remain of considerable importance as a target for espionage operations, but there is'some'evidence that the-communist
intelligence services may be placing a somewhat higher priority upon the
acquisition of scientific, technical, economic arid political information, including unclassified information of seeming technical or strategic value . The
importance of Canada as a target for espionage operations should not be
underrated . We hold United States and British classified information, we
participate- in North American air defence arrangements and in the North
Atlantic Treaty- Organization, and our attitudes, policies, capabilities and
intentions are in *themselves of some significance .
20 . There is no evidence to indicate that the general nature and extent of
communist activities in the intelligence field have been significantly affected
by changes in international relationships, by the atmosphere of the detente
or by the communist doctrine of peaceful coexistence . However valuable this
atmosphere may be from many points of view, it is undoubtedly true that
from the specific and limited viewpoint of security the detente has its
dangers . It would appear that periods of detente with communist powers tend
to be accompanied by increased attempts at subversion and penetration . In
present circumstances ; the detente has led to a considerable and rapid expansion in relations between the communist countries and the west, and in our
open societies the communists take advantage of such contacts to improve
their capabilities for espionage espionage and to increase their influence both overtl y
and covertly . At the same time as these opportunities are increasing there
has grown a readiness to believe that the threat to security posed by communism, if it has not actually disappeared, is at least diminished . This has
resulted in a situation in which defensive measures are constrained and
inhibited, and accorded lowered priorities in terms of national attitudes, effort
and resources . It seems to us important to appreciate that in present circumstances security procedures will remain necessary -whatever the changing
state of overt relationships between the communist powers and the west ;
7
�these precautions are in the nature of insurance, and one does not cease to
pay premiums because of good health which may be temporary .
Quebec Separatism and Security
21 . In addition to the requirement for security procedures imposed by the
communist threat, Canada is at present faced with a second and perhaps even
more difficult internal security problem arising from the activities of some
elements of the Quebec separatist movement . Separatism in Quebec, if it
commits no illegalities and appears to seek its ends by legal and democratic
means, must be regarded as a political movement, to be dealt with in a
political rather than a security context . However, if there is any evidence
of an intention to engage in subversive or seditious activities, or if there is
any suggestion of foreign influence, it seems to us inescapable that the federal government has a clear duty to take such security measures as are necessary to protect the integrity of the federation . At the very least it must take
adequate steps to inform itself of any such threats, and to collect full information about the intentions and capabilities of individuals or movements whose
object is to destroy the federation by subversive or seditious methods.
22 . Although the more moderate elements of the Quebec separatist movement have up till now been conducting a largely political campaign, it appears
to us that there is in certain quarters a tendency to resort to activities that
could well be regarded as seditious . What is more, there is no doubt about
communist and Trotskyist interest and involvement in the movement . Both
groups have established "autonomous" Quebec organizations as somewhat
transparent attempts to exploit separatist sentiment ; members of both have
achieved positions of influence in at least some of the separatist groups and
agencies, helped by the often bitter factionalism within the movement itself .
For these reasons alone it seems to us essential that the Canadian security
authorities should pay . close attention to the development of these particular
elements of the separatist movement .
23 . Foreign involvement is more difficult to establish with any certainty .
However, it is clear that certain communist countries have shown a marked
interest in the formation of the Communist Party of Quebec .
Canada and Her Allies
24 . In addition to the normal responsibilities for defence against threats
to internal security which she has in common with all nation states, and
more specifically in present circumstances with all members of the western
alliance, Canada's special relationships with the United States and Britain
impose additional requirements and make Canadian security procedures of
particular importance .
25 . The United States is the leader of the western alliance in terms of military, economic and political power . As a member of this alliance . with special
8
�relationships in many fields and an open frontier with the United States,
Canada has a serious responsibility to ensure that its territory is not used as
a base for the mounting and direction of foreign espionage and subversive
operations against the United States, and that Canada is not a safe haven for
foreign agents, or a route for infiltration into the United States . Quite apart
from membership in the alliance, it is in the Canadian national interest to
assist with the defence of North America against threats to internal security .
26 . There is another area in which Canadian security policies are responsive to the requirements of allies, and to the individual or collective security
regulations of allied countries . Canada receives classified information from
abroad, and especially from the United States and Britain . This classified
information is made available on the understanding that it will receive security
protection similar to that which it would receive in its country of origin ; and
the Canadian government is committed by a number of -agreements to providing such protection, which normally involves specified minimum standards
both of physical protection and of screening for the individuals who will have
access to the material . Undoubtedly, some of this classified information is
supplied because it is in (for example) United States and British interests to
ensure that Canada is informed on certain issues, but in general the continued
flow 'is at least partly dependent upon the apparent adequacy of Canadian
security measures .
27 . The point has been made that it might be of advantage to reduce
the extent of Canadian security precautions by ensuring that the amount of
classified material from allied sources reaching Canada is reduced to a
minimum, and we have given some consideration to the apparent importance
to Canada of this classified information . It is difficult to establish the position
with any precision, but the representations we have received from interested
departments convince us that -the flow is of considerable importance, first,
to Canadian perception of the international scene and of the detailed significance of many issues, and secondly to Canadian policy and decision-making
in a number of specific areas . These areas are mainly concerned with intelligence and security, research and development, foreign and defence and
(perhaps to a slightly lesser extent) economic policy ; in addition the continuance of defence production sharing arrangements between Canada and
the United States is partly dependent on the adequacy of Canadian security
procedures . Further, with regard to the-possibility of reducing the flow, it
has been pointed out that in many areas it is very difficult to be selective :
either Canada receives a mass of material or it receives none . The receipt
of even a minimal flow would require security procedures and precautions
and, in any case, many of these precautions would be necessary for Canadian
national purposes . In general, our position . on this issue is that we do not
think that a decision to reduce the flow of allied classified information should
be taken merely on -the grounds that its receipt demands the maintenance
of more extensive security precautions .
9
�Security Responses
28 . In order to meet the requirements we have outlined, a number of
security methods and procedures have been devised or suggested . The
following paragraphs represent an attempt to create a framework within
which to view the details of these methods and procedures . Before outlining
such a framework, however, we would first reiterate our view that the duty
of the state to protect its secrets from espionage, its information from
unauthorized disclosure, its institutions from subversion and its policies from
clandestine influence is indisputable ; what are matters for dispute are the
organizations and procedures established by the state to meet this responsibility in an area which can touch closely upon the fundamental freedoms
of the individual . Secondly, we would repeat our opinion that security
procedures must not be viewed primarily in the context of the detection
and prosecution of illegalities . They are mainly concerned with the collection
of information, with the prevention of leakage and loss and with ensuring
that compromise is discovered .
29 . In all countries security procedures consist of a range of measures .
First, there are those basic measures which provide for the acquisition of
information by means of active intelligence operations, investigation or
liaison with allies . This information provides the basis for the general assessment of the varying threats, and for the formulation of appropriate policies .
In addition, these measures provide the data against which risks are assessed
and judgments made in individual cases . No security arrangements can be
better than the data on which they are based, and the more complete the
information that is available the more sensible and equitable are policies and
decisions likely to be .
30 . Next, an array of measures is concerned with the control and regulation
of certain actions of individuals . These measures all involve the investigation
and "screening" of personnel with a view to preventing where possible those
who in the judgment of the government may constitute a risk to the security
of the state from entering the state, becoming citizens of the state, entering
public employment or having access to classified information . Procedures
concerned with security screening of personnel may themselves include a
range of activities : the establishment of criteria ; examination of available
records including criminal records ; interviews with the concerned individual ; inquiries concerning an individual ; arrangements for the evaluation
of reports ; arrangements to ensure the consistency of decision-making ;
procedures for review of these decisions ; and procedures for taking action
where individuals are judged to be risks in terms of their probable behaviour .
In more detail, these measures include the following activities :
(a) Control of entry to the national territory, by means of visa control
and arrangements for the security screening of intending immigrants
or visitors or both. Such measures are employed in one form or
another by almost all nations .
10
�(b) Control of the granting of citizenship to other ,than native=born
persons, by means of similar security screening-of applicants . Again
it is normal for nations to employ some such procedures .
(c) Control of passport issuance . Almost all nations take steps to ensure
that passports are -do cumerits of integrity" in the sense that they are
issued 'only to those - who are citizens . 'Some nations issue passports
to all citizens as a right, although exceptions are naturally made in
the cases of such persons as fugitives from justice, those who have
contravened certain laws and those who owe debts to the government .
Other nations . subject applicants for passports to security screening
on the basis of the opinion that possession .of a passport is a privilege
which the state-is entitled to grant or deny. . .
(d) Control of access to public employment . Here again, some nations
insist on a form of security screening for all public employees ; the
results of such a screening are sometimes used in the personnel
selection context to judge suitability as well as to ensure the absence of
any significant security risk .
(e) Control of access to classified information and material . Almost all
nations conduct security screening in one form or another before permitting individuals to have access to classified information.
31 . In addition, a series of measures relates to the classification, safekeeping, handling and transmission of material which requires security
protection, to the provision of appropriate technical and other facilities,
and to procedures to ensure compliance with security regulations . Finally,
_a legal and law enforcement structure is concerned with the adequacy and
enforcement of such laws as relate to various aspects of security defence .
32 . Different elements of this range of measures may receive differing
emphases or priorities in different countries and in different circumstances,
and there is naturally a continuing debate concerning the relative importance
of measures in different parts of the spectrum . Some, for example, consider
immigration security controls of vital importance ; others feel that the number
of persons eventually excluded as a result of these controls is so small as to
call into question their usefulness . Some believe that citizenship should be
an accolade only awarded to those (other than the native born) who can
satisfy rigid security criteria ; others feel that a resident is very little more
of a security threat if he becomes a citizen or less of a threat if he does not .
Some take the view that the basic measures of physical security are of prime
importance ; others argue that it is of first importance to be assured of the
loyalty and reliabiliy of those with access to classified information .
33 . Clearly a proper balance is necessary between these interrelated
measures . If immigration controls are reduced in effectiveness, possibly
access to the public service should be more strictly controlled by ensuring
(for example) that only citizens are so employed . If immigration control s
11
�are strengthened, possibly control of citizenship can be relaxed . The main
strategic decisions in the area of security are concerned with the allocation
of available defensive resources to the elements of the spectrum, and decisions
of this kind must be taken by the government on the basis of estimates of
the threat and judgments of the relative effectiveness and acceptability
of different measures in changing circumstances ; ultimately, we suppose, the
totality of these judgments must in some sense reflect the government's view
of national character, attitudes and aspirations .
34 . The remaining chapters of our Report are concerned with the individual procedures which together make up this spectrum of security defence,
with the organizational problems that arise from them, with their impact on
individuals, with their effectiveness in specific areas and with means by which
they may be improved and rationalized .
12
�III . ORGANIZATION FOR SECURIT Y
Present Canadian Structure
General . Considerations
35 . Our inquiries suggest that the problem of devising an entirely satisfactory and rational security structure is one of extreme difficulty . In the
first place, the government is functionally organized by departments, and
there are obvious problems in superimposing and enforcing consistent standards in a given "service" area across the entire - structure ; the long history
of issues concerned with financial control is sufficient to indicate the magnitude of this problem, which is of especial significance when organizational
structures are decentralized . Also, security is an area which lies on the
boundaries between general administration and professional specialty ; it is
easy-perhaps too easy-to regard security merely as an aspect of departmental administration and on this basis to disregard or evade its importance
and complexities . Further, security structures, like police structures, must be
closely related to the nature and quality of the national societies in which
they operate if they are to . achieve a reasonable measure of public acceptance .
This relationship and this acceptance are perhaps somewhat easier to achieve
in countries with long histories of threats to internal security and traditional
requirements for defensive measures, or in great powers where the risks are
clear and the stakes high .
36 . The present Canadian security structure is diffuse, and consists of a
number of disparate elements, including the Cabinet Committee on Security
and Intelligence, the Security Panel, the Privy Council Office, the Solicitor
General and his Department, the Minister of Justice and the Department of
Justice, and the RCMP . In addition, all departments and agencies of the government have responsibilities for security which vary widely in scope and
importance.
Policy-Making and Coordination
37 . The Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, the Security
Panel, and two members of the staff of the Privy Council Office are all concerned with the formulation of policy, the issuance of directives and regulations and the coordination of Canadian security policy and procedures . The
Cabinet Committee was established in April 1963, and in its security role
deals with important . policy issues referred to it by the Security Panel . On th e
13
�official level, the Security Panel is the senior body, consisting of selected
deputy ministers . It was originally formed in 1946, and was reconstituted in
1963 . Its terms of reference are "to advise on the coordination of the planning, organization and execution of security measures which affect government departments, and to advise on such other security questions as might
be referred to it" . Two officials of the Privy Council Office (an Assistant
Secretary to the Cabinet and a member of the Cabinet Secretariat) together
devote part of their time to providing the central point of reference and
coordination for this committee structure . Theoretically, the first point of
contact for departments and agencies seeking advice on security matters is
this secretariat . Generally problems are dealt with by the officials of the
secretariat themselves, but if necessary the issues can appear on the agenda
of the Security Panel and the Cabinet Committee .
The Royal Canadian Mounted Polic e
38 . The RCMP is the main federal operational and investigative body in
the field of security . The Force assumed this role during World War I because,
as the existing federal police force, it was at that time the natural federal
instrument in this area . There is however no explicit statutory authority for
the security role . Such authority as does exist is derived from certain Sections
of the RCMP Act (S .C . 1959, c . 54) . Section 17(3) of the Act provides
inter alia that "every officer, and every person appointed by the Commissioner
under this Act to be a peace officer, is a peace officer in every part of
Canada and has all the powers, authority, protection and privileges that a
peace officer has by law" . Section 18 of the Act makes it "the duty of members of the force who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner ,
(a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the
preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and of offences against
the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they
may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and
others who may be lawfully taken into custody . . . . . .an d
(b) to perform such other duties and functions as are prescribed by the
Governor in Council or the Commissioner . "
39 . Section 21 of the Act provides that :
"(1) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government
of the force and generally for carrying the purposes and provisions of
this Act into effect .
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made under
subsection (1), the Commissioner may make rules, to be known as
standing orders, . for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, administration and good government of the force . "
40 . Section 44(e) of the RCMP Regulations and Orders (1960), which
have been proclaimed by the Governor in Council under the Act, provide s
14
�that "in addition to the duties prescribed by the Act, it is the duty of the
force . . . (e) to maintain and operate such security and intelligence services
as may be required by the Minister" . The Commissioner's Standing Orders
include orders relating to security and intelligence activities . Section 1331 of
these Orders outlines the organization of the Directorate of Security and
Intelligence of the RCMP and Section 1366 states the responsibilities of its
Director :
"The Director, Security and Intelligence is responsible for the direction
and correlation of activities in respect to counter-espionage and subversive
activities against the State, for security investigations regarding personnel
employed by the Government and others as required, for co-operation
with Commonwealth countries and foreign nations in matters concerning
the internal security of the State, co-operation with the internal intelligence
organizations, both service and civilian, and for the direction of security
and intelligence investigations generally ."
41 . Additional authority 'for the RCMP's security and intelligence operations is contained in certain instructions and directives issued by the Government, which in effect authorize the RCMP to conduct the investigations necessary for a security screening programme, and in addition make the Force
responsible for various measures concerned with internal security in the event
of a national emergency as, proclaimed under the War Measures Act . In
practice the RCMP is concerned with the following security functions :
(a) all security and security intelligence operations, and "police" operations related to security ;
(b) maintenance and examination of records and field inquiries concerning personnel, but not evaluation of reports, nor decision-making in
individual cases ;
(c) advice concerning departmental security (this function appears to
be somewhat ill-defined) ;
(d) record keeping ;
(e) certain staff functions (membership of interdepartmental committees,
etc .) related to the management and planning of the national security
effort .
These functions are performed by a headquarters Directorate of Security
and Intelligence, which maintains representatives . at RCMP regional headquarters and detachments and at certain locations overseas, and which
operates in close liaison with the -other directorates of the Force . Nearly 60
per cent of the personnel of the security and intelligence directorate (includ.ing all the senior officers, all but three of the branch heads and almost all the
officers responsible for operations or investigation) are Regular Members of
the Force ; the remaining personnel include some special constables employed
on surveillance duties, Civilian Members employed as translators, technicians or researchers and public servants on clerical duties .
15
�42 . Until September 1966 the Minister of Justice, by virtue of the RCMP
Act, was the minister responsible for the RCMP and the minister who
reported to Parliament for the Force . The Government Organization Act
(S .C . 1966-67, c . 25), which came into force in September 1966, transferred
this responsibility to the Solicitor General, under whom a new Department
of the Solicitor General was created . The duties and functions of the Solicitor
General formally "extend to and include all matters over which the Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction, not by law assigned to any other department,
branch or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to (a) reformatories, prisons and penitentiaries ; (b) pardons and remissions ; and (c) the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police" . The Department of Justice is now only concerned with security matters when the Minister is required to rule on the
propriety of prosecutions or to provide legal advice relating to security .
Departments of Governmen t
43 . All departments and agencies of the Canadian Government have a
responsibility to protect the confidentiality that attaches to official material .
In addition, almost all have a requirement for more formal procedures to
protect classified material . For example, at the very least all ministers' offices
and all offices concerned with briefing ministers on Cabinet matters hold
classified documents, and in addition most departments involved in any way
with scientific, sociological, economic or other research require at least occasional access to classified material .
44 . Within this broad framework, however, departmental requirements
vary widely . Some sensitive departments generate and hold large amounts
of classified material, and have special security responsibilities . These include,
for example, the Departments of National Defence, External Affairs and
Defence Production, and the Privy Council Office and Cabinet Secretariat .
Other departments are less sensitive . Such departments as the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources generate
and hold smaller amounts of classified material, often in specific branches or
sections, and their personnel generally require less frequent access to such
material . Certain departments and agencies (such as the Department of
National Revenue, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and the Post Office)
are responsible for the "privacy" of much material they hold ; these departments are often the subject of special statutory provisions concerning
confidentiality .
Shortcomings and Alternatives
Policy-Making and Coordinatio n
45 . In the following sections of this chapter we examine the effectiveness
of the present organization and the alternatives that seem relevant . Because
we shall inevitably be noting certain shortcomings in present arrangements ,
16
�we wish to make it clear that they are not generally due to arbitrary judgment
or lack of care, but rather to difficulties inherent in existing organizational
structures, or to unresolved conflicts on policy .
46 . The policy-making and coordinating organization should in our opinion
perform a number of functions . It should :
(a) provide a machinery whereby security strategy can be devised, policies
and priorities determined, and resources allocated to various
measures ;
(b) be the arbiter of any conflicts between the interests of security on
the one hand, and departmental and other interests on the other ;
(c) be the authority which issues general regulations and procedures to b e
applicable throughout the whole official security environment ; and
which coordinates and enforces the application of these regulations ;
(d) provide the link between the investigative and operational security
service . and government departments, and between this service and
the public ;
(e) be responsible for the operation and administration of any machinery
established to review administrative decisions relating to the security
of personnel . The nature of this machinery is considered in Chapter
IV in relation to the general subject of security and the individual .
47 . At present, the Security Panel and the concerned officers in the Privy
Council Office make an attempt to perform most of these functions, but
they do so without executive authority or adequate resources, and with an
approach which is necessarily permissive rather than compelling . As far as
the formulation and coordination of security policy is concerned, it seems
to us . that under present arrangements the total view of the requirements
of security may . often be obscured by the pressures exerted by individual
departments and the exigencies of their proposed policies . Nor are we
certain that the present structural arrangements ensure that issues and arguments concerned with security are presented to government in an explicit
and undiluted form . Government policies in this vital area should not be
based merely on the recommendations of an interdepartmental committee
on which the professional proponents of security may readily be outnumbered .
48 . The present arrangements for the implementation of decisions and
policies appear in theory to be tidy and effective . Issues are raised, and directives are issued ; the coordinating machinery is consulted and advice is
proffered . It is our opinion, however, that this effectiveness is more apparent
than real . The basis of the Canadian security organization is the principle
that individual ministers, deputy ministers and agency heads are entirely
responsible for the security of their agencies, and this principle is reflected in
the fact that all coordination is entirely permissive . Even Cabinet Directives
relating to security appear to be merely advisory in the sense that only the
most informal arrangements exist for ensuring compliance or consistency in
departments .
17
�49 . We feel that changes need to be made in the central structure if policies
are to be scrupulously formulated and consistently enforced, and if the
security of the state and the rights of individuals are to receive adequate
protection . Our suggestion is that there should be established in the Privy
Council Office a formalized Security Secretariat with adequate status,
resources and staff to formulate security policy and procedures in the context of general governmental policies, and more importantly, with effective
authority to supervise the implementation of government security policies and
regulations and to ensure their consistent application . This Secretariat would
be analogous as an organizational entity to the present Secretariats on Science
and on Bilingualism . It would be headed by a Director responsible to the
Secretary to the Cabinet, and would maintain close links with and be advised
by the Security Service . We think that the Director would require the assistance of at least three full-time officers to perform these functions adequately .
50 . On the level of policy formulation, the Secretariat would make recommendations to the government after consultation through a formal or ad hoc
committee structure with interested departments . These recommendations
would not then be the formal product of the deliberations of an interdepartmental committee, at which some of the requirements of security may not
have been given adequate weight, but would instead be the product of a
specialist secretariat advised by interdepartmental consultation . The Secretariat would also be responsible for the preparation, coordination and enforcement of . government regulations on security . In these functions it would be
advised by a protective security branch of the Security Service . This branch
would conduct security audits but, if it found departments reluctant to rectify
faults, would request assistance from the Secretariat . The Secretariat would
press the security case on deputy ministers through the Secretary to the Cabinet or on ministers through its designated minister .
Operations and Investigation
51 . Naturally, many of the most important issues concerned with organization relate to the federal operational and investigative security service-at
present the Directorate of Security and Intelligence of the RCMP . The RCMP
is basically a unique uniformed para-military police force with many very
important virtues . Its members are carefully selected, highly motivated and
of great integrity . Its recruiting, indoctrination and training policies are generally oriented toward its police function . The Force's personnel policies are
based on recruiting young men between the ages of 19 and 28 as Regular
Members . The training process through which they pass is intended to provide them with the instruction necessary for their police duties and to steep
them in the traditions of the RCMP, which are fundamentally those of a
police force .
52 . At present all the Regular Members of the Directorate of Security and
Intelligence are drawn from personnel recruited and trained under norma l
18
�RCMP procedures, although they are not selected for security employment
until they have had at least three years experience in police duties and have
received special training . There is at present no effective- programme of postuniversity recruiting, even for the more demanding tasks in the Force (which
would, of course, include many duties concerned with security), and in practice a potential recruit who has attended a university is faced with disincentives . Little allowance is made during recruit training and during initial
duties in the Force for possession of a degree .
53 . These policies and practices mean in the first place that the RCMP is
cutting itself off from the whole of that group of potential recruits who attend
a university-in other words and in general terms, from those potential recruits who are likely to possess the most intelligence, initiative and imagination. We do not suggest that a university education is a necessary guarantee of
intelligence or character, but it is quite clear that at present there is a greater
likelihood of finding suitable recruits for complex and sophisticated duties
among those young persons who have attended universities than among those .
who have not . This fact will assume increasing significance as a larger proportion of young people continue their education beyond high . school levels .
Neither would we wish to imply that all the duties that need to be carried
out by a security service demand a high level of sophistication and intelligence . .
We do believe, however, that such attributes are of great importance in an
area of considerable sensitivity which can often require imagination, tact, high
professional standards and complex decision-making. We are reinforced in
this view by the special care taken in other .countries with the recruiting and
training of officers concerned with security duties, and we find it difficult to
believe that officers with the background and training of those in the RCMP
will be able to meet . the increasingly complex challenges in the field of security that are to be expected in the future .
54 : We acknowledge that there is in existence a programme whereby some
suitable members of .the RCMP are sent to university at public expense after
some years in the Force . In . addition, we are informed that plans have recently
been developed to commence a recruiting programme at universities in, 1969 ..
The . commencing salary of these recruits will . be higher than the salary of
those recruited directly from high school and, while recruits from universities
will undergo the same training and indoctrination programme'as high school
recruits, they will be expected to advance more rapidly in the Force if they
demonstrate superior ability. Undoubtedly, both these schemes are or will be
useful measures, although we have some doubt about . the potential for
success of the university recruiting programme under the conditions now
envisaged, but we feel that neither can be a substitute for a regular professional recruitment programme . There are many areas of activity (banks and .
railroads, for example, and some police forces) that have in the past confined
their recruitment to young men with lower levels of education ; almost all
such organizations have been forced by circumstances to . adapt, to the changing patterns of society .
19
�55 . Whatever the merits of the present system as a source of recruits for
police duties, we think it quite wrong that recruiting for a security service
should be tied tightly to a recruiting and training system generally oriented
towards the requirements of a police force . Apart from a similarity in some
investigative techniques, the differences between police and security duties
seem to us to be wide . Police forces are concerned primarily with law enforcement, including post facto investigation, with the collection of evidence, and
with the prosecution of crimes . Security services are primarily engaged in preventive activities and the collection of intelligence . A security organization
will almost inevitably be hindered in its operations by the lack of flexibility
inherent in a police force such as the RCMP . We feel, in short, that the
professional security service officer is quite different from the professional
policeman and that this difference should be reflected in recruiting methods,
in training and career patterns and in organizational structures .
56 . These questions of the characteristics and style of the RCMP as a Force
and the long-term effects of present recruiting policies have been central to
our thinking on the issue of organization . The second factor we have considered touches on a problem of great difficulty : the measurement of the
effectiveness of a security service . For obvious reasons, any direct measurement is almost impossible, especially in ~ the important fields of counterespionage and counter-subversion, and our first point concerning effectiveness is general and subjective . Although the role of the RCMP is admittedly
ill-defined, and recognizing that government policy has been inhibiting, we are
not sure that the RCMP has made a sufficient, or a sufficiently sophisticated,
effort to acquaint the government with the dangers of inaction in certain
fields . We are left with the impression that there has been some reluctance
on their part to take desirable initiatives and some inadequacy in stating the
case for necessary security measures in interdepartmental discussions at the
higher policy-making levels . A specific area in which the effectiveness of the
RCMP does appear to us to be capable of improvement involves personnel
investigations . These seem sometimes to be conducted with a certain lack of
tact and imagination, while reports and briefs to departments are often somewhat stereotyped . We can appreciate the problems of a departmental security
officer forced to make decisions on the . basis of such reports . On the other
hand, it must be stated that very few errors of fact or mistakes have come to
light-most of the apparently contentious cases that have been made public
have arisen from misunderstandings of one kind or another, or have been
the result of improper comment by departmental officials who have stated or
implied to a concerned individual that "security" was the reason for some
administrative action when this was in fact not so .
57 . In addition, we think it probable that the association of the security
function with the police role tends to make the work of the security authorities more difficult . The suggestion has been made (and we tend to agree with
it) that inquiries by ciyilians in connection with the security clearance of personnel would be regarded with more understanding than are inquiries b y
20
�policemen ; in particular it seems quite likely that many of the objections to
investigations on university campuses have stemmed from the fact that these
inquiries are conducted by policemen, rather than from the fact of investigation itself. Furthermore, there is a clear distinction'-between the operational
work of a security service and that of a police foice . ..iA security service will
inevitably be involved in actions that may contravene the spirit if not the
letter of the law, and with clandestine and other activities which may sometimes seem to infringe on individuals' rights ; these are not appropriate police
functions . Neither is it apropriate for a police force to be concerned with
events or actions that are not crimes or suspected crimes, while a security
service is often involved with such matters . Generally, in a period in which
police forces are subject to some hostility, it'would appear unwise either to
add to the police burden by an association with security duties, or to make
security duties more difficult by an association with the police function .
58 . These factors have led us to examine alternatives to the present organizational arrangements . One option we considered was that the Directorate
of Security and Intelligence should become organizationally and operationally
detached from the RCMP to a greater or lesser extent, while remaining under
the nominal administrative aegis of the Force . However, it seems clear to us
that the security service would need to adopt recruiting, training, professional
and operational policies quite different from those of-the rest of the police
corps, its head would have responsibilities to the highest levels of government
quite separate from those of the Commissioner of the RCMP ; and in the
long term the majority of its personnel (including probably its head)
would be civilians and not RCMP officers . Although some such solution as
this has attractions we find it difficult to believe that it . would be organizationally satisfactory or stable . On balance, the best solution seems to us
to be the creation of a new non-police agency to perform the functions
of a security service in Canada . This agency would eventually be quite
separate from the RCMP, although it would, when necessary, operate in close
liaison and cooperation with the RCMP and other police forces . The
organizational and operational detachment of the Directorate of Security and
Intelligence from the RCMP may be a necessary first stage in the process of
development of the new agency .
59 . We are aware that certain arguments have been raised in the past
against the creation of a civilian security agency ; we feel these should be
answered before we consider the details of a new organization . One important
argument is the suggestion that any new civilian service would readily be
penetrated by hostile intelligence services . This is a most serious matter,
for a penetrated security service is not merely ineffective, but is also an active
danger to its own country and to its allies . It is undoubtedly true that the
risk of penetration could be greater in a new organization of the kind we
envisage than in the existing organization, especially as it will be recruiting
at a somewhat unfavourable time ; the prevailing political sentiment of the
nation cannot be said to be generally sympathetic towards . the objectives and21
�activities of a security service . Nevertheless, we feel that the problem of
penetration is soluble as long as the new organization takes rigorous steps
to reduce the risks by very careful recruiting and by, for example, employing
recruits "under report" in less sensitive environments for months or years
until it has become apparent that they are worthy of transfer to more
sensitive areas . In addition, it is clear that a new security service would
initially employ many of the individuals now working in the Directorate of
Security and Intelligence .
60 . A second argument suggests that only the RCMP is spread sufficiently
widely across Canada to constitute an adequate service . However, nearly
half of the population of Canada is already concentrated in 20 metropolitan urban areas, and it is estimated that by 1980 one-third of Canadians
will live in three urban areas and some 60 per cent in about 30 major city
complexes . We realize nevertheless that any civilian security service would
have to place some reliance on the assistance of the RCMP and other police
forces in more remote areas of the country . A third argument arises from
the relationships which the RCMP has built up over the years with security
services and police forces in foreign countries . We have however heard
nothing to suggest that the creation of liaison arrangements between a new
Canadian security service and foreign security services would present insuperable problems . Clearly, these relationships have built into them an
element of trust, and it would take time for the new service to establish
an appropriate environment ; but again the initial stages of development would
be eased by the fact that many of the same individuals would be employed
on these duties .
61 . Finally, there is the question of administrative difficulty . Certainly,
the creation of a new service will pose certain administrative and financial
problems, and these will be exaggerated by the inevitable requirement that
the service should be free of some of the normal controls . It would for example require almost total freedom in the recruiting and discharge of personnel .
There would clearly be some new overheads that are at present not incurred
because of the association of the security service with the RCMP ; on the
other hand we think that certain economies might be introduced in a civilian
organization that are not at present possible . On balance we see no reason
why the new Service should cost more in terms of money and manpower
than the present Directorate of. Security and Intelligence of the RCMP .
62 . It is quite clear that the establishment of a new service will take time,
and that it must be built upon what already exists, especially as there will
be an overriding requirement to ensure that no degradation in effectiveness
takes place during the planning and changeover period . We would visualize
a deliberate and probably lengthy process of change, in the course of which
the head of the new organization would be appointed and allowed to plan
the development of the new agency and its changing relationships with the
RCMP . As we have said, the new organization will have to continue close
liaison and collaboration with the RCMP, as well as with other police forces .
22
�63 . We have considered arrangements that might be appropriate for the
control of the Security Service . Although- the Service must - remain part of
the executive arm of government and must be generally responsive to the
orders of the government, arrangements must be made to provide the Head
of the Service with some independence ; especially in circumstances in which
he may feel that ord'ers (to provide information, for example) may be
inappropriate . This independence must rest on some security of tenue, perhaps
similar to that held by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, and upon clear
and public terms of reference .which include provision for the disclosure of
information at his discretion . We . suggest that ,they should generally include
the following tasks :
(a) to collect, collate and evaluate information or intelligence concerning
espionage and subversion, and to communicate such information in
such manner and to such persons as the Head of the Service considers
to be in the public interest ;
(b) to be responsible for the direction, coordination and implementation
of counter-espionage and counter-subversive operations in Canada ;
(c) to be responsible for security investigations concerning civilian per =
sonnel employed by the Government of Canada, and other persons
as required ;
(d) to be responsible for the inspection of security precautions in departments throughout the Government of Canada and elsewhere as
required, and for the provision of . training and advice for departments of government and other agencies on matters concerned with
security ;
(e) to be responsible for the operation and coordination of all technical
security measures ; ,
( f) to cooperate and liaise as may be necessary with domestic, Commonwealth and foreign police forces and security services .
We would envisage that the new Service would generally be without law
enforcement powers, and would rely upon police cooperation when such
powers were required .
64 . We have also considered in some detail the arrangements by which
the Security Service should report to the government . At present the Director
of Security and Intelligence reports through the Deputy Commissioner
(Operations) to the Commissioner of the RCMP, who in turn reports to the
Solicitor General . In our view the Head of the new Security Service should
certainly have the right of direct access to the Prime Minister when the
occasion arises, although as a practical requirement it is probably desirable
that he should be-responsible at least for day-to-day operations to a Cabinet
Minister other than the Prime Minister.
65 . In addition, because of the concern of Parliament and the public in the
general area of security, we think that an effort should be made to provide
some public reassurance that the activities and operations of the Securit y
23
�Service are not immune from responsible scrutiny apart from that exercised
by the government of the day . We have considered alternative ways of providing this reassurance, including a parliamentary committee and a committee
of senior public servants . We have discarded the first of these possibilities,
partly because we think that the legislature should not be directly involved
in these executive matters, and partly because, if the committee were to
carry out its tasks in a meaningful way, its members would need formal
security clearance . On general grounds we think it inappropriate to subject
private Members of Parliament to these procedures, and in addition we foresee great complications if a Member nominated by a political party were ever
deemed unacceptable on security grounds . We also feel that a committee of
public servants, however senior and distinguished, would not necessarily be
regarded by Parliament or the public as effectively independent of the government of the day .
66 . However, in Chapter N we suggest the creation of a Security Review
Board to deal with the review of certain administrative decisions on personnel
cases . We imagine that the members of this Board would acquire considerable
expertise in the field of security policy, and that they would also command
public respect . We suggest that the terms of reference of this Board should
include provision for receiving and considering annual or semi-annual reports
from the Head of the Security Service, and that the Board should have
authority to draw to the direct attention of the Prime Minister any matters it
considers appropriate . This function would not be inconsistent with the role
of reviewing administrative decisions . We would not suggest however that
the Board should in this role be accessible to the public and thus come to
perform an "Ombudsman-like" function. If a federal Ombudsman or Parliamentary Commissioner eventually came to be appointed, his role in relation
to the general field of security decisions would need separate consideration .
Departmental Securit y
67 . Security organizations within departments vary widely in adequacy .
Standards of security discipline are equally varied and could in many cases
be improved . Generally, the Canadian security system is insistent upon the
individual responsibility of departments and agencies, and the observance of
this principle has clearly led to the present varying standards of departmental
security . One alternative to present arrangements would be a professional
centralized system under the direct control of the Security Service, with officers in each department owing a form of dual allegiance to the department
in question and to the Security Service . In many ways this would approximate
to the situation that now exists throughout the government structure in other
"service" areas-financial control, health and welfare services and printing
services, for example . Although some such system has superficial attractions,
we are inclined to believe that these attractions are illusory . It is probable that
the transfer of total responsibility in such an area as security from departments to an extra-departmental agency would encourage the common ten24
�dency to regard security as a matter apart from the normal business of the
departments and thus a subject of no concern to the general body of departmental staff .
68 . We feel in brief that a general policy of departmental responsibility
is necessary if an adequate standard of security is to be achieved, but there
are a number of prerequisites which must be fulfilled if the system is to operate effectively . In particular each department must prepare security regulations in accordance with its own requirements, and create an effective security
organization, headed by a trained security officer at an adequate level of
seniority within its structure and appropriately related to the rest of the departmental organization . We feel it of special importance that senior departmental officials, and especially deputy ministers and heads of agencies, should
regard it as one of their personal responsibilities to ensure that their departments have effective security organizations and regulations ; security measures
must be seen to have support at the highest departmental levels .
69 . A primary requirement of course is that each department or agency
should have the services of a trained security officer . Security appointments
should not (as is unfortunately sometimes the case) be regarded as positions
for -people without much hope of further advancement . We do not suggest
that all those who take part in departmental security duties can make a full
career in security, but we do feel that a tour of duty as a full-time (or sometimes part-time) departmental security officer should be an accepted part of
the process of development of potential senior public servants .
70 . We have in fact found few departments where security officers and
staffs are adequate in strength, calibre, status or training . We have no firm
views as to the specific place which the security officer and his staff should
hold in the departmental structure, but we are quite clear that he must be
sufficiently senior to have direct access as required to the deputy minister,
and to exert influence over heads of branches or departmental sub-units . We
realize the organizational simplicity of including security amongst the duties
of the senior personnel officer of a department, but we are not sure that this
solution is right, because of the conflicts of interest that are likely to arise .
In many cases we would prefer the security officer of a department to be
outside the departmental line organization and to be in a position to fulfil an
"audit" role within the department . In practice, this would mean that the
security officer would become a security adviser to the deputy minister, and
would carry out his responsibilities from this position .
71 . Many departments of government, some of which are concerned with
classified material, have branches with separate functions and establishments
in many different localities . The head of each branch or out-station should
be personally responsible for the security of his operation or facility, and
will normally need a full or part-time 'security officer on his own staff . These
security officers should be responsible also to the chief departmental security
officer .
25
�72 . Adequate training facilities should be made available for departmental
security staffs by the Security Service and, what is more, departments must
be compelled to take advantage of these facilities . In addition, special courses
or seminars should be held at intervals for senior officers with security responsibilities . Within departments, emphasis should also be placed on a continuous educational programme directed towards ensuring that the general body
of public servants is aware of the need for security measures and that those
concerned with classified material are adequately indoctrinated . We have been
impressed by the success achieved in other countries in educating and indoctrinating public servants in these matters, and we think that a much enlarged
effort is required in Canada .
73 . Further, positive arrangements should be made for expert advice and
information to be readily available to departments, and departments should
be compelled to seek this advice . For example, the protective security branch
of the Security Service might accredit liaison officers to departments or groups
of departments, and we would not rule out the possibility, in particularly
complex or difficult circumstances, that officers of the protective security
branch of the Security Service should be seconded for periods of time to
departmental staffs . This may be especially necessary if occasions arise when
widespread changes or improvements, such as those suggested by this
Report, are being undertaken .
74 . Finally, there should be comprehensive arrangements for extradepartmental inspection, audit and sanctions . We suggest that the protective
security branch of the Security Service, should be responsible for - auditing
the effectiveness and adequacy of security arrangements within departments,
and taking such action as may be necessary and appropriate (either directly,
through the Security Secretariat and the Secretary to the Cabinet, or through
the appropriate minister) in cases where departments have unsatisfactory
security postures or procedures .
75 . We would emphasize that we regard the provision of expert advice
to departments, the inspection and audit of departmental security procedures,
and the training of departmental security officers as matters of urgent importance . As we have suggested, if a new Security Service is established, these
general protective security roles should fall within its terms of reference . In
the meantime, however, we feel that immediate arrangements must be made
for the roles to be performed more effectively . Interim arrangements should
certainly ensure that the Privy Council Office and the Directorate of Security
and Intelligence of the RCMP have clear joint responsibilities in these areas .
Probably the RCMP should assume responsibility for training, inspection
and audit, while the Privy Council Office should assume responsibility for advice and for taking such steps are possible to ensure departmental compliance . Departments must cooperate by seeking advice and, with the assistance of the security authorities, ensuring that effective departmental security
structures and procedures are brought into being.
26
�IV. SECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
General Considerations
76 . The problem posed by the impact of security procedures on individual
members of society is of course one of the central issues of our inquiry . In
the general area of individual freedoms, concern has been expressed in recent
years over invasions by the state, as well as by private individuals and organizations, of what has come to be .called the "right of privacy" . The range of
apparent problems is broad, and includes such matters as the use of telephone .
interception, electronic intrusion devices, long range cameras and other
sophisticated equipment by police and governmental agencies in the course
of detection and investigation of criminal offences and :security matters ; the
collection and recording of information about individuals and organizations
for the purpose of security "screening" ; the use of such devices as the polygraph and the breathalyzer by the police ; the use of closed circuit television
and eavesdropping devices to supervise employees or to assist with the entrapment of consumers ; the use-of psychological tests and questionnaires by prospective employers, and in schools without parental knowledge or consent ; the
accumulation and storage of personal data -in computers by the state .
77 . Two aspects of this general area of concern seem to us to fall within
our terms . of reference . The first of these-is the use of certain investigative
techniques for the purposes of counter-espionage or counter-subversion
operations and for the acquisition of intelligence ; this we review in Chapter X .,
The second is the investigation of . personnel for the purpose of security'
screening and clearance ; this we deal with below .
78 . We must first state that we consider personnel security and personnel
screening of central importance to an effective security system . Some dependence -may be placed upon physical security measures and upon the enforcement of regulations, but ultimately the reliability and discretion of individuals
is the base upon which all true security must rest . This is especially true now
that advances in technology-the advent of rapid copying equipment and
sophisticated electronic devices, for example-have made it almost impossible to devise effective physical protection against a determined individual
with modern equipment . We think, that all persons, without exception, should
be subjected to the security screening process before being allowed access
to classified material . Those to be screened should include appropriate em-
27
�ployees of Canadian Government departments or agencies, members of the
armed forces and the RCMP, ministerial appointees, members and staffs of
task forces, consultants, university faculty members working on classified
research contracts or handling classified material, persons employed in industry concerned with classified contracts, and so on . The necessary procedures
consist essentially of two parts : first, the acquisition of data about the past
history of an individual ; and secondly, an attempt to forecast the individual's
future performance or reliability on the basis of this data .
79 . We have little sympathy with the more extreme suggestions that inquiries about persons should not be undertaken because of the individual's
"right of privacy", nor with the view that the process of personnel investigation by the State is alien to normal and democratic practice, nor with the
general premises that any individual has a right to employment within the
public service or a right of access to classified information . We think that
all employers-even governments-have a right to be selective in hiring
employees as long as selections are made upon a sound and equitable basis .
What is more, investigation of applicants for employment is a normal practice,
as is investigation for credit or insurance purposes . References are required
or referees are consulted . Many firms make credit bureaux checks of prospective employees, and we understand that some have relationships with
local police departments which enable them to acquire at least negative data .
Many firms "bond" employees, and this involves investigation . Some make
use of psychological tests and interviews in an attempt to assess aptitude . The
general process of data acquisition as a basis for forecasting the future performance or reliability of a prospective employee is widespread, well-understood and generally accepted . The state's procedures only differ in comprehensiveness and formality from those generally employed in one form or
another by responsible employers in the private sector .
80 . Neither does an individual have a right to confidence ; on the contrary,
access to classified information is a privilege which the state has a right and
a duty to restrict . We believe that the real rights of individuals are of a rather
different order. We feel, for example, that persons should be told that they
are to be subjected to inquiries for security clearance, and have a right to
expect that any inquiries made about them should be made by competent
and trained investigators, and that any decisions made about them should
be made carefully, in a consistent and equitable framework, and on the
basis of procedures that are not incompatible with the concepts of natural
justice and with national style and tradition .
81 . On the other hand, in order not to imperil sources of information
adverse decisions must sometimes be taken about individuals without revealing to the person concerned full details of the reasons or the supporting
evidence . It is sometimes necessary to refuse to employ an individual, or to
transfer him or even to discharge him, because after the fullest investigation
doubts about his reliability remain even though nothing may have bee n
28
�proved by legally acceptable standards . Such doubts must be resolved in
favour of the state rather than in favour of the individual, or at least some
greater weight must be attached to the interests of the state than would be
appropriate in legal proceedings . Also, people employed in sensitive environments may in certain circumstances be subject to unusual regulations concerned perhaps with search of their persons or restrictions on travel .
82 . In our view, there are no simple or legalistic solutions to problems of
these kinds, but only ad hoc checks and balances . Experience in the United
States (where almost complete reliance is placed upon due legal process and
the full force of the law can be invoked to rule upon almost any administrative decision) would suggest that there are no sensible or practical organizational or other arrangements which . can provide absolute protection to all
individuals against apparent occasional restrictions of their rights .
83 . Further, just as normal legal processes occasionally lead to injustices,
so will security procedures . Usually persons do not suffer in legal proceedings
because of arbitrary judgment ; if they suffer, they do so only because of the
nature of the system and the content of the law itself . Similarly in security
procedures extreme care must be taken to ensure that if the interests of an
individual are prejudiced they are prejudiced only because of an overriding
requirement and not because of lack of care . Whatever arrangements may
be made in an attempt to protect the rights of the individual, ultimately his
most important right-to fair, equitable and careful treatment-will depend
upon the existence of policies and procedures scrupulously formulated in
accordance with national style and traditions, and consistently executed and
enforced by competent and trained personnel of great integrity .
84 . Before proceeding to an examination of screening procedures, we
should note that the remainder of this chapter is largely concerned with
civilian government employees . In many instances, however, the comments
and suggestions we make are also applicable to members of the .armed forces
and to persons employed in classified work in industry ; we do however devote
later chapters to special problems in these areas . Somewhat similar procedures
are applied to most applicants for immigration or citizenship, and many of
the general remarks in this chapter apply here also, although again we devote
later chapters to a more detailed consideration of these matters .
Acquisition of Data .
85 . There are five methods by which data that is relevant to an individual's
reliability can be acquired : checking of available records ; written inquiries ;
personal inquiries ; physiological or psychological tests ; and personal interviews .
(a) . Records Checks. Minimal investigative procedures include the checking of readily available records such as RCMP subversive and criminal
records, government personnel files where previous service is claimed,
and .immigration or citizenship files where appropriate .
29
�(b) Written Inquiries . Written inquiries seek information about an individual's reliability, character, associations, experience and education
from former employers and supervisors, from schools and universities,
and from referees .
(c) Personal Inquiries . Personal inquiries (so-called "field investigations")
fall into two parts . First, an effort is made by means of personal interviews with former employers, associates, school or college teachers
or supervisors, neighbours or appropriate local agencies to check
and confirm the details of his past life that an individual has listed
on a comprehensive personal history form . Secondly, use is made of
these interviews to elicit information concerning character, habits,
morals, reputation or associations, as well as "leads" for further
interviews . If adverse information is elicited, further investigation is
concentrated on this particular area in an effort to confirm, deny or
expand it . Clearly this is a highly subjective and in some ways objectionable process, but in spite of considerable effort no substitute
for it has yet been devised . It seems to us however of special importance that the inquiries should be made and any resulting reports
prepared by mature, experienced, sophisticated and trained officers,
working under strict supervision, and that only significant information
should be recorded . We are impressed by the care with which personnel investigators are selected, trained and supervised and their
reports considered, checked, balanced and revised in some countries .
We cannot emphasize too strongly that, if an individual's rights are
to be protected, and cooperation obtained from such important sources
of information as universities, personnel investigations of this kind
must be regarded as duties requiring persons of high calibre and
considerable skill and experience.
(d) Tests.' It would be an ideal situation if it were possible to process an
individual through a series of more or less mechanistic tests, and
arrive at -an objective judgment of the subject's future loyalty, reliability and character . Unfortunately, we are informed that this is not
possible, nor likely to be possible in the foreseeable future . Some
reliance can however be placed on certain types of psychological
testing in special circumstances .
(e) Personal Interviews. Opinion is divided on the relevance and propriety of personal contact between an investigator and an individual
under investigation . Our own view is that each case must be considered on its merits . If areas of concern appear in, the course of
investigation, there seems no reason why attempts should not be
made to resolve them by interview, unless they appear to be of such
significance as to make it apparent that clearance is -almost certainly
impossible or the situation is such that a confrontation -appears unlikely to be rewarding .
30
�86 . Clearly, many combinations of these five techniques are possible, and
in fact actual procedures vary quite widely . In Canada, present arrangements
appear to be somewhat inconsistent ; In the first place, . it is clear that many
persons are recruited for classified employment before checks are completed,
and may even be given . access to . classified material before the results of . any
checks are available. This procedure is said to be due to the exigencies of
recruiting, but is nevertheless inexcusable . Secondly, records checks are conducted with some informality and inconsistency . Fingerprints are not consistently obtained from all applicants for classified employment, nor at all
from industrial workers on classified contracts, and in the absence of fingerprints fully adequate criminal records checks are impossible. Inquiries of referees are very limited, even in the context of personnel 'selection . It is unusual
for previous employers to be consulted in the absence of a field investigation .
Further, the requirement for a field investigation differs in different parts of
the government . Some departments require such an investigation for a
so=called "Secret" clearance, and some require it only for "Top Secret"
clearance . Subjects are interviewed by the security officers in some departments and not in others .
87 . There is a further area in which Canadian procedures seem to us
somewhat inflexible, and this is in the . relationship between security investigation and screening procedures on the .one hand, and the personnel selection
process on the other . The policy on this subject is that a person . to be
appointed to a permanent position in the public service„ will not normally be
made the subject of security screening for . this reason alone . However,
whenever a person to be appointed to such a position is, in the opinion of
the deputy minister or head of agency concerned, likely to be required eventually to have access to- classified information, that person shall before being
given :a permanent appointment be made the subject of at least a . rudimentary
security check . In fact, as far as we can determine, only the most limited
investigation of prospective members of the public service is conducted
by the Public Service Commission in . the absence of a requirement for
security screening . Sometimes qualifications are confirmed ; occasionally
referees are consulted . Personnel selection decisions are made largely on the
basis of a personal interview . What is more, in spite of the stated policy it
appears unusual for any security screening . to take place in anticipation of a
possible future requirement for access to classified information, except in the
armed forces and a few other departments and agencies .
88 . In the United States Government a .very different practice is followed .
Investigations are conducted by the Civil Service Commission as part of the
normal procedures for obtaining sufficient data to assess the suitability of
candidates . The Bureau of Personnel Investigations of the Commission is
responsible for the whole process of obtaining or confirming all the facts,
both favourable and unfavourable, that . bear on an individual's suitability
for employment . It . carries out this responsibility by means of records checks
or field inquiries, . and it evaluates the significance of . the information it de-
31
�velops in consultation with employing departments . All applicants for the
United States public service, whether or not they are to be employed in
sensitive positions, are subjected at least to records checks . The object of
this programme is to give effect to the Government's responsibility for maintaining the quality of the public service at a high level and for implementing
a meaningful merit system in which all factors bearing on suitability are
considered .
89 . We can see many advantages in the institution of a formalized effort
to acquire, in the context of personnel selection, elementary data about every
applicant for employment in the public service, whether or not he or she is
to be employed on classified duties . Adverse reports would of course not
necessarily be reasons for rejection, but the process of inquiry should help
to avoid the unfairness inherent in -a situation in which a candidate is able
to conceal relevant but adverse information merely because the government
makes little effort to check details of background and record . In addition,
even if an individual were being initially considered for a non-sensitive
appointment, some data would be available to indicate whether or not problems relating to clearance were likely to arise at a later stage when access
to classified material might be vital for promotion or transfer . In the absence
of such procedures, increasing mobility within the public service seems likely
to lead to growing numbers of problem cases . Further, inquiries concerning
individuals may become somewhat more acceptable if conducted in .the context of personnel selection rather than security investigation .
90. We have examined the present procedures for investigation and clearance, and have reached the conclusion that they could with advantage be
amended on the following lines . These suggestions extend records checks to
all members of the public service, and add certain elements of formality to
the procedures for granting access to classified material .
(a) Persons to be employed in the public service . Before a person is
employed in the public service his name should be checked against
the subversive records and he should be the subject of a fingerprint
check against criminal records . Adverse information need not result in
rejection, but the information should at least be made available to the
employing department, which can request further inquiries if these
-appear to be necessary .
(b) Persons to have access to Secret (and Confidential) information .
Before a person is given access to Secret or Confidential information
he should be the subject of comprehensive records checks (including subversive records, criminal records, all relevant federal departmental records, credit bureaux records and foreign records where
necessary and possible) . Where written inquiries to referees or previous employers have not been made as part of a personnel selection
process, this should be done . If these steps produce no adverse
information, access may be granted to Secret or Confidential informa32
�tion after a formal and recorded departmental judgment that this
access is necessary and desirable . If however any significant' adverse
information is developed, furthe r' investigation (including field 'inquiries) should be undertaken by the Security Service to confirm or
resolve doubts . After inquiry, the case should be referred by the
Security Service. (with a recommendation-a point to which we shall
return) to the department for decision .
(c) Persons to have access to Top Secret information . Before a person
is given access to Top Secret information he must be the subject of
a similar comprehensive records check and a fu ll field investigation
covering a period of at least the previous ten years of his life or the
period from age eighteen, whichever is shorter, and a formal and
recorded departmental judgment must - be made that this access is
necessary - and desirable .
(d) Clearance to Secret an d Top Secret levels should be formall y updated at regular intervals, Secret clearances 'by means of records
checks an d consultation with departmental- supervisors, and Top
Secret clearances by means of fu rther field investigations . Security
clearances should not be thought of as in any sense permanent, and .
in be tween these up-datings supervisors of personnel handling classified matters and departmental security officers should concern themselves, if necessary in consultation with the Secu rity Secretariat and
the Security Service, with cases in which possible doubts have com
.
etonic
91 . We have 'already referred to one specific inconsistency in present
regulations-that fingerprints are not required from industrial workers for
whom clearance is needed . In our opinion `there is no reason for any distinction between industrial workers and public servants in this respect . We regard
fingerprints simply as a' .means of identification, comparable perhaps to
photographs . We can see no validity in objections to the taking of fingerprints
and the retention of fingerprints on file . In addition,-we'understand that plans
are being made to "vacate" and seal original criminal'records after relatively
short periods and- to make" these'- sealed records available only for specific
reasons . We consider irof great importance that the full records should be
available for security screening purposes, although we would agree that only
the recent "unvacated" records should be used in the case of 'applicants for
employment in which access to classified informatiori is neither necessary
nor likely to be necessary in the future .
Reporting of Data
92 . Once data about an individual has been acquired, it must be reported
to the decision-making authority, which is the employing department . The
present practice is for the - RCMP to summarize the results of its records
checks and investigations in the form, of somewhat stereotyped letters o r
33
�"briefs" with little or no explanation of the significance to be attached to any
given item of information, and very often with data summarized to such an
extent as to be difficult to assess . We feel that this process of summarization
is wrong in principle . There will clearly be occasions (although we suggest
there are likely to be few in the area of personnel screening) when protection of sources must be considered of paramount importance, but the principle should be that decisions are made on the basis of all relevant information, although the means by which and the conditions under which the
information is made available to the departmental decision-makers may vary .
In general one of the most important functions of the protective security
branch of the Security Service should be to ensure that all relevant information is made available to departments in as complete a form as possible .
93 . In addition, the Government has taken the firm view that the RCMP
should do no more than provide basic information to departments concerning
the clearance of individuals, and that the Force must play no formal part in the
decision process itself . In a sense, the concept of departmental responsibility has been extended to support the position that the RCMP should not
be asked to advise formally on the significance of the information it provides .
The ostensible rationale for this attitude is somewhat mystical ; it is alleged
that provision o f this advice would tend to edge the nation closer to a"police
state" . We feel the real rationale is much more practical : the ability to dissociate activities concerned with personnel investigation from the results of
personnel judgment has obvious advantages as a public posture .
94 . We think this policy is wrong, for two reasons . First an organization
which provides data should bear some responsibility for the implications and
significance of that data . Such a responsibility adds to the compulsion to be
accurate and objective . Secondly, the present policy deprives the decisionmaker of the sole source of professional advice on the significance of subversive associations and the main source of professional experience on the
meaning and relevance of character defects and other factors . It seems to us
that this deprivation is as likely to be detrimental to the individual as it is
to be disadvantageous to the state . We agree that the final responsibility for
decision-making must rest with the departmental authorities ; we nevertheless
believe that the Security Service should have a duty to provide meaningful
advice to help with the decision, and that it should do this not only by providing as full information as possible but also by commenting on the importance and significance of the information it provides and by making formal
recommendations concerning clearance .
The Decision Process
95 . Whatever arrangements are made to provide data and advice, at some
point a decision to grant or withhold clearance must be made on each individual case . This decision involves estimating the possible future behaviour
34
�of an individual on the basis of his past history. The piocess is difficult
enough in the case of an applicant for employment, when the sole administrative effect of an adverse decision will be the'refusal of employment, or . the
selection of another individual from an eligible list . It is even more difficult if
it relates to a person already employed, when an adverse judgment may lead
to transfer, non-promotion, inhibition of career, . suspension or even dismissal,
and, what is more, may involve the department in a lengthy train of administrative negotiations and . difficulties concerned with hearings and reviews .
96 . A great deal of conceptual consideration has been devoted to definitions of loyalty and reliability, to the relationship of loyalty to security and to
the relevance of certain so-called character defects to either loyalty or reliability . In practice, we feel that the initial basis for decision must be a set of
criteria against which the history of the individual is- measured . It is . a truism
that no set of criteria can meet all cases, and that a large element of subjective judgment must eventually be applied in very many cases, but nevertheless the relevance and adequacy of the criteria seem to us to be of the firs t
importance .
97 . As we have suggested, we feel 'that "allpersons who may have access
to classified information in the performance of their duties must be persons
in whose reliability the government can repose full confidence . It has in our
view been clearly demonstrated that such confidence •cannot be placed in
persons whose loyalty to -Canada and our system of government is diluted
by loyalty to .any communist, fascist, or other legal -or illegal political organization whose purposes are inimical to the -processes of parliamentary
democracy. Therefore, persons in the following categories should not be .permitted to enter a position in the public service where they may have access to
classified information or are likely to have opportunities to gain such access :
(a) a person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and having a similar
nature and purposes ;
(b) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support a
communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated with a communist
or fascist party and having a similar nature and purpose ;
(c) a person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true nature
and purpose, is a- member or supports by his words or his actions an organization which has as its real objectives the furtherance of communist
or fascist aims and policies (commonly known as a front group) ;
(d) a person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign power,
or who deliberately assists any such agent or 'informer ;
(e) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to support any
organization which publicly or privately .advocates or practices the use
of force to alter the form of government .
It must be borne in mind that there may be reasons to entertain doubts about
persons who at some previous time fell into one or other of these categories,
even though these ,doubts may not :be confirmed by more recent information .
35
�98 . In addition, a person may be unreliable in the context of security for
a number of reasons other than associations or activities such as those described in the previous paragraph . To provide greater assurance of reliability,
persons in the following additional categories should not be permitted to have
access to classified information unless after consideration of the circumstances
the risk appears to be justified :
(a) a person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but because of
features of his character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, .
or make him vulnerable to blackmail or coercion . Such features may be
greed, debt, illicit sexual behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental
imbalance or such other aspects of character as might seriously affect
his reliability ;
(b) a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with
persons described in paragraph 97 above, is likely to be induced, either
knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety
and interest of Canada ; it is not the kind of relationship, whether by
blood, marriage or friendship, which is of primary concern, but the
degree of and the circumstances surrounding the relationship, and most
particularly the degree of influence that might be exerted, which should
dictate a judgment as to reliability ;
(c) a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound by
close ties of blood or affection to persons living within the borders of such
foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected to intolerable pressures .
99 . There are four points we would like to raise concerning . these criteria .
The first concerns homosexuality, the second Quebec separatism, the third
the relevance of student activities at college or university, and the fourth the
security clearance of aliens or former aliens .
100. The question of homosexuality is a contentious area, especially as
social mores change . It is a fact, demonstrated by a large number of case
histories, that homosexuals are special targets for attention from foreign
intelligence services . What is more, there seems to us clear evidence that certain types of homosexuals are more readily compromised than non-deviate
persons . However, we feel that each case must be judged in the light of all its
circumstances, including such factors as the stability of the relationships,
the recency of the incidents, the public or private character of the acts, the
incidence of arrests or convictions, and the effect of any rehabilitative, efforts .
In general, we do not think that past homosexual acts or even current stable
homosexual relationships should always be a bar to employment with the
public service or even to low levels of clearance . We do feel however that,
in the interests of the individuals themselves as well as in the interests of the
state, homosexuals should not normally be granted clearance to higher levels,
should not be recruited if there is a possibility that they may require such
clearance in the course of their careers and should certainly not be posted to
sensitive positions overseas .
101 . The problem of separatists is equally contentious, and we suggest
that security policy concerning separatism should be made clear . We can see
36
�no' objection to the federal government taking (and being seen to take) steps
Ao prevent its infiltration by persons who are clearly committed to the dissolution of Canada, and who are involved with elements of the separatist movement in which seditious activity or foreign involvement are factors . We feel
that information concerning membership in or association with extreme
separatist groups should be reported on the same basis as information concerning other allegedly subversive movements, and that the departmental
decision process should be similar . We are of course aware that there is a
wide spectrum of activity relating to separatism, ranging from overt political
activity to clandestine terrorist planning and action, and we do not for a
moment suggest that all persons who have been associated with overt and
non-violent groups should be excluded from federal employment . We see
no reason however why the federal government should employ (especially
in sensitive areas) persons who appear to be actively committed to an
extreme separatist position . At the very least we feel that a decision to
employ such persons should be taken only on the basis of a knowledge of their
records .
102 . A third issue concerns the importance which should be attached by
the Security Service or the decision-makers to the activities of young persons
at universities . The point is made that universities are traditional homes of
free thought and protest, and that the positions taken by young and inquiring .
minds should not be held "against" them in later years . We agree with this
point of view . Questionable university associations or activities should not
necessarily bar an individual from government or sensitive employment, although such activities may well be relevant in any later investigation .
103 . We are however somewhat disturbed by the tendency in certain
university circles to use the plea of academic freedom to substantiate claims
to inviolability and to privileged immunity from normal security procedures .
In the first place, we can see no objection to inquiries at universities concerning persons who are seeking government employment or security clearance . In
fact, we regard such inquiries as of special importance because the products
of universities are more likely than other persons to reach sensitive and influential positions . In any case, university authorities can be said to have the
same status as "previous employers" and should accept inquiries about
students on this basis . We see no reason why any immunity should be
accorded to members of faculties or student bodies who engage in subversive
activities . We do believe however that all inquiries at universities should be
conducted by mature, experienced and sophisticated investigators and be the
subject of sensible and balanced reporting . The Security Service should take
special care not to interfere with freedom of thought and discussion, to avoid
random inquiries concerning student activities, and to avoid overemphasizing
the importance of such activities .
104 . Fourthly, we note that the clearance of aliens or former aliens presents problems, which have become of significance now that aliens are enter37
�ing the public service in growing numbers . We feel that definite rules must be
established to deal with this question, and we think that a decision to grant a
security clearance to an alien or former alien should be taken on the basis
of positive information comparable in quality and adequacy to that which
would be obtained in Canada. Unfortunately, there will be many cases in
which it will be impossible to obtain adequate data concerning an individual
who has recently arrived from abroad, and we think that, in such cases, no
clearance should be considered until the individual has been resident in
Canada for a meaningful period and has undergone a full field investigation .
Former citizens or residents of communist countries are a special category ;
in these cases clearances should only be granted where the obvious advantages
of doing so outweigh the special risks involved.
105 . Finally, we feel that positive arrangements must be made to ensure
as far as possible that departmental judgments are consistent and balanced .
Two procedures-one general and one specific-should be adopted to this
end . In the first place, all adverse decisions and a sampling of non-adverse
decisions should be reviewed by the Security Secretariat in consultation with
the Security Service . Continuing inconsistencies or anomalies in departmental
judgments and action should soon become apparent, and the Security Secretariat can use the channels open to it to rectify the situation . Secondly, we
suggest that when a department decides to grant access to classified information in spite of the Security Service's advice or recommendation, the Security
Service must be informed of the disposition of the case, so that it can take
such action as it considers appropriate to review the department's security
posture, or to bring the department's decision to the attention of the Security
Secretariat . It seems to us that procedures of this kind will combine the
requirement for departmental responsibility for judgment with an assurance
that a department's judgment will be responsible .
Review Procedures
106 . Decisions to withhold or (especially) to withdraw clearances must
often lead to administrative decisions that may affect the careers or the livelihood of individuals . In some cases the individuals concerned find it in their
own interests to resign or agree to a transfer . There remains however a residue of cases in which the demands of natural justice may well require that
decisions affecting individuals should be subject to some form of appeal or
review at the instance of the individual concerned . A great deal of attention
has been devoted in many countries to the problem of devising a form of
review which will meet the proper requirements of national security, and the
fact that there is no simple solution to the problem is demonstrated by the
wide variety of approaches that have resulted in different countries-approaches which vary from an absence of any appeal system to an ostensible
complete depedence on formal judicial proceedings .
38
�107 . Our inquiries suggest that both extreme positions are untenable . Some
form of review system is clearly desirable in itself, as well as to meet reasonable public and parliamentary expectation . On the other hand, we are certain
that fully judicial procedures are ill-suited to the review of decisions based
on security grounds . There are a number of reasons for-this .,One reason has
in our view been overemphasized in Canada, although it still has great importance in certain circumstances ; this is the need to protect information and
sources from disclosure in any form of hearing . A second reason has not been
emphasized sufficiently ; this is the fact that decisions in this area ultimately
relate to the defence of the state ; for which the government and only the
government is responsible . Such decisions should not be surrendered to any
group outside the executive, although there is no reason why the executive
cannot seek advice in its decision-making . A third reason relates to responsibility . Ministers and deputy ministers are responsible for the security of their
departments ; they cannot reasonably be required to be bound by an outside
decision (other of course than that of the Prime Minister) on questions of
individual access to the classified material for which they are responsible . A
fourth reason is pragmatic ; if all judgments in . the area of security become
subject to, independent appeal and 'decision, the executive may tend to take
such steps as are possible to ensure that cases which merit this form of review
do not arise ; in other words, the harder it becomes . to deal with security
cases without recourse to legal and public review, the greater will be the
pressures for very rigorous-even unfairly rigorous-judgments by departments before employment, and for resort to administrative (rather than
security) measures against employees who become the subject of adverse
security reports .
108 . There are three areas in which review may be required-employment,
immigration and citizenship . Until recently the situation was that decisions
concerning dismissals of public servants (but not industrial workers) on
security grounds might be reviewed as a last resort by three members of the
Security Panel who act in a collective advisory capacity . The situation has
however been changed by recent amendments to Sections 7(7) and 7(8) of
the Financial Administration Act (S .C . 1966-67, c . 74) which read as
fo llows :
"(7) Nothing in this or any other Act shall be construed to limit, or
affect the right or power of the Governor in Council, in the interest of
the safety or security of Canada or any state allied or associated with
Canada, to suspend any person employed in the public service or, after
an inquiry conducted in accordance with : . regulations of the Governor
in Council by a person appointed by the Governor in Council at which
the person concerned has been given an opportunity of being heard, to
dismiss any such person .
'
"(8) For the purposes of subsection (7), any order made by the Governor in Council is conclusive proof of the matters stated therein in relation to the suspension or dismissal of any person in the interest of the safety
or security of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada . "
39
�Later in this chapter we suggest a means whereby this requirement for a
hearing may be met . Immigration decisions in which security is a factor may
be appealed to the Immigration Appeal Board, which may take into account
compassionate and humanitarian considerations, unless the two ministers concerned sign certificates denying discretion on other than strictly legal points
to the Board . Citizenship decisions involving security cases are decided by
the responsible minister and no appeal procedures exist at present . These
differing systems seem to us to be inconsistent, wasteful of expertise and in
the long term probably marginally dangerous to the security of the state as
well as to the rights of individuals . We have in fact encountered no very
widespread concern about these present arrangements but we feel that a new
and more formalized approach to the problem would serve to improve the
public image of security measures and still what criticism does now exist
about their fairness .
109 . We have reviewed the arguments and discussions that have taken
place over the years-particularly in ] 957 and 1963-concerning the propriety of establishing some form of security review panel to which public
servants would have access . In 1963, when the issue was considered in great
detail, the system was instituted by which three members of the Security Panel
would review any proposed recommendation to a minister for dismissal on
security grounds . At that time the main arguments advanced against the
establishment of a panel outside the public service were : first, that the
government would be subject to pressures for the extension of the proposal to
include fully judicial safeguards for the employee, and that these would inevitably compromise vital sources of security information ; secondly, that the
government would be subject to pressure for the extension of the plan to
members of the armed forces, who have their own grievance procedures, and
to employees of private firms, thus creating difficulties in the field of labourmanagement relations ; thirdly, that the proposed procedure would undermine
established managerial responsibilities and practices throughout the public
service ; and fourthly, that departments would tend to seek other methods of
dealing with security cases in order to avoid mandatory review of decisions
by a body outside the public service .
110 . We do not find these arguments completely persuasive. Briefly, we
feel that pressures for a fully judicial review system can be resisted, that
extension of a sensible system to the armed forces and to private industry
is not necessarily undesirable, that established managerial responsibilities
and practices in the public service in the area of security are not so effective
and satisfactory as to be entirely unworthy of interference, and that the
avoidance of decisions leading to mandatory review may not always be
undesirable from the point of view of national security . Further, although
we are convinced that great care is exercised in the handling of individual
cases, we are unimpressed by the operation of the system for final review
th at was adopted in 1963 . We do not think it impossible to devise a different
system which will provide for meaningful review of the decisions of depart-
40
�ments, preserve the requirement for governmental responsibility and decision, give adequate protection to sensitive information and sources yet
provide a reasonably effective, safeguard against . arbitrary, hasty or illconsidered judgments, and perhaps also avoid the necessity for ad hoc
inquiries into individual cases .
111 . In our attempt to devise such a system we have kept in mind three
principles . First, it seems to us vital that individuals (except applicants
for employment-and independent applicants for immigration) who are the
subjects of decisions on security grounds should be given as many details
as possible of the factors which have entered into the decisions . Quite
clearly there will be some cases in which little information can be made
available to the individual, but normally, in the general run of cases relating
to membership of associations, residence of relations and character defects,
it should be relatively simple to indicate the relevant factors-without disclosing sensitive sources . At the very least it is certain that in areas such as
employment, immigration and citizenship, in which decisions may be made
either on security or on non-security grounds, it is essential to inform the
subject of the category into which his case falls, so that he is able to take
the appropriate steps if he wishes his case to be reviewed .
112 . Secondly, as we have already implied, we maintain that the decisions
of a board concerned with the review of security matters can only be
advisory. Security is a function in which the safety of the state is involved,
and in such . an area the government must exercise its right to govern ; no
independent or extra-governmental. body can assume-this role. In practical
terms the board must review the final decisions of departments and advise
the Prime Minister and the minister concerned of the results of this review .
113 . Thirdly, we consider that security is an area in which expertise and
understanding are important . We consider it wasteful that expertise in this
area should be acquired and then used only in a few individual cases or
specialized areas ; all security decisions have much in common, and the
same board should review contentious decisions in all appropriate areas .
114 . In fact, we suggest that a new Board should be established to deal
with a variety of appeals against security decisions . The general responsibility of this . Board would be to review decisions made in the . area of
security in order to ensure that the rights of individuals had not been
unnecessarily abrogated or restricted in the interests of the security of the
state and its allies, and that no unnecessary distress had been caused to
individuals . The Board would deal with the following types of cases :
(a) Protests by public servants (including members of the armed
forces) who wish to appeal against a departmental . decision to
dismiss or transfer them on security grounds . In cases of dismissal,
the Board would provide the form of hearing required by Section
7(7) of the 1967 amendments .to the .Financial Administration Act
(S .C . 1966-67, c . 74) :
41
�(b) Protests by public servants against denial of promotion or against
an apparent inhibition of career prospects on security grounds . Cases
of this kind will normally only come to light after appeal through
normal channels to a Promotion Appeal Board if this Board feels
it necessary to advise the applicant of the true reason for failure
to take some such administrative action as posting or transfer .
(c) Protests by industrial workers against dismissal or transfer or against .
denial of promotion or apparent inhibition of career prospects on
security grounds .
(d) Protests by such persons as consultants or university faculty members
where withdrawal of clearance affects professional careers .
(e) Protests by sponsors or nominators against refusal on security
grounds to admit to Canada potential immigrants they have sponsored or nominated, and protests by sponsors or nominators against
refusal to grant landed immigrant status to a person already in
Canada whom they could have sponsored or nominated if he were
abroad .
(f) Protests by applicants for citizenship who have been refused on
security grounds .
115 . It will be noted that there are three categories of persons who we
think should have no' access to the Review Board . Nor should these classes
of persons be given any indication that the reasons for adverse decisions are
based on security grounds . These categories are as follows :
(a) Failed candidates for employment as public servants . An applicant
for employment knowingly places himself in a competitive situation,
and presumably appreciates that any decision concerning him will
be made on the basis of a complex of factors ; there is absolutely
no'requirement for the employer-in this case, the government-to
enter into controversy with an applicant by informing him of the
reasons for his .failure . Similar considerations apply to failed applicants for employment in industry, and to consultants and faculty
members who are denied clearance as opposed to having an existing
clearance withdrawn .
(b) Independent applicants for immigration resident abroad . Although
the Canadian Government is committed by common justice and
humanity to give fair consideration to all cases, it would be inappropriate for it to be placed in the position of having to enter into a
controversy concerning security with a citizen of another country
without sponsors .
(c) Persons without sponsors or nominators who enter Canada ostensibly
as visitors and then request a change of status to that of landed
immigrant . We see no reason why such persons should be treated
differently from independent applicants for immigration resident
abroad ; as such they should have no access to the Review Board .
42
�116 . In addition, it should be noted that persons who have already passed
through the immigration screening process (on their- own behalf or . through
sponsors or nominators) and have been formally admitted to Canada as
landed immigrants should have no need to appeal to this Board . We think
that deportation of such persons should be regarded as a most serious
punitive act, and that decisions to deport, even if taken on security grounds,
should be subject to formal judicial due process and appeal rather than
to a review by the kind of board we envisage . If the situation is such that
the government is unwilling to disclose acceptable and satisfactory evidence,
we feel that deportation_ should not be ordered .' As long as immigration
controls are reasonably rigorous and effective, such situations should not
often arise .
117 . The Security Review Board we envisage should consist of a Chairman and (say) two other members, 'all nominated by the Governor in
Council, and should meet as the need arises . The Board . should be independent of any government department or agency although its secretarial
support would be provided by the. Security Secretariat . Its members should
not be active government officials, although they would of course be subject
to government security screening procedures : The Board's procedures should
be on the following lines : ,
(a) An employee, sponsor or nominator of an immigrant, or applicant
for citizenship about whom an adverse decision has been made on
security grounds and who decides to apply for an inquiry is provided
with a document indicating to the extent possible without compromising sensitive information or sources the reasons for the adverse
decision .
(b) The Board interviews separately and privately representatives of
the department concerned, representatives of the security authorities,
the person concerned (who may be accompanied by any friend,
lawyer or trade union official he wishes to nominate) and any other
individuals whom the person wishes to be heard . The Board may
interview these persons as many times as it considers necessary to
gain a full understanding of the case . The Board is not bound to
make its decision and render its advice solely on the basis of the
evidence brought before it, and may order such further inquiries
as it considers appropriate . As all those who appear before the
Board are interviewed separately, there is no direct confrontation or
cross-examination, but the Board may of course ask questions based
as previous testimony .
(c) The advice of the Board on a given case, the reasons for this advice
and any recommendations or comments which the Board considers
appropriate are communicated by the Board to the Governor in
Council and the minister concerned . A brief record of the Board's
decision is also communicated to the individual concerned . When th e
43
�advice of the Board has been received, any further action on the case
is considered by the Prime Minister in the light of this advice .
118 . The suggestion has been made that recent legislation affecting the
public service, especially the Public Service Employment Act, the Public
Services Staff Relations Act and Amendments to the Financial Administration Act (S .C . 1966-67, c . 71, c . 72 and c . 74), together with the grievance
procedures which stem from them, may make it difficult in future to deal
with individual security cases in the manner we outline above . We have
considered the existing legislation, however, and believe that the government's position is secured by Section 112 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, which reads as follows :
"(1) Nothing in this or any other Act shall be construed to require the
employer to do or refrain from doing anything contrary to any instruction, direction or regulation given or made by or on behalf of the Government of Canada in the interest of the safety or security of Canada or
any state allied or associated with Canada .
"(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), any order made by the Governor
in Council is conclusive proof of the matters stated therein in relation
to the giving or making of any instruction, direction or regulation by
or on behalf of the Government of Canada in the interest of the safety
or security of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada . "
44
�V. IMMIGRATION AND SECURIT Y
Present Procedures
General Considerations
119 . The principle, is firmly established that . Canada's requirement for
immigrants must be balanced .against and reconciled with the need to protect
the safety and health of the state and its ;peop!e by excluding certain classes
of persons who appear to be undesirable : This undesirability may take a
variety, of forms ; individuals may be undesirable because they lack skills
which will enable them to support themselves and their families ; they may be
undesirable because they are physically or mentally unhealthy or have
criminal records involving moral turpitude . The need for some form of
screening to exclude such persons is generally understood and accepted .
120 . Unfortunately in present- circumstances individuals may also be
undesirable on security grounds : their past records of activities or associations may suggest that they are likely to behave in ways which may be
detrimental to the security of Canada or -her allies . Accordingly, Canada,
in common with almost all other states, attempts to exclude persons who
represent a potential danger in the fields of subversion or espionage . It is
however admittedly a difficult task to assess how great a potential danger
any particular individual represents, and, because of the almost complete
absence of satisfactory data concerning the behaviour of different classes
of immigrants after their arrival in Canada, it is hard to assess after the
event the effectiveness of the security screening programme .
121 . It should be noted, first, that only a very small proportion of potential immigrants who are excluded from Canada are refused on security
grounds ; most refusals are on grounds of health or lack of skills . In numerical
terms the security screening programme has a negligible effect on the total
number of immigrants who enter Canada . Secondly, we have already mentioned in general terms Canadian responsibilities to her allies for security
measures . In the area of immigration policy, because of the open border
with the United States, this responsibility is of special importance .
Classes of Immigrants
122 . Canada's immigration regulations,, which had become extremely
complex and inconsistent, underwent a major revision in October 1967 . The y
45
�now provide for the admission of four classes of immigrants, and the distinction between these classes must be appreciated if security screening procedures
are to be understood :
(a) Sponsored dependants: every person residing in Canada who is a
Canadian citizen or a person lawfully admitted to Canada for
permanent residence (i .e ., a landed immigrant) is entitled to sponsor
for admission to Canada for permanent residence any of the following so-called "dependants" : husband, wife, fiance(e) and accompanying unmarried children under 21 of fiancee(e) ; unmarried
children under 21 ; parents or grandparents over 60 or under 60 if
incapable of gainful employment and accompanying immediate
family of parents or grandparents ; orphaned brothers, sisters,
nephews, nieces, or grandchildren under 18 ; children who were
adopted under 18, and who are unmarried and under 21 ; certain
children under 13 whom the sponsor intends to adopt ; and (under
certain conditions) one other of the sponsor's next closest relatives .
(b) Nominated relatives : every person residing in Canada as a Canadian
citizen or landed immigrant may nominate for admission to Canada
for permanent residence any of his or her children over 21, married
children under 21, brothers and sisters, parents and grandparents
under 60 years of age, nieces, nephews, uncles, aunts and grandchildren .
(c) Independent applicants : those without sponsors or nominators .
(d) Applicants already present in Canada : persons who have entered the
country as non-immigrants and wish to change their status .
123 . Sponsored dependants are admissible without regard to their skills,
personal qualifications or the financial circumstances of the sponsor . They
are ordinarily admitted without question unless barred for serious reasons
of health, criminal activity, or security . Nominated relatives and independent
applicants must, in order to be admissible, pass a series of selection tests
relating to their occupational skill and educational level and a number of
other factors . A nominated relative is presumably coming to Canada to earn
a living, and, unlike the sponsored dependant, must satisfy some criteria as
to his ability to do so . In practice, these prospective immigrants are assessed
points, according to their education, personal qualities, and other factors .
An immigrant who ranks high in each of these categories is likely to be
accepted subject to medical and security screening . Other factors taken into
account, particularly in the case of independent applicants, include employment arrangements, knowledge of English or French, and area of destination .
Applicants already present in Canada (i .e ., non-immigrants in Canada who
apply for permanent admission and landed immigrant status) are admissible
on essentially the same bases as if they had been examined abroad, except
that those who do not qualify as sponsored dependants must meet a somewhat higher selection standard than if they had applied abroad .
46
�Security Screening of Immigrant s
124 . The security screening programme for prospective immigrants was
originally established in 1947 with the following objective : "To deny admission to any persons who, from their known history and background, would
be unlikely to adapt themselves to the Canadian way of life and to our
democratic form of government" . The authority for the present programme
derives from the Immigration Act (R .S .C . 1952, c. 325), Section 5 of
which states that no person shall be admitted to Canada as an immigrant
if he is a member of any of certain classes of persons . These classes include :
"(d) persons who have been convicted of or admit having committed any
crime involving moral turpitude, except persons whose admission to
Canada is authorized by the Governor in Council upon evidence satisfactory to him tha t
(i) at least five years, in the case of a person who was convicted of such
crime when he was twenty-one or more years of age, or at least two
years, in the case of a person who was convicted of such . crime when
he was under twenty-one years of age, have elapsed since the
termination of his period of imprisonment or completion of sentence
and, in either case, he has successfully rehabilitated himself, o r
(ii) in the case of a person who admits to having committed such crime
of which he was not convicted, at least five years, in the case of a
person who committed such- crime when he was twenty-one or more
years of . age, or at least two years, in the case of a person who
committed such crime when he-was under twenty-one years of age,
have elapsed since the date of commission of the crime and, in
either .case, he has successfully rehabilitated himself ;
(e) prostitutes, homosexuals or persons living on the avails of prostitution
or homosexualism, pimps, or persons coming to Canada for these or any
other immoral purposes .
(f) persons who attempt to bring into Canada or procure prostitutes or other
persons for the purpose of prostitution, homosexual or other immoral
purposes ; . . .
(1) persons who are or have been, at any time before or after the commencement of this . Act, members of or associated with any organization,
group or body of any kind concerning which there are reasonable grounds
for believing that it promotes or advocates or at the time of such membership or association promoted or advocated subversion by force or other
means of democratic government, institutions or processes, as they are
understood in Canada, except persons who, satisfy the Minister that they
have ceased to be members of or associated with - such organizations,
groups or bodies and whose admission would not be detrimental to the
security of Canada ;
(m) persons who have engaged in or advocated or concerning whom there
are reasonable grounds for believing they' are likely to engage in or advocate subversion by force or other means of democratic government,
institutions or processes, as they are understood in Canada ;
(n) persons concerning whom there are reasonable grounds for believing they
are likely to engage in espionage, sabotage or any other . subversive activity
directed against Canada or detrimental to the security of Canada ; . . .
47
�(q) persons who have been found guilty of espionage with respect to Her
Majesty or any of Her Majesty's allies ;
(r) persons who have been found guilty of high treason or treason against or
of conspiring against Her Majesty or of assisting Her Majesty's enemies
in time of war, or of any similar offence against any of Her Majesty's
allies ; . . . "
125 . Certain arrangements have been developed over the years in order
to decide whether immigrants fall within these prohibited classes . These
arrangements necessarily vary from country to country, but information
about a prospective immigrant may be acquired from the application form
itself, by personal interview, or in some cases through liaison with authorities
in the immigrant's country of origin . As can be imagined the quality of
the information obtained from these authorities varies widely ; there are
some places where the situation is such that, through no fault of their own,
the authorities are often unable to furnish useful information ; in some
other countries (including those within the communist bloc) no liaison
with the authorities is practicable, and the main reliance is placed upon
interviews with the potential immigrant and upon the security screening
of the immigrant's sponsor in Canada . The information bearing on the
suitability of individuals is considered by Canadian officials located in the
countries concerned in relation to a set of criteria (which also vary from
country to country and according to whether the immigrant is sponsored,
nominated or independent) . If in the judgment of these officials the circumstances are such that the applicant should be refused on security
grounds, in certain instances the case is referred to Ottawa for decision .
126 . A further element of variation is introduced by the fact that sponsored dependants are normally not themselves the subjects of security examination . Instead, the sponsor is checked against the subversive records in
Ottawa and only if an adverse trace is found is a security check of the
dependant instituted in his own country . In the case of nominated relatives,
both the nominator and the relative are ordinarily subject to some form of
security screening . Independent applicants are normally subject to full
screening .
127 . It should be emphasized that, according to the present procedures,
the officials in the field do not make the final decision to reject a sponsored
dependant on security grounds ; this decision rests ultimately with the Department of Manpower and Immigration . Cases are studied by departmental
officials and a decision is normally made by the Director of the Home
Branch and the Deputy Minister. In addition, if any particular case appears
to be somewhat sensitive or contentious, it may, at the discretion of the
Department, be referred to an ad hoc Interdepartmental Committee of
officials . The function of this body, which is entiely advisory, is to make
a recommendation to the Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration
as to whether the prospective immigrant should be admitted or refused .
48
�The advice of the Committee may be rejected by the Deputy Minister or
the Minister of Manpower and Immigration .
Deportation and Appeal Procedures
128 . Until 1967, facilities for appeal were available only to persons who
had been ordered deported, and not to those who had been refused admission as immigrants . The then existing Immigration Appeal Board dealt
only with deportation orders, and was advisory to the Minister of Manpower
and Immigration . This situation was changed by the Immigration Appeal
Board Act of 1967 (R .S .C. 1966-67, c . 90) . The new Board established
under this Act is concerned with both immigration and deportation, may
hear and consider' humanitarian and compassionate as well as legal factors,
and commands some of the discretionary power previously vested in the
Minister of Manpower and Immigration . An appeal may be made on any
ground that involves law or fact or mixed law and fact by a person against
whom an order of deportation has been issued, or by the sponsor (if a
Canadian citizen) of a dependant against refusal . to admit the dependant.
It should be noted that neither nominators of relatives, nor independent
applicants outside Canada, have a right of appeal, but an applicant already
in the country may appeal against a deportation order whether or not he is
sponsored or nominated . This right of appeal, incidentally, applies even to
stowaways or deserting seamen .
129 . In cases of deportation the Immigration Appeal Board may, in
addition to ruling on the legal correctness of the deportation order, consider
whether the order should be stayed or quashed on compassionate or humanitarian grounds . At the stage when the Board has confirmed the legal correctness of the order, a certificate signed' jointly by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration and the Solicitor General may be introduced stating
that in their opinion on the basis of confidential security reports it would be
contrary to the national interest for the Board to stay or quash the order on
compassionate or humanitarian grounds . On receiving such a certificate the
Board has no alternative but to allow the order to proceed . A similar certificate may be issued to prevent the Board from exercising its discretion on
compassionate or humanitarian grounds in cases where sponsored dependants are refused visas .
Comments and Alternative s
Data and Decision s
130 . We have several times referred to the need for scrupulously formulated and consistently enforced security policies and procedures, and we feel
that this requirement applies with special force in areas such as immigration
where there is an immediate impact on the lives of individuals but no im49
�mediate question of access to classified information . We realize that some
anomalies are inevitable, but we believe that the basic principles should be
clear and unequivocal .
131 . We feel that data must be acquired as far as possible about the
criminal and security records of all prospective immigrants to Canada irrespective of relationship, sponsorship, or country of origin . We can see no
reason why, in the case of sponsored dependants, efforts are made to acquire
information about the immigrant himself only if a check of the sponsor
against the subversive records has produced some adverse trace . We cannot
understand why the state should deny itself the use of available means of
inquiry concerning an immigrant merely because he is sponsored . In our
view, security and criminal checking of the sponsor should be a substitute
for the screening of the potential immigrant only when no information is
available on the immigrant himself .
132 . We fully appreciate that on humanitarian grounds it is necessary to
apply rejection criteria with leniency in the cases of close relatives, and
especially where husbands or wives, aged persons or children are concerned,
but we would point out that sponsored dependants are a large class and
include many persons whose connection with the sponsor may be relatively
remote . In general we feel that unless humanitarian considerations are
judged to be overriding, significantly adverse security reports on an adult
immigrant should lead to rejection, as should significantly adverse reports
on a sponsor or nominator in cases where the immigrant himself cannot
be checked .
133 . We have noted that the final decision to admit or reject a prospective immigrant rests with the Department of Manpower and Immigration,
even where an objection has been raised on security grounds . We recognize
the ultimate responsibility of the Department for the acceptance or rejection
of immigrants, but we feel that the Department's responsibility in the area
of security is analogous to that exercised by all departments for their own
security . In particular, the significance to be attached to an adverse security
report would be best evaluated in conjunction with specialists in security .
134 . We believe that security procedures in the area of immigration
could be much improved if there were an upgrading of the quality, maturity,
and training of the concerned officials in the field . A working knowledge
of the local language, for example, would seem to be imperative . Given
such an upgrading, however, we feel that the decisions of the officials in the
field, who have immediate knowledge of the applicant, should carry great
weight .
135 . If the officials in the field are uncertain about the admission or
rejection of any applicant on security grounds, the case should be referred
to Ottawa for . consideration by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the Security Service, and, at the option of either one, the Securit y
50
�Secretariat . In addition, every case of rejection of a sponsored dependant or
nominated relative should be reviewed jointly by these agencies in Ottawa .
Humanitarian considerations relating to dependants or relatives will thus be
introduced into the decision process in Ottawa, as will representations from
interested persons in Canada about particular applications . Only if no agreement can be reached by the Department and the security authorities on any
of these cases should the Minister's final responsibility for decision-making
be exercised, and even then he should be in receipt of briefs on a particular
case both from his Department and from the security authorities . . In addition, the Security Secretariat should assume responsibility for a continuing
audit and review of a sample of field decisions in order to detect any significant biases in the decisions made at particular locations .
Rejection Criteria
136 . Even with these revised arrangements the officials in the field will
continue to need guidelines on which to base their judgments although, given
officials of adequate calibre and experience, these guidelines need not be so
binding in detail as the rejection criteria have been in the past . We regard
the present criteria for sponsored dependants and nominated relatives as
unnecessarily complex and somewhat illogical, and the criteria for independent applicants as obscure and outdated . We think that one set of criteria
should apply to all countries and all cases .
137 . We have tried our hand at drafting a set of general and universally
applicable guidelines, or factors that should be considered by the officials
in the field in making initial judgments of potential immigrants from the point
of view of security . In considering the following- guidelines three points
should be noted . First, these guidelines relate only to security and are not
intended to affect judgments of acceptability in other civil or criminal
contexts as laid down in the Immigration Act . Secondly, the guidelines should
be interpreted with mature judgment by the officials on the spot according
to their understanding of local conditions . Thirdly, elements of leniency
should be introduced into the decision process in Ottawa, and should not
be the concern of the officials using these guidelines abroad . In general, we
think that persons in the following classes should be rejected :
(a) Persons who are believed on reasonable grounds to have held at any time
an official position in a communist, neo-Nazi, neo-Fascist or other subversive or revolutionary organization, or .to have held a government, party,
public or other senior position or appointment known to be given only
to reliable members of such an organization .
(b) Persons who are believed on reasonable grounds to have held membership
within the past ten years in a communist, neo-Nazi, neo-Fascist or other
subversive or revolutionary organization, unless the applicant can demonstrate that membership was for trivial, practical, non-ideological or other
acceptable reasons .
(c) Persons who are suspected on reasonable grounds to be or to have
been at any time agents on behalf of a communist, neo-Nazi, neo-Fascis t
51
�or other subversive or revolutionary organization, or to have taken part
in sabotage or other clandestine activities or agitation on behalf of such
an organization .
(d) Persons who for unexplained reasons engage in significant misrepresentation or untruthfulness in completing documents for immigration purposes
or during interviews .
We suggest also that similar guidelines should be used in Ottawa in making
judgments both about sponsors or nominators on those occasions when no
direct check of the applicant has been possible, and about applicants who
are already in Canada .
138 . Certain points must be added about applicants from the communist
bloc and Hong Kong . As far as the communist bloc is concerned, we do not
accept the argument that anyone who leaves a communist country is
necessarily a non-communist or an anti-communist . However, we are sure
that the acceptance of dependants and relatives from communist countries
can often be justified on humanitarian grounds, although we have some
reservations about the remoteness of the, dependants and relatives who may
now be sponsored or nominated . In these cases we feel that the sponsor or
nominator should be screened against criminal and subversive records, and a
significant adverse report should be balanced against the humanitarian
considerations . We feel that independent applicants from communist countries must not normally be accepted unless they have first established sufficient residence in a country where facilities exist to carry out a meaningful
check on their character and background . In certain other circumstances,
even this requirement may, after careful consideration, be waived (say, in
the case of a communist scientist of international repute), but we feel that
the principle must remain . To ignore or regularly to contravene it would in
our opinion cast doubt on the value of the entire security screening programme . It would encourage communist governments to make use of an
obvious opportunity to infiltrate persons into .North America, and, when
combined with the current case of entry into the Canadian public service,
would eventually invalidate (or at least call into question) the basic governmental security programme .
139 . The acceptance of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong presents
another series of special problems, which arise largely from the inadequacy
of Canadian security screening procedures in Hong Kong . The Canadian
authorities depend in many cases entirely on the results of an interview,
conducted through an interpreter by an officer who does not speak Chinese
and is not particularly expert in Chinese affairs . We think that these arrangements must be rapidly and extensively revised . Some years residence in
Hong Kong itself or in an area where some meaningful check is possible
must be made mandatory . Fingerprints are a clear requirement . There is
no doubt that fingerprinting is the only sure method of establishing identity
and facilitating criminal traces, particularly in Hong Kong ; available statistic s
52
�make quite apparent the additional positive traces that are revealed by
fingerprint checks . Furthermore in cases of doubt the fingerprints of the
individual to whom the visa is issued should be compared at the port of
entry with the fingerprints of the person who actually arrives .
140. We consider in fact that the requirement for fingerprinting should
be extended to all prospective immigrants to Canada, irrespective of their
country of origin or the immigration class into which they fall . In many cases
meaningful checks of criminal records cannot be carried out without fingerprints, and in addition they may well be of importance in establishing
identity. In this connection, we note that most other western countries
fingerprint prospective immigrants .
Applicants in Canada
141 . The granting of landed status to unscreened non-immigrants . who
are for one reason or another already present in Canada has historically
constituted a significant gap in Canadian security defences . The extent of
this problem is shown by the fact that on three occasions in the past ten
years (in 1958, 1960 and 1966) the Department of Manpower and Immigration found it necessary to make arrangements to grant so-called amnesties
to persons who were in Canada illegally . We believe that steps must be
taken to ensure that persons who apply for landed immigrant status after
arrival in this country are not entitled to any form of appeal or review to
which they would not have had access had they applied through normal
channels . In other words, independent applicants who cannot satisfy the
security (and other) criteria they would have been required to satisfy in
their country of origin should be deported without appeal . Sponsors of
dependants should have the same access to the Security Review Board they
would have had if the dependant had been abroad . Furthermore, we think
that this access should be extended to nominators of relatives who are refused visas or landed status . If the Review Board's recommendations is
adverse and is accepted by the government, no further appeal should be
possible .
Deportation and Appeal
142 . Our views on one important aspect of deportation and appeal
procedures have already been outlined . We feel that the deportation of an
immigrant who has been formally landed in Canada is a most serious matter,
and that it is right that any such order should be subject to formal judicial
due process and appeal before a body such as the Immigration Appeal
Board. If the government is unwilling to produce acceptable and satisfactory
evidence, we feel that deportation should not be ordered . Such situations
should not often arise, if reasonably effective immigration screening procedures exist .
53
�143 . However, it seems to us inequitable that an individual who has not
been granted landed immigrant status should have-access to _ a fully judicial
system of appeal against deportation on security grounds, when an applicant
abroad has no such right . Individuals can attempt to evade our immigration
regulations by entering the country as visitors and making use of the process
of appeal now available to them . We think however that the sponsors or
nominators of prospective immigrants (but not the prospective immigrants
themselves) should be able to request the review of decisions taken on
security grounds to refuse immigrant visas or (in the case of persons already
here) landed status to those whom they have sponsored or nominated .
This review should be undertaken not by the Immigration Appeal Board,
but by the Security Review Board that we suggest in Chapter IV . We believe
that access to a review board of this kind will in the long term be considerably more satisfactory than present procedures .
Aliens Registration
144 . We have given some consideration to the usefulness in Canadian
circumstances of an aliens registration procedure . In the most usual form
of this procedure an alien entering a country is required to complete a
document at time of entry, and to file with the government at regular intervals (or at each change of address) details of his location, status and
occupation . This process is continued until the alien either becomes a
citizen or leaves the country . Experience with such systems has shown that
only . a relatively small percentage of those who should make returns do
so, and that it is difficult to enforce sanctions against delinquents . The
most rewarding aspect of the process is that it may help to provide some
data concerning the activities of a sampling of immigrants, and thus provide
a basis for judgments about the usefulness and effectiveness of screening
procedures . There is serious doubt however whether an aliens registration
system is the best way of achieving this limited objective, because those
persons who do not respond most probably include those who have engaged
in dubious activities . It would appear that a continuing programme of
follow-up studies of samples of the immigrant population would have considerably more validity .
145 . We understand that a system is in force in Canada whereby visitors
entering the country complete a form, which is retained on record until their
departure ; this provides some check that individuals do not overstay their
visas . Beyond this, however, we think it impracticable to go .
54
�VI . CITIZENSHIP, PASSPORTS AND VISA S
Present Citizenship Procedure s
146. The grant of Canadian citizenship is a prerogative of the Crown,
exercised in practice by the minister responsible for the administration
of the Canadian Citizenship Act (R .S .C. 1952, c . 33), at present the
Secretary of State . Citizenship may be awarded to individuals who comply
with certain administrative and residential qualifications, but may be withheld by the minister in the public interest .
147 . The following procedures for granting citizenship have developed
over the years . Application for citizenship may be made after a person has
been resident in Canada for at least five of the eight years and twelve of
the eighteen months immediately preceding his application . Non-British
subjects apply in person either to one of the 13 departmental or the . more
than 250 local courts . British subjects may apply by mail to the Registrar of
Canadian Citizenship or to one of the departmental courts . The applicant's name is checked-against the subversive records of the RCMP, and the
Citizenship court may conduct a check of local criminal records . NonBritish applicants are then subject to an oral interview by a citizenship
court and, if no significant adverse information on the individual has come
to light and he possesses the proper residence, language and administrative
requirements, the applicant is advised that the court is satisfied with his
qualifications and is making a favourable recommendation to the department. If he lacks a specific qualification-knowledge of English or French,
for example-the applicant is informed of this fact .
148 . The recommendation of the court and the RCMP security report
are received in the Department and, in the absence of adverse information,
the Registrar of Citizenship authorizes the issuance of a certificate to the
applicant at a citizenship ceremony . If adverse information is received from
the RCMP, the case -is examined by an Interdepartmental Committee of
officials . The significance of. the security information is considered, together
with such factors as age, marital status, occupation', place and length of
residence in Canada, and generally the circumstances and conditions of the
applicant concerned . After a review of all the relevant data, the . Committee
may recommend that the application be approved, rejected, or deferred .
55
�149 . When the Committee's recommendation has been received by the
Department of the Secretary of State, the Minister exercises his discretion .
In practice the Registrar of Canadian Citizenship authorizes conferral where
the recommendation has been in favour of the applicant, and the Secretary
of State or the Under Secretary of State acting on his behalf makes the
decision where the recommendation has been for deferral or rejection .
The Minister himself will make the final decision on an application, where
sensitive or contentious political issues may be involved . If the Department
accepts a recommendation from the Committee that citizenship should not
be granted, the applicant is simply advised by the Department that he has
been rejected, but is given no specific reasons to explain his unacceptability .
It is often quite obvious to the applicant, however, in view of the fact that
a court has earlier indicated that it has no objections to his application, that
security considerations have been the cause of his rejection .
150 . In the earlier years of its operation, the Committee tended to base
its recommendations on rather rigid and arbitrary criteria, and to recommend the rejection of applicants suspected of being sympathetic to subversive causes and organizations . Such an attitude has more recently come
to be regarded as unrealistic and a more lenient approach has been adopted .
Furthermore, the Committe makes its judgments in the knowledge that
its recommendation does not result in a permanent refusal ; any rejected
applicant can make an indefinite number of further applications at intervals
of at least two years .
151 . An applicant for citizenship has at present no right to appeal a
rejection on security grounds . Although a Citizenship Appeal Court has
recently been established to hear appeals resulting from a negative decision
by a citizenship court, this body has no relevance to security cases as an
appeal is possible only in connection with a rejection by a local court,
which is not authorized to consider questions of security .
Citizenship and Securit y
152 . Our assessment of the efficiency and the value of our system of
security screening of applicants for citizenship is naturally based on our
view of the relative threats that may be posed to the security of Canada
by citizens and non-citizens . There are undeniably certain material advantages to be gained by the possession of citizenship, including the right to
vote, the right to run for public office, the right to a Canadian passport, the
right to enter Canada, and the right to be employed in certain occupations
and professions. It is true that many of these privileges are more or less
available to the non-citizen who is determined to avail himself of them,
although in some cases it may be necessary to make a false declaration
(with a minimal risk of discovery) in order . to do so . A resident noncitizen, for example, can remain in and return to Canada almost at will
provided he complies with Canadian law ; he can vote if he so desires (n o
56
�check of qualifications is normally made during the compilation of voters'
lists) ; and he could probably even run for office after reasonably lengthy
residence .
153 . One of the more important advantages of Canadian citizenship is
the legal acquisition . of a Canadian passport, and the ability to travel as a
Canadian . On the other hand, a resident without a Canadian passport is not
necessarily restricted in his ability to travel . Most countries will extend or
renew their passports indefinitely even if the bearer continues to be absent
from his country of origin . There is also of course the possibility that a
Canadian passport may be deliberately acquired in order to be made
available for hostile use . It would appear to us however that foreign intelligence services can obtain an adequate supply of Canadian passpo rt s by other
and simpler methods, and we would not regard it as very likely that individuals would seek Canadian citizenship merely to obtain passpo rt s for
such purposes . Other less tangible considerations have been advanced in
support of the maintenance of existing criteria for refusal of citizenship,
including the arguments that to award citizenship to communists would be
to make a mocke ry of the Oath of Allegiance, and that any relaxation of
procedures would represent a .communist propaganda victory .
154 . We have considered all these factors from the admittedly limited
point of view of security, and have concluded that on balance the danger
posed to the security of Canada and her allies by a Canadian resident
legally admitted as a landed immigrant is only marginally diminished by lack
of citizenship, and only marginally increased by possession of citizenship .
The individual in question is, and will remain, - a resident, and we are not
persuaded that his capabilities in the fields of espionage or subversion will
be significantly enhanced by a citizenship certifi cate .
155 . While we are impressed with present attempts to ensure objectivity
and consistency in the app lication of the existing procedures, we feel that
there still remains an. element of unfairness in denying citizenship to an
individual who has been a resident of Canada for five years when his
actions have not been illegal* and represent no immediate and direct threat
to the security of Canada . We suggest that as a general rule citizenship
should be withheld only for actual illegalities or c ri minal acts ; in the area
of security, these would include espionage, treason and similar offences .
Membership in communist organizations or even .of the Party itself, however,
should not constitute causes for rejection .
156 . We think however that there will remain some occasions on which
it will be appropriate for the Minister to exercise his discretion to refuse
citizenship on security grounds . We have in mind, for example, cases in
which an applicant has taken certain actions clearly constituting a significant
risk to security, but which it may not be in the public interest to prosecute
or which may not in themselves be i llegal . Such cases could include an
57
�applicant who had had recent clandestine meetings with an intelligence agent
of a foreign power, or who had shown other evidence of being an agent or
informer of a foreign power . There may be nothing that could be proved
to be illegal about such meetings, but it would probably be inappropriate to
grant citizenship to an applicant in these circumstances, and the Minister's
discretion must, we feel, continue to apply to such cases . We envisage that
all those whose applications for citizenship are rejected on security grounds
should have access to the Security Review Board described in Chapter IV .
Existing Passport Procedure s
157 . Passports in Canada are issued to Canadian citizens by the Passport
Division of the Department of External Affairs . Theoretically, a passport
cannot be demanded as of right, as its issue constitutes an exercise of the
royal prerogative . In practice, however, the granting of passports has tended
to be regarded by the government as a service, and only a very few categories
of citizens-for example, those who owe money to the Department of External Affairs for repatriation-are denied passports . It has not been government policy to deny a passport to a Canadian citizen on security grounds
unless travel abroad by the person concerned can be judged to represent a
grave threat to our national security .
158 . In order to acquire a Canadian passport a-person living in Canada
and claiming to be a Canadian citizen completes an application form in
which he claims Canadian citizenship by birth, by naturalization or under
some other provision of the Canadian Citizenship Act . If he is naturalized,
proof of citizenship must be provided ; if he claims to have been born in Canada, no documentation of any kind is required . The application must normally
be endorsed by a guarantor, who must belong to one of a number of groups
or professions . (There are currently some 300,000 eligible guarantors in
Canada .) The guarantor signs a statement to the effect that he has known
the applicant for at least two years, and believes the data contained in the
application to be true, but this statement is neither witnessed nor made under
oath . Neither is the requirement for a guarantor mandatory . If, for example,
an applicant claims that he has not resided in a particular location long
enough for any guarantor to know him well, he may go to a Commissioner
for Oaths, Notary Public or Justice of the Peace and file a statutory declaration to this effect . The completed application may then be mailed to the
Passport Office in Ottawa or presented over the counter . If it appears to be
in order, the passport (valid for five years and renewable for a further five
years) is mailed to the address provided in the application, or handed over
the counter to the applicant or his messenger . About 300,000 Canadian
passports are now issued each year .
159 . Applicants for a Canadian passport living outside Canada apply to
the Canadian diplomatic mission (Embassy, High Commissioner's Office,
or Legation) or Canadian Consular or Trade Office in their country o f
58
�residence . All such applic ants must provide documentation whe ther they
claim citizenship by birth or by naturalization .
Passports and Security
160 . We are fully aware that a passport is not intended to be a guarantee
of its bearer's loyalty and reliability, and we are in full agreement with the
policy that passports should not be denied to Canadian citizens on security
grounds . We would not deny freedom to travel even to known subversives,
nor would we. place limitations on the geographical validity of their passports . We do believe however .that urgent steps must be taken to ensure
that the Canadian passport is a document of integrity, issued only to those
persons who are entitled to receive it . This is not the case at present, in
spite of certain minor innovations which have been introduced into the
system of issuance recently . In Canada Canadian passports are in effect issued
indiscriminately to any person who claims to have been born in Canada ;.
no evidence of birth is required, nor are any effective checks made to,
ensure that the applicant (or his ostensible guarantor) exists . The guarantor
system can be readily circumvented by means of the statutory declaration,
and Canadian passports are delivered by mail even to a box number or
accommodation address .
161 . Canada has acquired a dubious international reputation . with regard
to her passports, and there is evidence that hostile intelligence services have
concentrated on the acquisition of Canadian documentation because of this
relative ease of procurement . In her own self-interest Canada should exercise
considerably more stringent control in this area, and in addition there is
the consideration that a Canadian passport acquired by hostile authorities
will in many cases not be used in Canada . As a member of the western
alliance, Canada has an obligation to implement an adequate system of passport control, and not to represent a vulnerable link .
162 . We have compared our procedures with those which exist in certain
NATO and Commonwealth countries . Canada is unique among these nations
in that she does not require a certification of birth from anyone claiming to
have been boni in Canada . In most other countries, passports are issued by
local authorities with the details of the application subject to verification
from available records . Most countries require a personal appearance by the
applicant (or his appropriately authorized representative) before the passport is issued .
163 . It would seem to us important that all applicants for passports
should be treated alike, and that two basic requirements should be levied
upon all passport applicants-certification of birth or citizenship, and
personal appearance before a local official . As far as the former is concerned, Canada should demand that all applicants for a passport who claim
to have been born in Canada produce a birth certificate, or alternatively .
59
�acceptable proof of birth ; naturalized Canadians must continue to be
required to produce their citizenship certificates . We are aware of the fact
that such a requirement woud be of only limited value in uncovering fraudulent applications, but it would impose some difficulty for the dishonest
applicant . In those cases where a passport was urgently required and a birth
certificate or suitable evidence was not immediately available, the Passport
Office might have discretion to issue a passport for only a limited period
(say, six months), on condition that the bearer promise to provide satisfactory evidence of birth on return to Canada, at which time the passport
would be made valid for the normal term . In those few cases where evidence
of birth was impossible to obtain, an affidavit and a serious guarantee by
a known guarantor could be accepted after investigation .
164 . The requirement that all applicants appear personally before a
public official necessarily involves some decentralization of arrangements for
the receipt of applications or the issuance of passports . The Glassco Commission on Government Organization recommended the decentralization of
the Passport Office and suggested that the (then) Department of Citizenship
and Immigration might be the logical agency to act for External Affairs in
the issue and renewal of passports . Other suggestions have been made, including the use of the offices of clerks of courts (in the United States, for
example, an applicant must appear personally either at one of the ten passport offices or before one of the 3,800 federal and state courts), or RCMP
detachment offices (or the Provincial Police offices in those areas of Ontario
and Quebec where no RCMP detachments exist) . The Department of External Affairs does, in fact, envisage a limited expansion of its facilities in the
immediate future, and intends to open passport offices in Vancouver, Toronto
and Montreal ; we support such a programme, but we are quite sure that
more extensive arrangements must be made for personal appearance . While
we accept the need for occasional exceptions under particularly compelling
circumstances-if the applicant is very ill, for example-we are convinced
that generally all applicants for passports must present themselves before
an authorized local official where their existence, statements and documentation will be subject to verification .
165 . We feel that the guarantor system should be retained even after a
decentralized passport operation has been established . The guarantor represents a useful point of departure for future investigation of statements
made on the application form, and the requirement may sometimes constitute
a further, though minor, impediment to those who would seek to obtain a
passport by illegal means . We would add, however, that in our opinion
pressures to extend the ability to act as guarantor to additional groups of
persons should be resisted .
166. Further, we are somewhat alarmed by the apparent ease with which
ostensibly lost passports may be replaced . We think that it should be made
clear to the public that the loss of a passport is a serious matter . When
60
�individuals lose more than one passport or where there is reason to suspect
that the "loss" may have been intentional, the issuance of a further passport
should be delayed until the validity of the original has expired . In cases of
emergency such persons would travel on emergency passports issued for
specific journeys .
167 . The usefulness of a computerized list of Canadian citizens has been
pointed out to us . We would not recommand that such a list should be
created merely for passport control purposes, but if a decision were made
on other grounds to form such a system passport applications should clearly
be referred to it.
Certificates of Identit y
168 . A certificate of identity is roughly the equivalent of a passport for
a non-citizen and, in conjunction with appropriate visas, may be used as
a legitimate travel document . About 1,500 are issued each year, and roughly
the same number renewed .
169 . Certificates of identity have several applications . For example, if a
landed immigrant wishes to travel abroad while living in Canada, he will
normally do so on the basis of his native passport, as most countries will
extend or renew their passports indefinitely, even if the holder continues to
be absent from the country of origin . If, however, his passport has expired
and cannot be renewed, a certificate of identity may be granted . Generally,
the security and other criteria that are applied to citizenship applications
apply to the gr ant of . these certificates . They may however be granted to
persons who have been rejected for citizenship for such reasons as inadequate language proficiency . The certificates are valid for up . to two years
and require visas for entry to any foreign country, including the United
States . Further, a certificate of identity may occasionally be granted as a
one-way document to a non-citizen who is without a passport, wishes to
move elsewhere and has been accepted by another country . Finally, if an
individual (a refugee, for example) wishes to come to Canada but does not
possess a passport issued by his native country, he may, after being cleared
by our immigration authorities, be granted an "affidavit in lieu of passport" ;
this is a one-way document and must be surrendered upon entry to Canada .
170 . We are satisfied that the procedures relating to certificates of identity
are satisfactory and we do not think that any additional problems will be
raised by our suggested relaxation of criteria for the rejection of applicants
for citizenship . Certificates of identity are issued in small numbers and are
granted only under specific and unusual circumstances for limited purposes .
Exchanges of Visits with Communist Countrie s
171 . In principle, increasing contact between the communist countries
and the west by means of visits in each direction by private or official delega-
61
�tions and individuals is desirable for a variety of reasons . Nevertheless,
certain problems posed by these exchanges must be of concern to western
governments and security authorities . First, western visitors to communist
countries are liable to be subjected to various forms of pressure, persuasion
and intimidation with the object of exploiting them for intelligence purposes
at the time of the visit or later . Communist societies are such that behaviour
which would be accepted in a western society, or apparently simple acts
(such as, for example, trivial attempts to trade on the so-called "black
market"), can unexpectedly render largely innocent individuals vulnerable
to pressures from the intelligence services of the countries concerned . This
problem is compounded in the case of persons who originate from communist countries ; some of these states refuse to accept loss of native citizenship, and western authorities may be quite unable to be of assistance to people
in this situation . In these circumstances, western governments have a duty
to provide warning, advice and counsel to intending travellers as a form of
defence against these activities .
172 . Secondly, in permitting visits to the west, the communist countries
are often motivated by intelligence considerations and by the possibility of
exploiting western industrial, scientific or technological achievements and
information . Almost all visitors from communist countries are subject to
some form of control by their governments, and it is routine communist
practice for delegations to include officers charged with intelligence tasks
in addition to their ostensible missions .
173 . Present Canadian procedures in the general area of exchanges of
visits are directed towards ensuring as far as possible that visas are not
issued to intending visitors from communist countries until relevant factors
have been weighed, and also that Canadian individuals and delegations are
warned of the security and other dangers involved in visits to communist
countries . These procedures date from 1956 when a committee of senior
officials known as the Visits Panel was established by the Cabinet . Generally,
this Panel co-ordinates the plans of government departments and agencies
for official exchanges between Canada and the communist countries in
order to obtain comparable advantages in reciprocal exchange agreements,
helps with arrangements for unofficial visits to and from communist countries which it considers would be in the national interest and provides advice
to the Canadian sponsors of such visits, makes recommendations concerning financial support for Canadian groups and individuals in the professional,
academic and performing arts fields who are visiting the Soviet Union, and
reviews Canadian policy and practices and current trends in exchanges with
communist countries .
174 . The Panel and its Secretariat seem to us in recent years to have
faced their somewhat unrewarding task with considerable skill . Such difficulties as they have encountered have arisen partly from the limited
authority of the Panel and partly from the inflexible attitudes of a numbe r
62
�of the concerned agencies and organizations . We appreciate . that any
attempt by the government to achieve complete control over all exchanges
of visits with communist countries by individuals or delegations, official or
private, for tourism, business or any other purpose, _would of course . be
undesirable as well as impracticable . Nevertheless, we feel that some simple
steps can be taken to improve the situation from the point of view of
security -without significantly affecting the rights and convenience of individuals . .
175 . At present, government departments are able to -engage in preliminary discussion concerning prospective exchanges with communist governments, and are only required to -submit details to the Panel when agreement in principle has been . reached ; often in fact negotiations have reached
such a stage that useful intervention by the Panel in the interests of security
or a balanced programme is difficult . Also, some departments and agencies
are excluded either explicitly or-by usage from the operations of the Panel .
Our view is that there is no reason why any official or government-sponsored
arrangements should be excluded from consideration by the Visits Panel,
even during the preliminary stages of negotiation, as long as there is some
assurance that this consideration will be reasonably realistic . Neither would
we exclude official or government-sponsored professional or scientific
exchanges from consideration . Whatever the needs in individual cases,
the Panel can only maintain serious surveillance -of the progress of the
total exchange programme if it is fully competent to deal with all forms
of official exchanges .
176 . With regard to unofficial exchanges of visits with communist countries, we think that the Panel Secretariat should continue and expand -the
present arrangements by which contact is made with commercial, profes=
sional, industrial and academic organizations or similar agencies contemplating such exchanges, and their cooperation sought on an informal or
semi-formal basis . The problem seems to us to be of especial significance
in the case of academics and students . Western students and academics
tend to spend fairly lengthy periods in communist countries, and are
known to be particular targets of the comunist authorities ; they are after all
quite likely eventually to assume influential or sensitive posts in their' home
countries . Also, the experience of other western countries suggests that
students and academics from communist countries often play significant
roles in "talent-spotting" and recruiting agents in the west .
177 . We do not wish to enlarge upon the difficulties which apparently
hinder at to obtain useful cooperation in the academic fields, but
we think that a special effort must be made to establish closer and more
meaningful liaison with the universities and with such institutions as the
National Research Council . The value of government advice, and the
justified interest of the security authorities in these programmes, must be
.demonstrated to these institutions with tact and sophistication. The govern-
63
�ment should take the position that, if situations in which visas have to be
refused are to be avoided, invitations must be issued and programmes
devised with due regard to such considerations as security and balance of
advantage . At the very least arrangements must be made to ensure on the
one hand that the number of students and academics from communist
countries does not grow haphazardly, and on the other that Canadians taking part in exchanges are made aware of the dangers they will face .
178 . The suggestion has been made that exchanges of both official and
unofficial visits could be more readily reviewed and coordinated if they were
undertaken within the framework of a formal cultural, technological and
scientific agreement . Many countries, including the United States, Britain
and France, have concluded such agreements with the Soviet Union and
other communist countries . The usefulness of agreements of this kind from
the point of view of security seems to us to depend upon their nature . If,
like that concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, they are
comprehensive and detailed, and include, either in the agreements themselves
or in annexes or protocols, detailed plans for exchanges of visits in all or
most areas of concern for a given period, they would have obvious ad-_
vantages . They would, for example, enable considerations of reciprocity and
security to be taken into account during the advance bargaining and negotiations, rather than piecemeal or after the event . Simple agreements without
details would seem to us to have little relevance to security .
64
�VII. SECURITY OF INFORMATION
AND PHYSICAL SECURITY
Security of Informatio n
General Consideration s
179 . This chapter is mainly concerned with a variety of practical security
procedures, most of which depend upon three factors : the preparation of
sensible regulations ; arrangements to implement and enforce these regulations ; and the, provision of such equipment and facilities as will enable
them to be implemented effectively . We deal first with security of information or documentary security, that is, the classification, safeguarding,
transmission, custody and destruction of documents ; and we add comments
upon the present Canadian Official Secrets Act and certain sections of the
Criminal Code relating to security of information and material, and upon the
question of administrative secrecy and access to government records for
research and other purposes . In the second section of this chapter we deal
with physical and technical security (the protection of buildings and offices
against intrusion by physical, electronic and other means, and the protection
of material within buildings and offices) and with communications security .
180 . The basic Canadian Government regulations touch briefly upon most
of the subjects we have mentioned above ; their general intent is shown by
the following extracts :
"The instructions contained in this book lay down the minimum security
requirements which all departments and agencies are to enforce . Because
security is largely an interdepartmental .problem, the need for consistency
of security procedures among all . departments and agencies is paramount .
Security obviously cannot be satisfactorily maintained if one department
applies less effective standards than another . The instructions which this
booklet contains 'are therefore mandatory . Security control, however,
is a departmental responsibility, and therefore an additional duty rests on
each department and each official to take such further measures as may
in particular circumstances seem necessary to meet the individual needs
of a department .
"Many of the regulations, however, are only deterrents to espionage, for
there is no security measure which can fully protect a department or
agency which may number a foreign agent among its employees . For
this reason they must be supplemented by the initiative, vigilance and
common sense of all persons who are permitted access to classified information. All departments and agencies handling classified' informatio n
65
�are required by Cabinet Directive to appoint a security officer, whose
responsibility it is to ensure that these regulations are effectively administered .
"The principle upon which all good security must be based is that classified
information should be made available only to persons who have an appropriate security clearance and who need to have such information in
the performance of their duties . It should not be made available to persons
merely because of the positions they hold or the level to which they have
been cleared for security . It is the responsibility of senior offcers to decide
which information is or is not relevant to the duties of their staff.
"The regulations are being circulated to all departments and agencies, and
may be usefully distributed to such senior officials as may require them .
They are not, however, intended for distribution to all employees . The
Panel has assumed that they will form the basis of departmental regulations designed to meet the particular circumstances of each department
or agency . "
181 . In some countries regulations of this kind are embodied in statutes
or otherwise have at least some of the force of law . In the United States,
for example, they are the subject of a formal executive order . In Canada,
however, these regulations have been regarded as administrative instructions ;
most departments and agencies in fact consider them as merely advisory,
and their reactions to them have been varied . For example, the first step
in compliance is clearly the preparation of departmental security instructions
in general consonance with the government regulations but related to the
circumstances of the individual departments . Only a few departments (including the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence) have
in fact issued adequate and comprehensive instructions (most of these departments had done so before the government regulations were issued) and
have taken any steps to enforce them and audit their enforcement . Twelve
years after the government regulations were issued, many departments which
in our opinion should have security instructions are without them, many
have inadequate instructions and some take no effective steps to enforce
even the general regulations .
182 . Our inquiries into present standards of physical and documentary
security have admittedly not been exhaustive, but we have vetted the security instructions and have physically examined the security posture and situation of some 20 departments and agencies including most of those with any
serious responsibilities for the security of classified material . These examinations were not surveys in depth of the departments' security organizations
and practices, but they were adequate to demonstrate in general terms
current security standards, and they led to a conviction that standards of
security of information and physical security within many departments and
agencies of the Government of Canada need improvement . Some of the
shortcomings arise from the reluctance of the central personnel and financial
authorities to make available adequate resources for the security function ;
another part of the blame must be attributed to the senior officers of man y
66
�departments for their lack of understanding of the requirement and its
importance ; a further part of the blame must be laid at the door of the security
authorities for their apparent inability to convince and educate the government and the public service of the need for security, and for their willingness
to accept a largely passive protective security role .
183 . As we have already suggested in ,Chapter III, we think the solution
to these problems lies in making arrangements to provide expert advice
to departments, to inspect and audit departmental security procedures and
to train departmental security officers . If a new Security Service is established, . these general protective security roles should fall within its terms
of reference . In the meantime however we feel that immediate arrangements must be made to ensure that the Privy Council Office (or the new
Security Secretariat we have proposed) and the Directorate of Security
and Intelligence of the RCMP have clear joint responsibilities for
training, inspection and audit, and for taking steps to ensure departmental
compliance . Together, the two agencies should re-examine present regulations, in consultation with departments when appropriate and in the light
of our comments on certain detailed points below . They should prepare new
regulations for promulgation by the government, at which time departments
should be allowed a specified period in which to create adequate and
effective security staffs and structures and to make preliminary efforts at
compliance . During these months departments should have available to
them the advice of the two agencies, and on the completion of this period
their efforts should be audited . Cases of non-cooperation, and cases in which
the security posture of departments or agencies is unsatisfactory should be
brought to the attention of deputy ministers and ministers either directly by
the RCMP, or if necessary through the Security Secretariat .
184 . Following this preliminary period, a continuing effort will be needed
to ensure that compliance with regulations continues to reach reasonable
standards, to educate senior officers, to train departmental security staffs,
and generally to create throughout the government service an awareness of
the requirement for and importance of the simple measures of protective
security . If for any reason the Security Service considers that the security
posture of a particular department is unsatisfactory, it should have authority
to suggest a survey to the deputy minister concerned . In the unlikely event
that the deputy minister is uncooperative, the Security Service should be able
to appeal his decision to the Security Secretariat and the Secretary to the Cabinet . We would hope however that matters would rarely reach these straits .
We would envisage, for example, a system of security liaison officers of the
protective security branch whose duties would be to establish day-to-day
working relationships with departmental security officers and staffs . One
officer might well liaise with one (or perhaps two) of the departments
heavily concerned with classified material ; others might be responsible for
liaison with groups of departments with less heavy security responsibilities
and with similar problems . These officers would also of course provide th e
67
�links between the Security Service and the departments on personnel security
matters, and would in fact bear the Security Service's recommendations to
the departments and discuss them with the appropriate departmental officers .
Our general suggestion, in fact, is that an interlocking security community or
framework should be created within which departmental responsibility can
be competently exercised .
185 . Given reasonable regulations and instructions, adequate security
staffs and sensible training programmes, there is no reason why breaches of
security by individuals (which are almost always due to lack of training or
to carelessness) should not be handled where necessary as matters of normal
discipline . We can see no reason for example why an individual who consistently fails to put away classified documents, or to lock a safe, should not
be subject to the same sanctions as if he had consistently arrived late at the
office, or had been consistently absent .
Documentary Security and Classification System s
186 . The point has often been made in examinations of security procedures that one of the main objectives of an espionage agent is to procure
information in documentary form . Therefore, it is argued, it is of considerable importance to prevent the unauthorized copying of classified documents
and the unauthorized removal of documents from offices and buildings . We
appreciate these arguments, although we think that the importance of documentary material is sometimes overrated . From the point of view of the
receiving intelligence service, a document must be considered in its context .
If it is a draft, or merely an individual's bright idea, or an outdated instruction, it may be of small value . Generally, documents must be available as
part of a constant stream if they are to be of serious use, and a discussion
with a well-placed, intelligent and trusted agent may well be worth many
documents . In other words, we are sure that security of personnel (with all
that this involves in terms of investigation, judgment and reinvestigation) is
generally more important than physical or documentary security measures .
187 . However, it is quite apparent that no conceivable system of personnel
investigation and clearance can offer complete certainty that all cleared personnel will prove trustworthy. In fact, there are some grounds for suggesting
that the most dangerous spies (or at least those who are potentially the most
dangerous) are amongst those who may succeed in evading personnel security precautions, or about whom favourable judgments may well be made .
Therefore, steps must be taken to ensure a reasonable standard of formality
and security in the handling of classified documents . The first step in this
process is to ensure that sensible regulations govern the classification of
documents .
188 . The categorization of documents and material according to their
apparent sensitivity is a basic, though slightly illogical, part of the securit y
68
�system . Theoreticaliy, a document is-either secret (in the common sense of
the word) or it is not . Any further distinctions involve curious concepts such
as partly secret documents that may be seen by partly reliable people . In
fact, and in spite of a certain mystique that has grown up around the subject
of classifications, the reasons for categorization are primarily economic . It
has presumably been judged that the risks involved in -less than optimum
security . standards (of personnel investigation or of physical security) can
be accepted for certain classes of documents .
189 . At present a single classification system is effectively in use throughout most of the western world, although there are a number of exceptions .
We quote below the definitions officially in use in Canada, together with
some extracts from the principles governing classification .
"Definitions of Classifications
"1 . All official documents produced by the Canadian . public service are the
property of the Canadian Government . Most of these documents, together with
those on loan from other governments, require some form of protection . The
degree of security protection that a document requires will be indicated by
a classification placed preferably in its top right-hand corner . .
"2 . The following are definitions of the four classifications together with
examples of their application . . .
Top Secre t
"3 . Documents, information -and material are to be classified Top Secret
when their security aspect is paramount, and when their unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation . From this
general description it will be seen that the classification of Top Secret should
be used only rarely . When it is used, the user should first be certain that all
the special measures which are contingent upon its use are in fact fully
justified . The following are examples of subjects falling within this category :
(a) Documents or material containing plans for the defence of the natio n
as a whole or of strategic areas vital to its defence ;
(b) Information on new and important . munitions of war, including important
scientific and technical developments directly connected with the defence of
the nation ;
(c) Detailed information on new or proposed defence alliances, and on the
defence plans of allied nations .
Secret
"4 . Documents, information and material are to be classified Secret when
their unauthorized disclosure would endanger national security, cause serious
injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or would be of substantial advantage to a foreign power . The following are examples of subjects falling
within this category :
(a) Minutes or records of discussions of Cabinet or Cabinet Committees :
(b) Documents or material containing plans for the defence of areas and installations of other than vital strategic importance ;
(c) Documents or material directly 'pertaining to current and important
negotiations with foreign powers ;
(d) Particulars of the national budget prior to its official release ;
69
�(e) Information about foreign powers, the value of which lies in concealing our
possession of it ;
( f) Information about new and important scientific and technical developments pertaining to national defence ;
(g) Information about the identity or composition of scientific or military
units employed on operations involving techniques, the knowledge of
which would be of substantial value to a foreign power .
Confidential*
"5 . Documents, information and material are to be classified Confidential
when their unauthorized disclosure would be prejudicial to the interests or
prestige of the nation, would cause damage to an individual, and would be
of advantage to a foreign power . The following are examples of subjects
falling within this category :
(a) Information of a personal or disciplinary nature which should be protected for administrative reasons ;
(b) Minutes or records of discussions of interdepartmental committees when
the content of such minutes or records does not fall within a higher
category ;
(c) Political and economic reports which would be of advantage to a foreign
power but which do not fall in the Secret category ;
(d) Private views of officials on public events which are not intended to be
disclosed .
Restricted
"6 . Documents, information and material are to be classified Restricted
when they should not be published or communicated to anyone except
for official purposes, and when they are not classified in any of the three
previous categories . . .
"General Principles Governing
Classification of Document s
"8 . The following important principles should be borne in mind in giving a
classification to a document :
(a) Each document will be classified on its merits by reference to its contents
and their implications and not by reference to an automatic test e .g .,
the classification of other documents in the same series . . .
(b) It should be borne in mind that the source of the information contained
in a document may justify a higher classification than the information
taken by itself would at first seem to warrant, e .g ., Confidential information obtained from a very delicate source may justify the classification
of a document as Secret . That is, the process by which the information was
obtained may require more protection than the information itself .
(c) The tendency to give too high a classification to information is a natural
one, but the result is to clog the machinery for dealing with documents
and to allow personnel to become so familiar with handling highly classi"*Documents which are 'Confidential' not in the sense of a security classification as used
here, but merely private and persona], should be marked "In Confidence" or "Private and
Personal" . These designations can be used, for instance, on certain letters to provincial
governments or to commercial organizations where the contents are for the private
information of the addressee and must not be made public, but do not need the protection
given to a document bearing the security classification 'Confidential' . "
70
�fled material that the significance of the classification becomes obscured,
particularly if persons handling the material recognize that it is overclassified .
(d) The classification appropriate to a document may alter with the passage
of time, and departments_ should arrange to review classified documents as
and when required . Documents received from other departments should
not be downgraded without the approval of the originating department .
In the case of reports from intelligence sources, factors other than the
contents of the report may need to be considered . . . It is strongly
recommended that the originating departments indicate wherever possible,
either at the time of issue or later, that a document may be downgraded
after a given date or event. "
190 . It will readily be understood from these quotations that the accurate
classification of documents is a demanding task, requiring experience and
understanding of the implications of the compromise of a given piece of
information . In practice, of course, in many departments there is an obvious
tendency to "play safe", especially on the part of more junior officials, and
to classify too much or to overclassify . This is of concern because it is to
be presumed that security precautions will be more effective the more limited
the area they attempt to cover . In any case, additional and unnecessary
precautions will be wasteful and hindering, 'while overclassification will in the
long term tend to bring the idea of security into disrepute ; at least among
more sophisticated public servants .
191 . It was the opinion of most of those concerned with the question
that overclassification was a general current problem . Unfortunately, these
experts were quite uncertain as to what steps should be taken to improve
the situation . Suggestions included total revision of the system, even to the
extent of employing only two categories-classified and unclassified ; the
introduction . of two classification systems, one for so-called "administratively
classified" documents, and the other for "defence classified" documents ;
more rigid control of authority to classify, at least to the higher levels of
classification ; redefinition of the present classifications ; and systems for the
review of classification of documents after action on them had been completed and before they were finally filed .
192 . We have considered these and similar possibilities in some detail,
and while we understand the current concern about overclassification, we find
ourselves unable to suggest any very sweeping changes in present procedures .
Although they are not necessarily overriding, there are considerable advantages to be gained from retaining .a system which is generally in consonance
with those of our allies . The present system is reasonably well understood
and established, . and it would appear to us that very compelling arguments
would need to be advanced for major changes . We agree, for example, that
the definitions in current use are much too vague to offer a great deal of
guidance to an official faced with an individual case, but we have found it
difficult to redraft them in terms that are likely to be much more meaningful
or helpful . We think the best that can be done is to ensure that each depart-
71
�ment or agency issues its own specific security instructions and includes
examples of classification from within its own experience . It should be noted
also that it is rare for an official to approach a classification problem completely "cold" ; there will be a background of data on the file or in the official's
own experience which will assist with the problem . In departments only
occasionally concerned with the question advice should be available from
superiors or security staffs .
193 . It seems to us that the obverse of this problem of overclassification
is also of significance in some areas . For example, in the scientific branches
of certain departments which are only occasionally concerned with genuinely
sensitive matters, there are undoubtedly pressures to underclassify unwisely
in the interests of scientific freedom or publication . It is also less usual in
branches of this kind for scientific papers to be reviewed with the possible
need for classification seriously in mind . Ultimately of course a true solution
to this general problem of correct classification will only be found in adequate
training, education and security awareness . It may well take a long time to
reach satisfactory standards, but once they have been reached many of these
apparently intractable .problems of over- and under-classification will tend
to diminish .
194 . Neither do we think there are any great advantages to be gained from
an attempt to distinguish between "administratively classified' documents
and "defence classified documents" . The present system of classification seems
to us to present few problems in this connection . Most documents that may
be classified for administrative reasons can in broad terms be said to come
under an undramatic interpretation of the definition of Confidential : they
would be prejudicial to the interests of the nation or cause damage to an
individual . We would not discourage departments or agencies which have
special markings in use for (say) personnel matters, but we think that one
of the normal security classifications (usually Confidential) should be used
if it is intended that the document in question should come within the
cognizance of the official security of information system . We . realize also
that special arrangements are in force in appropriate departments to protect
the privacy of such information as income tax returns and commercial
statistical data, and we would not suggest any changes in these procedures .
195 . We do think however that in the area of classification consideration
should be given to one particular anomaly . This is the fact that, since no
government information may be made public without due authorization, the
classification Restricted is superfluous, and may indeed even mislead officials
into revealing information not so marked . We think therefore that the use
of the classification Restricted should be abandoned, and that information
which it is . important to protect should form part of the regular security
system, and should thus be classified at least Confidential . Documents without
any security markings would then be protected from publicity solely by the
normal disciplinary rule that communications to the press and public ma y
72
�be made only with the authority of specified officers . The Oath of Office
and Secrecy which gives expression to this rule is taken by all officials ; while
it appears to us to have no legal significance, it may serve as a warning
against the unauthorized publication of official information .
Declassification Programthe s
196 . Classification markings are often ephemeral . For example, a document may be highly classified one day because it argues the case for a policy
in the making . As soon as the policy is ''announced, the same document is
of historical interest only, and can certainly be downgraded, if not entirely
declassified . There are many views on the implications of the question of
declassification . Some maintain that the advantages of downgrading or declassifying documents are not worth the effort involved ; an accumulation
of "dead" and overclassified files is a tolerable minor nuisance . Some suggest that effective efforts must be taken to strip and reclassify files, if only
in the interests of reducing the need for expensive secure storage facilities .
Others have attempted to introduce an administrative system by which certain categories of documents are automatically downgraded at regular
intervals .
197 . Ideally, of course, it . is quite clear that changes in classification
should be formally made at appropriate times, and the markings on the
documents amended . Our own view however is that this ideal is quite
impossible of achievement . We think it would be unacceptably extravagant
of effort to insist that all departments and agencies examine their total records
solely for the purpose of declassification . We think that no general downgrading system 'can be devised which will apply automatically to the whole
possible range of classified material, although we are also aware that some
departments (especially the Department of External Affairs) must make
arrangements to re-examine records at regular intervals if the requirement
to release many of these records for historical research and public appraisal
after a given period of years is to be met.
198 . We think . that declassification is an area in which departmental judgment must be permitted to play a large role, subject only to the condition
that records, while they remain classified, must remain the responsibility of
the department holding them, and that no documents should be declassified
without the agreement (either individually or by category) of the originating
department . We suggest that the file-stripping programmes which are in force
in some departments be extended to cover the question_ of classification,
although we realize that this will tend to delay the programme, as in many
cases the judgment of relatively senior officers will be required . In general
we suggest that departments should be constantly reminded of the value of
downgrading documents and that officers should seize any opportunity . to
amend the classifications of papers that come to their attention in the course
of their duties .
73
�Handling of Classified Documents
199 . Assuming that documents are properly classified, there are a number
of measures which need to be taken in the handling of these classified documents . First of all, certain restrictions concerning the copying and removal
of such documents need to be observed . Some quite simple measures are
possible . Copying of classified documents should be centralized, and records
kept . These, together with records of persons entering or leaving buildings
at unusual hours, should be subject to examination and audit by security
staffs . We also think that insufficient attention has been given to the handling
of classified documents in departments or branches in which only a small
number of the officials and staff is cleared . In departments such as National
Defence and External Affairs where classified material is commonplace, it
is normal practice to set aside certain rooms or areas for the handling of
special categories of very highly classified information ; these areas are under
the control of specified staff, and the documents in question may only be
consulted and worked on within these areas . We think that in departments in
which classified material is uncommon, similar arrangements should be made
for Secret or Top Secret material .
200 . Arrangements of this kind would eliminate the present problem of
shared offices and offices (readily accessible to uncleared staff) left empty
at lunchtime with classified documents lying on desks . Security breaches of
this nature seem to be almost routine in some departments . We feel that
they should be the subject of consistent and rigorous disciplinary action . We
would add, however, that they will only be detected if security staffs are
adequate, and aware that part of their responsibility is to make regular
checks of offices where classified material is held or handled .
201 . In addition, we think that more attention should be paid to what is
known as the "need-to-know" principle . This means that classified information should be disseminated no further than is necessary for the conduct of
business . This principle is extended in the cases of certain very highly
classified categories of material to the establishment of lists of those persons
who are "indoctrinated" for access to the material . This process serves both
to control access, and to provide a starting place for investigation in the
event of loss or apparent compromise . We think it may be useful to establish
similar formalized indoctrination arrangements, at least for persons with
access to Top Secret information, and especially in departments where
highly classified material is rare . In addition, we think that a central list
of all persons with access to such information should be maintained by the
Security Secretariat .
The Official Secrets Act
202 . We have several times stated our view that security procedures are
not primarily legal in character, but administrative and disciplinary . How-
74
�ever, one important legal issue is directly related to security of information :
this is the adequacy of the present Official Secrets Act and certain provisions
of the Criminal Code .
203 .The United Kingdom Parliament enacted its first Official Secrets Act
in 1889 . This Act was repealed in 1911 and replaced by a new statute which
applied to Canada as well as to the United Kingdom (1 & 2 Geo . 5, chap .
28) . In 1920, the United Kingdom amended its Act on the basis of its experience during the first World War, but specifically provided that the
amending statute was inapplicable to Canada (10 & 11 Geo . 5, chap . 75) .
In May 1939, under the stress of 4orthcoming hostilities, the Canadian
Parliament repealed the 1911 British statute and passed the present Canadian
Official Secrets Act, which is in fact a very slightly reworded consolidation
of the 1911 and 1920 British statutes . The Canadian Act (R .S .C. 1952, c .
198) has been amended twice, first in 1950 when the maximum penalty
under the Act was increased from seven to fourteen years imprisonment,
and secondly in 1967 when minor changes were required as a result of the
Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (S .C . 1966-67 c . 96) . At Appendix
"C" are copies of the English and French texts of the Canadian Official
Secrets Act, and of extracts from the Canadian Forces Reorganization
Act .
204. The Canadian Official Secrets Act is an unwieldy statute, couched
in very broad and ambiguous language . A large part of the confusion which
attaches to the Act in Canada has arisen from its use of the phrase which first
occurs in section 3(1) (c) ; "any secret official code word, or pass word, or
any sketch, plan, model,, article, or note, or other document or information" ;
this was mistranslated into French from the English original as "un chiffre
officiel ou mot de passe, ou un croquis, plan, mod'ele, article, note ou autre
document ou renseignement" . The same phrase (with a similar translation)
also occurs in later sections of the Act, but the phrase is sometimes turned
as "official document or secret official code word or pass word", or "sketch,
plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code word or pass word
or information", etc . In fact there is sufficient inconsistency in the Act for
there to have arisen in Canada a question as to whether the words "secret" or
"official" qualify only "code word", or "code word or pass word" or (more
importantly) also the words "sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other
document or information" . In other words, must the Crown prove in all cases
that the information concerned is secret and official? If so, an espionage
operation directed towards the collection of information in the public domain,
or within the possession of a government agency but not classified (such as
much information in government files) might not constitute an offence
under the Act.
205 . Strangely enough, the interpretational problem has never become
acute in Britain where opinion generally has been consistently in favour of
the view that all affairs of government are within the meaning of the Act ,
75
�whatever their security classification, or even if they have no security classification (see, for example, Rex . v . Crisp and Holmwood [1921] 1 K .B . 451) .
206 . In Canada, however, a good deal of confusion was caused by the
decision rendered in the case of Rex . v . Biernacki (1962) 37 C .R . 226 .
The accused had collected information on the antecedents, social status,
employment and character of Polish immigrants . It was evident that the
information had been collected for use in, or in the course of, espionage
operations . However the Court discharged the accused at the conclusion of
the preliminary hearing, holding that the information collected was neither
"secret" nor "official" and that to collect such information (even during the
course of an espionage operation) was not an offence under the Official
Secrets Act . A similar view was taken by a Judge of the Quebec Court of
Appeal commenting on one of the arguments in the case of Rex . v . Boyer
(1946) 94 C .C .C . 195 . He remarked that the Official Secrets Act, by its
very title, indicated that its provisions did not apply to what had already
been published or publicized or had fallen into the public domain .
207 . In addition, the Act contains unusual evidential and procedural
provisions relating to espionage cases . For example, the Crown need not
prove that an accused is guilty of . any particular act tending to show a
purpose prejudicial to the interests of the state ; it need only appear so from
the circumstances of the case or the conduct or character of the accused .
If information "relating to or used in" a prohibited place, or "any secret
official code word or pass word is made, obtained, collected, recorded,
published or communicated" without authority it shall be deemed to have
been so made, obtained, etc . for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or
interests of the state unless the contrary is proved . Again, unless the
contrary is proved, the fact that an accused has been in communication with
or has attempted to communicate with an agent of a foreign power is considered to be evidence that he has for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or
interests of the state obtained or attempted to obtain information that might
be directly or indirectly useful to a foreign power . Unless he proves to the
contrary, an accused is deemed to have been in communication with an
agent of a foreign power if he has visited the address of or consorted or
associated with such an agent within or without Canada, or if the name
and address of an agent, or any other information regarding an agent is
found in his possession. The Act defines in very broad terms who is regarded
for the purposes of the Act as an agent of a foreign power and when an
address is deemed to be that of an agent of a foreign power .
208 . These provisions appear extraordinarily onerous, although of course
prosecutions under the Act cannot take place without the approval of the
Attorney General and this requirement should normally afford protection
against unnecessary use . Further, it is fairly clear from at least one case
(Rex v . Benning 4 C .R . 39 (1947-Ont . C.A .) ) that an entirely "technical"
charge, based in this instance only on evidence of communication wit h
76
�agents of a foreign power (Section 3(4) ) and with no evidence that the
, accused has obtained any information that might be useful to a foreign
power or passed such information to them, is not likely to be sustained by
the courts . In addition, it should be noted that a large proportion of Canadian prosecutions relating to official secrets have been conducted under the
sections of the Criminal Code (408(1)(d) and 408(2)) concerning conspiracy . A prosecution for conspiracy to commit an Official Secrets Act
offence is .a. prosecution under the Criminal Code ; it does not require the
Attorney General's fiat, nor are the procedural and evidential rules and
advantages of the Official Secrets Act available to the' prosecution : However,
in spite of these qualifications we feel that the present Act is too broad and
too rigorous .
209 . We have given some thought to the ideal content of an Official
Secrets Act . In our opinion, such an Act should in the first place protect all
classified information from any unauthorized dissemination, whether or not
the . purpose of such dissemination is prejudicial to the interests of the state
and whether or not the information is intended to be directly or indirectly
useful to a foreign power ; possibly (as in the British Act) offences due to
carelessness should be treated as misdemeanours (summary conviction
offences) rather than as felonies (indictable offences) and thus carry
reduced penalties, but the Act should have general application as far as
classified material is concerned . A certificate from a responsible minister
that the classification of given material was necessary and appropriate in'
the national interest should be accepted by the courts .
.
210 . Secondly, the Act should protect unclassified information from
attempts at collection and dissemination which are prejudicial to the interests
of the state or intended to be useful to a .foreign power . The fact that such
attempts are systematic, clandestine, conducted for payment or carried out
under the direction of foreign agents should be evidence that they are prejudicial to the state or intended to be useful to a foreign power .
211 . Apart from the two provisions we have mentioned (relating to classi.fication in . cases involving classified information, . and relating to . purpose in
cases involving unclassified material), we see no reason for other major
unusual evidential or procedural arrangements . We think however that prosecutions should continue to require the Attorney General's fiat ; also the Act
would undoubtedly require sections comparable to those in the present Act
concerning, for example, definitions of agents, harbouring spies, attempts and
incitements, powers to arrest and search without warrant and in camera
hearings . We think there is a good deal to be said for the view that conspiracy to commit offences against an Official Secrets Act amended as we
suggest should be included as an offence in the Act itself .
212 . Some countries manage without a formal Official Secrets Act, and
rely upon statutory provisions concerning espionage and other . specific
offences . Nevertheless, it is possible that an Official Secrets Act may have
77
�some deterrent effect, and it was in fact the almost unanimous attitude of
the authorities in those countries without such an Act to envy those who
had one . On balance, we think that in Canadian circumstances an Official
Secrets Act is desirable .
213 . However, we have said enough to indicate that we think the present
Act is unsatisfactory from a number of points of view . We have considered
the possibility of relatively minor amendments, but we feel that any such
attempts would inevitably call the whole Act into question . There may be no
urgency about the matter, but we nevertheless think that consideration should
be given to a complete revision of the Canadian Official Secrets Act, bearing
in mind the points we have mentioned .
214. A wide variety of Criminal Code provisions may be relevant to
security . These include, first, the sections relating to treason, sabotage and
sedition ; secondly, sections which may be invoked to prosecute certain
breaches of security, including bribery, attempts to weaken the loyalty of
officials, or breach of trust by a public officer ; thirdly, sections which could
apply in conditions of political or social unrest, such as intimidation of Parliament, unlawful assembly or rioting and unlawful military training ; and
finally, sections which deal with crimes that could be committed in the
course of espionage or subversive activities, such as making a false statement to procure a passport, fraudulent use of a citizenship certificate,
spreading false news, making use of official papers, personation or mischief .
215 . Most of these provisions require no comment, but the section of the
Criminal Code concerned with treason should be mentioned . This reads in
part :
"46 . (1) Every one commits treason who, in Canada . . . .
(e) without lawful authority, communicates or makes available to an agent
of a state other than Canada, military or scientific information or any
sketch, plan, model, article, note or document of a military or scientific
character that he knows or ought to know may be used by that state for
a purpose prejudicial to the safety or defence of Canada ; . . .
(h) conspires with any person to do anything mentioned in paragraph (e) or
forms an intention to do anything mentioned in paragraph (e) and manifests that intention by an overt act . "
Section 47 provides that the maximum penalties for offences under these
subsections are death or life imprisonment in wartime, and fourteen years
imprisonment in peacetime .
216 . These provisions concerning treason in the Criminal Code clearly
overlap with the Official Secrets Act . If they are necessary at all, we find
their restriction to military or scientific information difficult to understand .
If this section remains in the Criminal Code (possbly on the grounds that
it may be useful in wartime), it should be expanded to apply to information
of all kinds .
78
�Administrative Secrec y
217 . Some controversy has in recent years centred around the extent to
which governments maintain that their administrative activities and documents should remain confidential unless and until the government concerned
chooses to reveal them . In many countries various professional groups,
including journalists, scientists, lawyers and historians, have complained
about the adverse effects of so-called administrative secrecy .
218 . It is in fact true that some countries-notably Sweden and the
United States-have arrangements by which the public ostensibly has access
to a great deal of administrative information that is not available to the
public in, for example, Canada and Britain . The constitutional principle of
publicity in administration has applied in Sweden since 1766 . Theoretically,
all state documents are public, and a department is required to produce
any document or file at the request of any citizen or any representative of
the press, radio or television, who need give no reason nor declare any
specific interest . However, the practice is very complex and there are a
number of exceptions, including documents concerned with defence and
foreign policy, personal files, especially in the social service ministries, informal memoranda and certain drafts .
219 . The position in the United States is rather different. A relatively
new Public Law-the, Freedom of Information Act of July 1967-permits
public access . to certain documents, if the inquirer can identify them and
if they are unclassified . There are certain exempted classes of records, which
vary slightly from department to department ; if the regulations are interpreted broadly, the exempted categories are large .
220 . The question of unofficial historical or other research is dealt with
in the United States as a separate issue . The State Department, for example,
recognizes three "periods" with respect to its records . First there is a "closed"
period covering the more recent years ; during this period, foreign policy
records are in general closed to access by non-official researchers in advance
of the publication of the Department's documentary series entitled "Foreign
Relations of the United States" ; the beginning date of this closed period is
advanced automatically as the annual "Foreign Relations" volumes are
released . Secondly, an "open" period extends from the earliest days up
to 30 years before the current year ; foreign policy records for the open
period are in the National Archives and may be consulted under regulations
issued by the National Archives . Thirdly, there is a "restricted" period between the open period and the closed period ;, access to foreign policy records
in the restricted period is confined to qualified researchers who are United
States citizens and who demonstrate a scholarly or professional need for the
information contained in such records . Additional restrictions are in fact
included in the regulations . Access to foreign policy records is not given
if their publication would be contrary to the interests of national defence o r
79
�foreign policy ; and such records would include any that might tend to
prejudice the conduct of foreign relations, might tend to give needless
offence to other nations or to individuals abroad or would violate confidence .
Neither, of course, are records originated by another government or another
agency of the United States Government made available without permission .
On the other hand, application may be made for a specific relaxation of the
regulations, and for access to certain records during the restricted or closed
period .
221 . The situation in Canada is less formal . In the absence of any
statutory provision (other than the Official Secrets Act) either forbidding
or permitting access to government records, departments have had to treat
individual applications on their merits . As far as the Department of External
Affairs is concerned, its files include so many documents originated by
other governments intermingled with its own material that it has felt obliged
not to release these files unless or until the foreign documents are released
by the government concerned. Up to the time the Governor General ceased
to be the channel of communication with the British Government, a very
high proportion of the files contain documents which are, technically at
least, British documents . It has therefore been considered necessary not to
release some files containing British documents until such files are "open"
in Britain . Until recently, under the provisions of the Public Records Act of
1958, such records remained "closed" until they were 50 years old ; but it
is now British policy to open records after 30 years . Most other countries
are as restrictive as the-British, or more so .
222 . Although general access to Canadian files has for these reasons been
restricted to those 50 years old or more, in a few cases where few nonCanadian records were involved and where material was not sensitive,
controlled access by serious researchers has been permitted to records of
somewhat more recent-date . In addition, the Department of External Affairs
is preparing for publication a series of documents under the general title
Documents on Canadian External Relations which will make available to
scholars all significant documents of the "open" period . This publication
should go far to meet the legitimate needs of researchers for documents,
and thus minimize requests for access to files .
223 . We are not required to make general recommendations about these
problems, but, as far as Canada-is concerned, we would view suggestions for
increased publicity with some alarm . We think the knowledge that memoranda might be made public would have a seriously inhibiting effect on the
transaction of public business . We believe that the process of policy-making
implies a need for wide-ranging and tentative consideration of options, many
of which it would be silly or undesirable to expose to the public gaze . To
insist that all such communications must be made public would appear to us
likely to impede the discussive deliberation that is necessary for wise administration . In Canada, the bureaucracy is not vast, and the number of seriou s
80
�inquirers quite small . It seems to us that there is no reason why controlled
access to specific administrative files or documents cannot be permitted and
arranged on an ad hoc basis when a genuine requirement can be established .
224 . However, as far as historical and other research is concerned, we
think the lack of a stated government policy a serious handicap and we
suggest that steps should be taken to remedy this situation by making public
appropriate regulations . It is important that our regulations should remain
in step with those of Britain since our files (and especially the earlier ones)
contain so much British material ; it is also important that we remain in step
with the United States . In practice, there seems to be no alternative to a
"thirty year rule" . From the point of view of security we must point out that
there is some material (mainly intelligence and security material) which for
a variety of good reasons should not be made public even after thirty years,
and adequate arrangements must be made to strip files of such material
before the files are made available to the public .
Physical Security
.Buildings and Offices
225 . During working hours, the security of buildings and offices (or at
least the 'protection of classified information used and handled in these
offices) is the responsibility of those working in them . As we have suggested,
standards of security in this area are often poor, and must be improved, but
this is a matter of departmental training and discipline . Nevertheless we do
regard it as surprising that so many buildings in Ottawa, including buildings
in which highly classified material is held, are accessible to the public without hindrance during working hours . Certainly the East Block is one of the
very few freely accessible central Cabinet and Foreign Offices in the western
world .
226 . Responsibility for the guarding of government buildings containing
classified information during silent hours is however somewhat diffuse . In
some cases (where one department occupies most of a given building), it is
that department's responsibility to request a security survey by the RCMP,
to hire Corps of Commissionaire or other personnel as guards (if it wishes
to do so), and generally to maintain an adequate standard of protection .
Where no single department or agency occupies most of a building, the
RCMP assumes responsibility on a direct request from one of the occupying departments .
227 . This situation seems to us unsatisfactory . We think it should be
government policy that any building which contains classified information
should be subject to a security survey, and placed under guard during silent
hours . In some cases, where (say) only confidential information is held, it
may be possible to compromise on some system of electronic intrusion alarm
plus regular inspections . In general, however, the basic principle that build =
81
�ings containing classified material should be effectively protected at all times
must be upheld . Consideration should also be given to the establishment of
an "escort" system for visitors to the more sensitive buildings during working
hours .
228 . It will, of course, become part of the responsibility of the protective
security branch of the Security Service to play an active role in physical
security, to survey all government buildings which contain classified material
and to audit the implementation of government policy and regulations . In
the meantime we feel that urgent steps are necessary to acquaint departments and agencies with the requirement for guards and to ensure that at
least preliminary steps are taken toward their introduction as necessary .
Technical Security
229 . One aspect of physical security is generally referred to as technical
security, and is concerned with protection against electronic eavesdropping
and telephone interception, and with a variety of other technical subjects .
A number of Canadian agencies are involved in one way or another with
these matters . We think that all the present agencies concerned with technical security should be combined in one part of the protective security
branch of the Security Service . Relevant technical expertise is limited in
Canada and must be pooled if an adequate service is to be provided in this
field.
230 . Technological advances, including the increasing use of computers,
have given rise to a range of other new security problems, some of which
can be solved fairly simply, but some of which are relatively intractable
without considerable effort . There seems to us no doubt that the process of
technological innovation will continue to create problems of this general
kind, and that a serious research and developmental effort will be required
from the technical security authorities .
Communications Securit y
231 . With regard to the security of governmental information transmitted
by telegraphic means, we are satisfied that the regulations which prescribe
that all classified telegrams shall be enciphered and handled under conditions approved by the competent authorities are in general observed . The
cryptographic systems in use in Canada seem to us to provide adequate
security.
232 . The situation with regard to the security of telephone conversations is much less satisfactory . From what we have heard, we do not believe that there is sufficient awareness, even in senior governmental positions where it is most important, that the telephone is a basically insecure
instrument, and that therefore classified matters should not be discussed on
the telephone .
82
�VIII. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENC E
External Affairs and the Foreign Servic e
233 . It is quite evident that security in the foreign service is a matter
of special importance . Staff are dispersed, and in many countries, especially
the communist countries, they are clear and obvious targets for hostile
intelligence attack. This is true not only of officers of the Department of
External Affairs, but of officers and employees of the many other departments with staff abroad . In fact, officials and employees of the Department
of External Affairs represent less than one-third of the nearly 7000 Canadian employees stationed abroad and the list of departments with such
personnel is surprisingly lengthy, including for example National Defence,
Trade and Commerce, Defence Production, Manpower . and .Immigration,
Finance, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd ., and the Emergency Measures
Organization . It must be understood that the attention of hostile intelligence
services is not directed only towards those . who have access to classified
information . Officials or employees without access may become . useful
sources of information, not about classified matters, but about other individuals employed in the post or the service . This information may later be
used to compromise or entrap the officials who do have access . There is
no dearth of examples and case histories to demonstrate the truth of the
statement that Canadian officials serving abroad are targets of hostile intelligence attack, especially in communist countries ; and some years ago the
Department of External Affairs itself suffered from serious security problems
particularly at certain missions within the communist countries . Many reasons
have been advanced for the existence of these problems-hasty recruiting
during a period of rapid expansion, for example, and the attraction of the
foreign service for individuals with certain character defects . Although there
is no doubt that many of the factors giving rise to these situations have
been minimized, . the existence of such problems reflects on the past effectiveness of the departmental security system .
234. The present security organization of the Department of External
Affairs is established within a Division which is also responsible for a variety
of other functions . The . security organization overseas includes Regional
Security Officers, post security officers . appointed by heads of missions, and
security guards recruited especially for service at posts abroad .
83
�235 . In theory, heads of posts abroad are responsible for the security
not only of the External Affairs missions but also of the offices of other
government departments ; they are instructed to ensure that all classified information is given adequate protection by representatives of Canadian
Government departments and agencies to whom it may be entrusted, and that
classified information is handled and stored in accordance with the regulations . Canadian posts abroad have been divided into three categories :
(a) Posts where all Canadian departments and agencies share the same
premises . At these, the head of mission undertakes responsibility for
all security measures affecting the security of the post ;
(b) Posts where Canadian departments and agencies are located in the capital city with some offices outside the main`chancery premises ; at such
posts, a local security co-ordinating committee can be formed by the
head of mission, consisting of representatives of all departments and
agencies concerned, to advise on local security problems and report
to the head of mission ;
(c) Posts outside and at some distance from the capital city, where the
head of mission cannot assume any direct responsibility for security .
At these, the head of the local post is responsible for security, in
consultation with the head of mission in the capital city or the Department of External Affairs .
236 . Post security officers are responsible for the day to day app li cation
of security regulations and for the formulation of local security orders . The
Regional Security Officers provide guidance and assistance in security
matters to .posts within their region and inspect, report upon and supervise
arrangements at these posts . Upon receipt of a report from a Regional
Security Officer, a head of post takes such steps as are .within his authority
to correct any fault, and if the recommended action exceeds his own authority he seeks approval from the Depa rtment .
237 . Our general comment on this organization is that we are not sure
that the structure is properly adapted to the size of the present operation,
and to the sophistication of the attack . We feel it may retain vestiges of the
time when the Department of External Affairs was small and could be
managed on an informal basis, and when few Canadians were stationed
abroad . - We think that the establishment of a separate Security Division
within the Department is probably justified .
238 . A number of other points also need consideration . In the first place,
it is quite clear that in spite of the theoretical tidiness of the instructions,
there exists a great deal of confusion in posts abroad concerning responsibi lity
for the security of Canadi an offices and personnel . The responsibility of the
head of post is not always understood by the other depa rtments ; and, in
fact, when the head of a post attempts ~ to exercise his responsibility towards
other departments, he frequently finds it difficult to do so . Some post securit y
84
�officers, acting as agents for heads of posts, assume responsibility for the
inspection and supervision of the security of all government departments
located in the same country, but most, do not . Whether they do or do not
appears to depend largely upon the seriousness with which they and their
local superiors regard the security function .
.239 . We think that this matter is too important to be left to the whims
of those on the spot . It must be made quite clear to all concerned (if
necessary by some form of general security instruction applicable to all
departments with representatives abroad) that the head of post is responsible
for all Canadian security measures in the country to which he is accredited,
and that the post security officer acts on his behalf . The post security officer
must have full authority to supervise the security of the offices of other
departments ; he should, for example, maintain a list of the security clearance
status of all Canadians officially in the country ; he must have access to relevant information concerning the personnel in the post, and when necessary
to the security staffs at the headquarters of the other departments in Ottawa .
In practice, of course, any departments and agencies dealing with classified
information must have security officers of their own on the spot, and a good
deal of delegation of responsibility by the post security officer will be necessary, especially in posts such as London and Washington where there are
large staffs in buildings quite separate from the Chancery, or where offices
are located in cities other than the capital . Nevertheless, the principle of
audit, inspection, recommendation and ultimate enforcement by the head of
mission and his security officer should be preserved .
240 . Such a plan is only practicable if the post security officer is reasonably trained . At present, heads of posts have probably become at least
slightly acquainted with some security problems in the course of their progress
through the service, but there is no guarantee that a post security officer has
received any more than the short security indoctrination offered to all personnel before posting outside Canada . Whether he is trained or not depends on
the exigencies of the service and the initiative of his head of post or head
of Chancery.
241 . We think that the function of post security officer should be the
primary responsibility of an adequately trained officer of sufficient status to
advise and influence heads of missions and officers from other departments
at all posts abroad ; this is especially necessary in large posts or in posts
with special security problems, such as all those within the communist
countries and some outside . In a few cases, the appointment of a full-time
security officer would appear to be justified, but training and status seem to
us to be the factors of primary importance . We realize the difficulty of
providing personnel for a system of this kind, but we can see no reason why
other departments and the Security Service itself cannot be used as sources
of experienced and suitable security officers for special posts on a secondment basis .
85
�242 . Standards of physical security at missions abroad are very varied .
We are disturbed by the number of Canadian Government offices abroad
located in commercial buildings to which the public has access throughout
the day and night, and in which classified material is left unprotected except
by a safe during silent hours . In some locations there are inadequate arrangements for the separation of areas in which classified information is handled
and areas in which locally engaged staff work . However, we understand that
steps are being taken to rectify these situations . In addition, all the information we have received leads us to believe that the present calibre of some
of the security guards in Canadian missions is unsatisfactory . We realize the
difficulties of recruiting suitable personnel for such duties and providing
them with a useful career,' but we think this problem must be solved if
adequate security is to be maintained .
243 . Generally, we consider that more attention must be paid to the problem of providing reasonable standards of physical security at posts abroad .
Trivial financial considerations should not be allowed to enter into matters
with possible security implications ; we were told for example of instructions
to change a cleaning contract from a known and trusted firm to an unknown
company because of a marginally lower bid. The fact that such instructions
are issued suggests to us that there is a need for greater awareness of the
realities of the security problem amongst those responsible for financial
administration in Ottawa .
244 . The operations of the Canadian Government abroad are very dependent upon the assistance of locally-engaged staff (usually nationals of the
country in which they are located) as interpreters, messengers, cleaners,
drivers, and so on . This gives rise to a number of issues which vary with
the location of the mission . In communist countries there is no doubt that
all staff should ideally be Canadians (just as the whole staffs of Soviet
missions in the west are- Soviet nationals) because local employees are
usually members of the intelligence service of the country concerned, and
can report on Canadian staff and readily install intrusion devices . However,
in spite of the dangers, we 'agree that a programme to change the present
situation would not be feasible, even if the local authorities in communist
countries would permit it . The employment of foreign nationals means however that a very high standard of security discipline must be maintained in
such missions .
245 . The dangers at posts outside the communist countries are perhaps
slightly less acute, but they exist nevertheless . In many countries there are
great difficulties in identifying communist agents and sympathisers .
Further, in such countries there is perhaps a greater tendency to recruit
local staff for more responsible posts, which may require some access to
classified material . Except in the most exceptional circumstances, we think
that such tendencies, which are largely apparent in departments other than
External Affairs, should be resisted .
86
�National Defence and the Armed Force s
246 . The Department of National Defence is also a department with important security problems, partly because of the very large volume of classified material which it holds or generates, and partly because of the large
numbers of its personnel who :require security clearance. The Deputy Minnister is responsible to the Minister of National Defence for the security
of the whole Department in accordance with the security policies and
directives laid down by the government . Within this framework the Chief
of the Defence Staff is responsible for the security of the Canadian armed
forces, and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board is responsible for
the security of the' Defence Research Board and its establishments .
247 . Within the Canadian armed forces security is a responsibility of
command at all levels . Security staffs provide advice to commanders, administer and direct the security forces and other security resources, and
maintain liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies . The organization
of security within each command varies to meet the different requirements
of the commanders . In general, police matters and security measures are
coordinated by a command staff officer .
248 . At Canadian Forces Headquarters, a . Director of Security is responsible to the Director General of Intelligence and Security for advice on
the state of security within the Canadian armed forces . This responsibility
includes the development. of policy, procedures and regulations as well as
advice to commanders arising from inspections and surveys, and the enforcement of relevant regulations . The functions of the Directorate of Security
are grouped in three areas : security standards and procedures for the protection of information and the physical security of material and units ; security clearance of personnel ; and technical supervision of military police
and security staffs employed at commands and bases . A special investigation unit carries out field investigations of personnel in the Canadian forces
and the Administrative Branch of the Department, and also conducts criminal investigations at the request of any Commanding Officer . The investigators employed for personnel clearances are of corporal rank or above
and are selected for this work only after having obtained some investigative
experience in the military police and security fields . Training in field investigation is mainly done "on the job" .
249 . We have a number of comments on these procedures . First, the
security organization in the Canadian armed forces constitutes a second
security investigation agency . Ideally we believe there should be but one
such agency. We understand however that in general investigations by the
armed forces are concerned primarily with character weaknesses, and that
cases, in which subversive aspects come to notice are immediately turned
over to the RCMP . We also appreciate the requirements for the armed
forces to provide a career in security investigation for uniformed personne l
87
�and to maintain its competence in this field, so that trained personnel may
be available for use in theatres of operations . On balance we think there is
a case for the armed forces to continue to conduct field investigations, with
certain limitations .
250 . The first limitation we suggest is that the armed forces agency should
be responsible for the investigation only of uniformed personnel and potential recruits to the forces . At present, Defence Research Board civilian
personnel are investigated by the RCMP, while civilian members of the
Administration Branch of the Department and civilians employed by the
Canadian forces are investigated by the armed forces . We have already suggested that the field investigation of civilian public servants should be removed from the police context and the functions reallocated to a branch
of a civilian security service . If this is done, we think that the investigation
of all civilians (including those employed by the Department of National
Defence and the armed forces) should be conducted by the civilian security
service .
251 . The second limitation relates to standards . There have in the past
been significant differences in the standards of investigations performed by
the RCMP and the armed forces . As we have said many times, we think it
important in the interests of individuals that the type of investigation, the
calibre of the investigator, the nature of the reports and the criteria for
judgment should be consistent . We have outlined our general views on
standards of clearance in Chapter IV, and we think these standards should
apply to all personnel-uniformed or civilian-of the Department of National Defence.
252 . The Department of National Defence has expressed particular concern about the question of separatism as it affects members of the armed
forces . We tend to share this concern . Quite apart from such practical considerations as immediate access . to weapons, the concept of allegiance is
important to the armed forces, and it would clearly be unwise to recruit
personnel whose loyalty is at present confused or divided or who may in the
future come to owe allegiance to a separate state . We realize that this argument cannot be carried too far ; many individuals-including many with clearances-change their allegiances and citizenships in the course of their lifetimes . Nevertheless it is clear that the Department and especially the armed
forces can justify a special interest in the separatist activities of members or
potential recruits . We think that the same standards should be applied to
civilian members of the Department as we suggest in Chapter IV should be
applied to other government employees . As far as the uniformed personnel
are concerned, we think there should be a clear statement of government
policy that persons currently engaged in separatist activities will not be permitted to join the armed forces, and will be released if they are found to be
members of the armed forces .
88
�Release of Informatio n
253 . A further problem is concerned with the exchange of information
with other countries . At present questions conce rn ed with the release of
classified defence information are dealt with by an official committee of the
Depa rt ment of National Defence, the meetings of which are attended by
officials of other Depa rtments when necessa ry . We suggest that the formulation and coordination of national disclosure policy should become a function
of the Secu rity Secretariat, advised as necessa ry by departments . The major
part played by the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs
in these matters would of course continue, but the central role would be
performed on an extra-departmental basis.
254 . In addition, there exists a number of problems conce rned with the
flow of unclassified information ( particularly scientific or technological publications and information) between Canadian Government departments and
officials and the communist countries . ( It should be noted that the transmission or sale abroad of even unclassified publications is strictly controlled by
communist gove rn ments ; similarly, there is no doubt that the presentations
and comments of communist individuals or delegations at scientific or other
conferences or meetings are also examined and controlled .) At present
individual depa rt ments, many of which are not aware of or prima ri ly interested in securi ty considerations, are responsible for exchange programmes,
subject to certain general instructions . We believe that in practice the present
system is inconsistent and possibly dangerous . We think that an effective
form of centralized coordination must be establi shed, and consider that this
should also be a function of the Secu rity Secretari at, advised as necessa ry by
departments . Depa rtments should be instructed to consult with the Securi ty
Secreta ri at before entering into specific or general arrangements for the
exchange of unclassified information with communist count ri es, and the
Secretari at should approve or disapprove proposals, subject of course to
appeal by depa rtments to higher levels .
89
��IX . INDUSTRIAL SECURIT Y
General Considerations
255 . We define industrial security procedures as those concerned with the
protection of information and material relating to classified industrial contracts placed with Canadian industry by the Canadian Government or by
allied governments . We have not considered the safe-guarding of information
which is not government-owned and thus, for example, the problems posed
by industrial espionage in the private sector or the theft of trade secrets
by competitors, although such activities can -obviously affect Canadian
economic interests, especially if they are conducted by or on behalf of a
foreign firm .
256 . There are three reasons why a Canadian industrial security system
is necessary . In the first place, the Canadian Government has some secrets
of its own to protect ; it would for example be highly detrimental to Canadian
national interests and Canadian defence posture if all the details of Canadian
defence research, development and production contracts were available
at will to potential enemies . Secondly, there is no doubt that a reasonable
standard of government-controlled industrial security is an important factor
in Canada's economic well-being . Suspicion of industrial security standards
can have a generally adverse effect upon industry and trade, for the flow of
contracts and the interchange of information will tend to be restricted if
allied powers suspect that their secrets may pass to potential enemies or
their technology to competitors . Thirdly and more specifically, Canada
receives a great deal of allied classified information and undertakes classified
contracts for its allies . Quite apart from any moral obligations, the Canadian
Government is a party to a number : of agreements by which it is required
to ensure that industry provides this allied information with protection essentially similar to that which it would receive in its country of origin .
Present Organization
257 . During World War II, industrial security in Canada was a responsibility of the civil Department of Munitions and Supply . At the end of the
war the responsibility was transferred to the armed forces ; but in 1949 the
Chiefs of Staff asked to relieved of the task . Responsibility was then transfered first to. the Canadian Commercial Corporation and finally in 1951 t o
91
�the Department of Defence Production . A Director of Industrial Security,
responsible to the Deputy Minister, was appointed to head an Industrial
Security Branch within this Department . The Branch dealt with all security
matters, both within the Department and in industry, and was responsible
for the negotiation of international security agreements ; later, the Director
of Industrial Security came to assume responsibility for security within the
Department of Industry as well as within the . Department of Defence
Production . In 1966 the Department of Defence Production was reorganized
and the status of the Industrial Security Branch reduced to that of a Division
within the Contracts Administration Branch . The Head of the Industrial
Security Division is now responsible to the Director of Contracts Administration who reports through the Director General (Contracts) and the
Assistant Deputy Minister (Purchasing) to the Deputy Minister of Defence
Production . The Head of the Industrial Security Division has a direct channel
to the Deputy Minister in order to deal with sensitive matters concerning
personnel security within the Department ; more recently a direct channel
has been re-established for matters relating to security in industry .
258 . The duties of the Industrial Security Division are very broad in scope ;
they include provision of advice on security matters to the Departments of
Defence Production and Industry, associated agencies and Crown companies ;
administrative arrangements for, and decision-making on, personnel clearances of departmental employees and employees in industry (but not personnel investigation, which is the responsibility of the RCMP) ; physical
security of departmental premises ; advice on the classification and security
requirements of contracts ; clearances and inspections of industrial plants
and facilities ; control of classified documents held in the departments and
released to industry ; implementation and monitoring of international agreements and regulations on industrial security . The latter include agreements
and procedures resulting from the production-sharing arrangements between
Canada and the United States (the United States-Canada Industrial Security
Agreement of 1952 and a later agreement on the exchange of classified
information), similar agreements within the framework of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements
(some on specific programmes) with allied countries . Regulations and
procedures have in fact already been established to cover most eventualities
relating to industrial security, and precedents have been created for the
negotiation and content of any relevant international agreements . The
continuing tasks are largely concerned with the implementation of appropriate
procedures relating to personnel clearance, contract security, document
classification and control, and facility inspection and clearance, and with
the detailed implementation and monitoring of international regulations,
especially those relating to exchanges of visits and classified information
between Canadian and United States industry .
259 . The Department of Defence Production's security staff is very small .
Apart from the staff at headquarters in Ottawa, small field offices ar e
92
�maintained in Montreal and Toronto, each consisting of an officer and a
secretary . These field offices are responsible, under the direction of the Industrial Security Branch, for the inspection and general supervision of the
security of industrial plants across Canada, for liaison with these companies
and for the provision of -advice to their managements and security officers,
for a number of administrative .functions relating to the transmission of documents and exchanges of visits and for the investigation of specific incidents .
The territory covered by the Montreal office extends from the East Coast to
Belleville ; Ontario, while the territory of the Toronto office extends from
Belleville to British Columbia .
260 . The bulk of the plants at present engaged on classified contracts is
located in Ontario and Quebec, but the others are spread from Newfoundland
to British Columbia . In addition some executives, and in many cases the
physical facilities, of additional firms are cleared so that they may receive
classified information in order to maintain their expertise and bid on classified
contracts . A large part of the detailed responsibility for industrial security is
assumed by the firms themselves . If they have access to classified information
they are required to nominate security officers, and most large firms maintain
such officers on a full time basis ; small firms nominate a staff member for parttime security duties .
Shortcomings and Options
261 . As always in the field of security, it is a matter of great difficulty to
arrive at a reasonable judgment of the effectiveness of present procedures .
However, on the basis of such inquiries as we have been able to make, it
would appear to us that some improvements could be made in the present
standards of industrial security in Canada .
262 . We believe that industrial security is an activity in which government and industry are necessarily interdependent . In spite of provisions in
contracts, enforcement by sanction is in practice difficult even if it were
desirable, and reasonable security can only be achieved by cooperation . We
have therefore been disturbed by the somewhat antagonistic relationships
which appeared to exist at one time between the industrial security authorities and at least some sections of industry . If industry is to cooperate
willingly the industrial security authorities must either devise procedures
which appear to industry to be efficient and practicable, or if this is not
possible at least satisfy industry that any delays are necessary and inevitable . Failure to do either of these things could result in the most dangerous
situation of all, in which industry is antagonistic to what may appear to be
bureaucratic and incompetent procedures, and may take steps to evade the
spirit, if not the letter, of security regulations .
263 . In such circumstances, we would be especially worried about the
arrangements for auditing the compliance of industrial firms with the regula-
93
�tions and for general liaison with firms on security matters . Before classified
information is released to an industrial plant, a physical inspection of the
facility is conducted, and advice proffered on security requirements . As we
have said, these inspections are conducted by the two field officers of the
Department of Defence Production and are supposed to be repeated at
intervals . In our opinion repeated facilities inspections should be regarded
as of central importance to the industrial security programme ; they represent
not only an opportunity to consider a firm's physical environment but also
a chance to examine the general posture and attitude of the company in
terms of security precautions . If they are regular, these visits can also represent an important enforcement procedure, for the inspecting officer can
ensure that suggestions made on previous visits have been carried out . It is
quite clear to us that a reasonable inspection programme of the kind we have
in mind cannot possibly be undertaken across the whole of Canada by two
officers ; certainly present inspections fail to meet reasonable standards of
frequency and thoroughness .
264 . In addition, the field offices of the Department represent the crucial
point of day-to-day contact between industry and government for a wide
variety of matters concerned with industrial security . Although some of these
matters may in themselves be relatively trivial, nevertheless the apparent
competence and responsiveness of the field offices will be noted by industry,
and will have an effect upon industry's willingness to cooperate in an effective industrial security programme . Finally, the field offices should provide
the continuity necessary for an effective security programme by advising and
assisting newly-appointed company security officers . For all these reasons we
think it of great importance that sufficient numbers of personnel of adequate
calibre be made available to these offices .
265 . It seems clear to us that for some years there has been a lack of
understanding on the part of the management of the Department of Defence
Production of the importance of the security function, and a lack of support
for it . This has resulted in the present situation in which industrial security
has too low a status in the departmental structure, and too low a priority in
the competition for resources, and especially for sufficient staff of adequate
calibre . We are aware that the Department is now making efforts to rectify
this situation by seeking additional staff .
266 . We have considered a number of possible structural changes which
might be made in order to improve the present situation . One obvious option
is to reallocate responsibility for industrial security to the Department of
National Defence, so that, for example, the Canadian Forces Headquarters
security organization becomes responsible for the security of armed forces
contracts and the Defence Research Board responsible for the security of its
own research and development contracts . This possibility seems to us worthy
of detailed examination, and has in fact been urged in one form or another
by a number of individuals in government and industry .
94
�267 . In the first place, there would appear to be advantages in avoiding
the present situation in which a single department-Defence Productionhas an unaudited responsibility both for the security of classified contracts,
and for a variety of commercial functions the efficient exercise of which may
reasonably be in conflict with the requirement for security . In addition, the
involvement of two departments-National Defence and Defence Production
-in issues in which security must be weighed against other factors would
at least help to ensure that any conflict was formally resolved on an interdepartmental level . Further, nearly all classified contracts relate to defence
matters, and a large part of the relevant classified information is made available to Canada through defence chanriels, and remains in a sense the responsibility of the Department of National Defence . It would seem likely
that industrial security would generally be handled with more enthusiasm if
it were a function of whichever department was primarily responsible for
the classified material .
268 . At the administrative level, the Canadian Forces and the Defence
Research Board have establishments across the country, each with security
officers and staffs who could probably be used to perform facilities inspections ; at least they represent a framework within which an industrial security
capability could be readily developed . A good deal of security expertise is
available within these agencies, and security organizations exist in Canadian
Forces Headquarters and Defence Research Board Headquarters which could
probably be expanded at small extra cost to assume control of these . additional tasks .
269 . We acknowledge, however, that reallocation of responsibility from
the Department of Defence Production to the Department of National Defence would raise a number of problems . Some classified contracts are negotiated directly and are not at present the direct concern of the Department
of National Defence. Further, some of the most important industrial security
tasks are carried out during the negotiating stage before a contract is
awarded, and the separation of industrial security from the department responsible for the negotiations might raise questions of divided responsibility .
We do not think such problems are insuperable . There seems to us to be a
clear analogy between the engineering inspection and quality control functions
now performed by the Department of National Defence for defence contracts
and the general form of the industrial security role . We would not push the
analogy too far, but we suggest that if problems of coordination can be solved
in one area they can certainly be solved in the other .
270 . It seems to us, therefore, that the balance of advantage lies in
allocating the function to the Department of National Defence . However,
if this suggestion is considered impracticable, the Department of Defence
Production should continue to take steps to improve the present situation .
First, sufficient numbers of personnel of suitable calibre, experience and
maturity must be allocated to the task . Secondly, the industrial securit y
95
�function must be given an appropriate status in the departmental organization . Thirdly, relations with industry must be strengthened, procedures must
be improved and rationalized, and services provided more rapidly . Industrial
security procedures and decisions must be subject to the same audit and
enforcement by the Security Secretariat, advised where necessary by the
Security Service, as are procedures in other areas .
Personnel Security in Industry
271 . The criteria for Canadian industrial personnel clearance procedures
are identical with those for the public service, but the procedures themselves
are somewhat different . The security officer of each firm is made responsible
for ensuring that, before being employed in a position requiring access to
classified information, each person being considered for such employment
provides sufficient data about himself by completing a Personal History
Form, and for submitting the completed form to the Department of Defence
Production . Fingerprints are not at present required from industrial workers .
The Director of Industrial Security submits the form to the RCMP, which
for Confidential or Secret clearances conducts a subversive records check
but, in the absence of fingerprints, is unable to make an adequate check
of criminal records . In those few cases where a Top Secret clearance is
necessary the RCMP carries out a normal field investigation . On the basis
of the information resulting from these inquiries, and of any other data
that are available, the Department of Defence Production may grant the
firm a security clearance in respect of the employee or prospective employee .
The procedures that are followed when adverse reports are received, and
doubts cannot be resolved, are similar to those that are followed in the
case of government employees .
272 . We have already outlined our views on these procedures in
Chapter IV . As far as possible, we would apply to industrial workers the
same procedures as are applied to government employees . Data should be
acquired about industrial workers as for all other persons who are required
,to have access to classified information ; certainly industrial workers should
be required to provide fingerprints . Records should be checked and, when
necessary, inquiries made by the Security Service : the formality of the decision process should be that the Security Service makes a recommendation,
and the responsible department takes the decision to grant or withhold
clearance .
273 . Similarly we think that review procedures should be identical with
those available to government employees . An applicant for industrial employment who is refused employment on security grounds should not be
told why and should have no right to apply for the decision to be reviewed .
On the other hand an individual who already has access should be informed
of the grounds for withdrawal of access to the extent possible withou t
96
�jeopardizing security, and told of his right to ask for a review of the Department's decision by the Security Review Board . Similarly, an individual
who is employed by a firm on a permanent basis, and whose career is significantly inhibited because security considerations have led to the refusal
of a transfer or promotion should be told the reason and of his right of
review .
274 . In practice, the question of the review of decisions has not been
a particularly live issue as far as industrial workers are concerned . The
main problem in this area seems to have arisen from the inordinate length of
time it sometimes takes to obtain even a minimal clearance when no trace
of any kind appears in the records . Classified contracts often require the
services of skilled and scarce workers . It is seldom economically possible for
a company to hire workers unless they can be put to work on a current
contract within a short time, and delays in obtaining a clearance are said
frequently to deny a company the services of a potential recruit . We have
been unable to establish in detail where delays occur, but we believe it of
considerable importance to ensure that clearances are available within a
reasonable time, at least in the vast majority of cases where no adverse
trace exists in any records . We think that as many steps as possible should
be taken to speed up present procedures . A wide variety of arrangements
are available for this purpose, including adequate and competent staffs, a
simplified Personal History Form, direct transmission of the form from the
company to the Security Service (with a copy to the responsible Department), and special procedures to meet the convenience of industry when
very rapid replies are essential for one reason or another . Eventually the
automation of subversive and criminal records will help to improve the
situation .
Training of Company Security Officer s
275 . As we have indicated, responsibility for certain aspects of industrial
security procedures is assumed by the firms themselves, through the company
security officers . These officers are central to the efficient operation of the
system . As a result, although they are company employees and owe their
first allegiance to the company which employs them, the government has
a justifiable interest in their calibre and efficiency . At present these qualities
vary widely ; some company security offiers are aware and competent, but
some are clearly untrained and ineffective .
276 . We think that the selection and training of company security officers
is a matter of importance, in which the government should involve itself .
Regular training courses should be run either by the Security Service or by
the responsible Department with the assistance of the Security Service, and
as a general rule no company security officer should be "recognized" by the
government until he has successfully completed such a course or has acquired
equivalent experience . What is more, employment of a "recognized" securit y
97
�officer by a firm should as a general rule be a condition of any classified
contract . We realize that small firms, including some consultants, may have
some difficulty in meeting these requirements, and we do not rule out the
possibility of special briefings for the executives of such firms, or other special
arrangements to meet their convenience . In principle, however, we think it
important that the officer who is designated as responsible for security in a
company which has access to classified material should receive appropriate
training .
277 . In addition, we think that a great deal more could be done to increase
awareness of the importance of security amongst executives of firms engaged,
or likely to be engaged, in classified contracts . Other countries have considerable educational programmes for this purpose, including conferences for
executives and lectures for staff. Measures of these kinds are needed in
Canada .
Documents, Visits and Classification
278 . There are three detailed areas which seem to be causes of particular
annoyance to some sections of Canadian industry . The first arises from the
fact that, under the provisions of the United States-Canada Agreement,
classified documents must only pass across the border in the course of transit
from one government to another, and arrangements for visits between firms
or by employees of firms to government establishments to discuss classified
matters must also be arranged between governments . The second concerns
certain present regulations for the handling and destruction of classified
documents . The third relates to the classification of contracts or parts of
contracts .
279 . We are told that delays of up to six months can occur when a
Canadian firm requests a classified document from a United States industrial
or research establishment, and that these delays can sometimes be of considerable significance to a company's operation . In addition, delays of three
months can occur between the submission of a request to visit an establishment across the border and the receipt of authority .
280 . We can see no objection to the rules themselves . Classified documents
are government property, and should only pass between governments .
Permission should be sought from the appropriate authorities when nongovernment employees wish to discuss classified matters outside their immediate environments . We find it somewhat difficult to judge the exact
relevance of the criticisms we have heard-clearly there will be some document requests that governments will wish to consider in detail over a period ;
there may well be some requests to which they will not accede at all . Similarly, there will be some occasions when one government or another will wish
to give extended consideration to the desirability of a particular visit . In general, however, it seems to us that bureaucratic processes and inertia on both
98
�sides are -responsible for a good deal of the delay, and obviously arrangements must be made which will meet the justifiable industrial requirement for
reasonable expedition . There exists a whole range of possibilities, including
the provision of adequate. staffs to deal with requests with reasonable speed,
authorization for direct exchanges between named persons of documents
related to a specific . project (subject to the government authorities being
informed), blanket authorization for exchanges of visits between designated
persons on designated subjects, the use of specified company security officers
as government agents for the making of arrangements, and so on . We are
told that steps are being taken to improve procedures and we hope that these
will continue .
281 . With regard to the handling and control of documents it has been
pointed out that the regulations laid down by the- Department of Defence
Production-for industry are more stringent than the regulations in government
departments . To some extent this, is a. matter of interpretation . For instance,
the Industrial Security Manual requires that a contractor shall keep a record
of all classified . material or information . received, distributed, originated,
reproduced or destroyed . Certainly if this regulation is interpreted by the
firm to mean that every classified working note made by an employee shall
be registered, and that a signature shall be obtained whenever a document is
passed across an office, the implementation of the regulation must be timeconsuming and onerous . On the other hand, it is certainly appropriate that
the government should be able to require production of any classified information it has supplied to a firm, and to seek reasonable assurance that classified documents created by the firm are accounted for with some precision .
282 . Similarly it appears that some firms are faced with problems caused
by the growing numbers of classified documents they hold . In fact, the regulations stipulate that any firm may destroy any classified document it has
itself created, but that the firm must seek permission for the destruction of
government-owned documents . If a firm does not wish to go through the
procedure of seeking permission for the destruction of government-owned
documents, it may return them to the Department of Defence Production .
As far as declassification is concerned, we think it . right that companies
should be required to seek permission from the government, but given adequate staffs we can see no reason why special arrangements cannot be made
to meet extreme cases . Officials of the Department could, for example, spend
periods with companies to assist with the sorting and declassification of documents when a problem of long standing exists .
283 . Generally, it is quite clear that the formulation and application of
the security regulations could be improved and rationalized, and we can see
no reason why this process of rationalization should not be carried out in
consultation with industry . The basic principle must be preserved that classified information remains the property of the government and cannot be th e
99
�property of an individual or a firm, but there is obviously room for a good
deal of negotiation on the details of the rules and for more imaginative
interpretation and implementation .
284 . The proper classification of the various aspects of a classified contract is of considerable importance to the effective operation of the industrial
security system, for overclassification or unnecessary classification can place
a considerable burden on industry . The originator of the contract-in Canada usually the Department of National Defence-prepares a document
known as a Security Requirements Check List which sets out the security
classifications to be applied to various aspects of the project ; this is likely to
be a matter of considerable complexity if the contract is of any size . These
check lists are passed to the Department of Defence Production and to
industry when the contract is awarded . We believe that more formality should
enter into the classification process . The full implications of the classifications
allotted to various aspects of a project should be considered in greater detail
by the contract originator and the security authorities, in consultation with
the contractor . The need for classification should be balanced against the
cost and effort required to implement the necessary procedures . The need
to declassify specific aspects of a contract as the contract proceeds should
also be considered .
100
�X. SOURCES AND TECHNIQUE S
285 . All security activities depend upon information . The adequacy of
appreciations and judgments can be no better than the information available . Without accurate and full information, the perception of the threat by
the security authorities, and thus by the government whom they advise, will
be less than satisfactory . Unimportant threats may be overemphasized, significant threats may be overlooked, and vital counter-measures may not be
taken .
286 . Similarly, in the area of security clearance, it is in the interests of
both the state and of individuals that information should be accurate and
complete . Inadequate records can mean that poor reports are sent to departments and unreasonable judgments made . Persons may unjustifiably be refused access to classified information, or unworthy persons may be given
access .
287 . Most of this is true of any activity that involves choices or decisions :
it is important that adequate information should be available . What is
different about the area of security is that those who possess the information
often take steps to conceal it, or to prevent its acquisition by the security
authorities . This means that the security authorities must often take special
steps to obtain it . The remainder of this chapter is concerned with some of
these steps and the issues that arise from them . We do not consider the
obvious and casual sources who provide information in the course of the
clearance process, such as referees, employers or neighbours, nor do we deal
with such sources as open publications and liaison with friendly agencies .
We are more particularly concerned with sources that directly or indirectly
provide data on espionage or subversive organizations and operations .
288 . Human agents are one of the traditional sources of intelligence and
security information, and any security service is to a large extent dependent
,upon its network of agents, on the scale of their penetration of or access
to useful targets and on their reliability . Operations involving human sources
require the most sophisticated handling by trained men with wide experience .
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties associated with some of these operations, we regard them as essential to an effective security posture . We would
101
�go further, and suggest that it is impossible fully to comprehend or contain
the current threats to security-especially in the field of espionage-without
active operations devoted to the acquisition of human sources .
289 . Surveillance programmes are of some importance in maintaining
contact with the activities of known or suspected subversive individuals or
foreign intelligence officers . It should be noted, however, that members of
communist missions in Canada have considerably more freedom to travel
than have Canadian and other western diplomats in communist countries .
This freedom naturally leads to increasing pressure on available resources .
290. In recent years the general question of the use of technical sources
has caused concern in democratic countries in case it should constitute an
invasion of privacy. In Canada the Criminal Code does not explicitly declare
wiretapping or eavesdropping to be crimes, although it is possible that in
certain circumstances they could constitute the indictable offence of mischief .
In addition, it can be argued that sections of some Telephone Company
Acts or the General Regulations of the Board of Transport Commissioners,
in combination with sections 107 and 108 of the Criminal Code, could provide
a basis for prosecution related to telephone interception .
291 . Our views on this subject are simple . We are not required by our
terms of reference to consider the propriety of telephone tapping or eavesdropping by private persons, or even by the police for criminal investigation
purposes . In the security context, however, we see no reason to differ from
the conclusions of the British Committee of Privy Councillors which examined this general subject in 1957 . This Committee concluded that espionage
and subversive activities are carried out by highly trained persons who take
extreme precautions, that the weakest link in this highly skilled chain of
espionage and subversion is communication between agents, and that methods
of interception are very effective, and indeed are often the only effective
means of countering espionage and subversion and of safeguarding the secrets
of the state .
. 292 . There appears to be a possibility that legislation may be proposed
to control the interception of telephone conversations and electronic eavesdropping. We think it important that any such legislation should contain a
clause or clauses exempting interception operations for security purposes
from the provisions of the statute : We think it reasonable however that
arrangements should exist for the control of such operations . In the case of
telephone interception, we think this control should be ministerial rather
than judicial, since ministers are more readily aware of the full details of
the cases brought to their attention, are in better position to understand
the special requirements of security, and could maintain more centralized
control of the complete range of wiretapping operations .
293 . Eavesdropping, however, presents a rather different problem . The
practice is particularly distasteful to the common conscience, -and we thin k
102
�that it should only be undertaken when it appears to be an indispensable
source in connection with a specific operation . We believe that eavesdropping
operations should be authorized personally and individually by the Head
of the Security Service, and that he, rather than the minister to whom he
reports, should bear full responsibility for all such operations .
294 . The question of the interception of mail for security purposes also
deserves consideration . In Canada, mail may be withheld by the Postmaster
General if he suspects that any person is by means of the mails attempting
to commit an offence, or aiding or procuring any other person to commit
an offence, but it may not be opened in any circumstances except with the
consent of the person under suspicion and then only by a specially appointed
Board of Review . These rules are known to the public from the Post Office
Act (R .S .C . 1952, c . 212) and seem to us to provide an open invitation
to hostile agents to make use of the mails for their secure communications .
We believe that arrangements should be made (possibly in the course of
amendment of the Official Secrets Act) to permit the examination of the
mail of persons suspected by the security authorities on reasonable grounds
to be engaged in activities dangerous to the security of the state . However,
any such examination should also be strictly controlled, and should require
ministerial authorization in each instance.
103
�XI . RECOMMENDATIONS
295 . We have not attempted to summarize our Report . Instead we state
briefly below our more important recommendations . The supporting arguments for these recommendations will be found in the body of our Report,
as will a number of our relatively less important suggestions . Numbers in
parentheses refer to paragraphs in the text .
Organization for Security
296 . WE RECOMMEND that there should be established in the Privy
Council Office a formalized Security Secretariat with adequate status, resources and staff to formulate security policy and procedures in the context
of general governmental policies, and more importantly, with effective
authority to supervise the implementation of government security policies
and regulations and to ensure their consistent application . This Secretariat
should be analogous as an organizational entity to the present Secretariats
on Science and on Bilingualism . It should be headed by a Director responsible
to the Secretary to the Cabinet, and should maintain close links and be
advised by the Security Service .
(49 )
297 . WE RECOMMEND the establishment of a new civilian non-police
agency to perform the functions of a Security Service in Canada . This
agency should eventually be quite separate from the RCMP ; it should be
generally without law enforcement powers, although it should, when necessary, operate in close liaison and cooperation with the RCMP and other
police forces . The organizational and operational detachment of the Directorate of Security and Intelligence from the RCMP may be a necessary first
stage in the process of devlopment of the new agency . WE ALSO RECOMMEND
that :
(58,63 )
(a) The duties of the Security Service should include the following tasks,
and its terms of reference should be made public :
(i) to collect, collate and evaluate information or intelligence concerning espionage and subversion, and to communicate such
information in such manner and to such persons as the Head
of the Service considers to be in the public interest ;
105
�(ii) to be responsible for th e direction, coordination and implementation of counter-espionage an d counter-subversive operations in
Canada ;
(iii) to be responsible for security investigations concerning civilian
personnel employed by the Government of Canada, and other
persons as required ;
(iv) to be responsible for the inspection of security precautions in
departments throughout the Government of Canada and elsewhere as required, and for the provision of training and advice
for depa rt ments of government and oth er agencies on matters
concern ed with security ;
(v) to be responsible for the operation and coordination of a ll technical security measures ;
(vi) to cooperate and li aise as may be necessa ry with domestic,
Commonweal th and foreign police forces and security services .
(63 )
(b) The Service should be responsible to a designated minister, but the
Head should have the right of direct access to the P ri me Minister.
The Head should also have a ce rt ain degree of independence of the
(63,64 )
government of the day .
(c) The Head of the Security Se rvice should present periodic reports for
th e consideration of the Security Review Board ( see paragraph 299(d)
below) and the Board should have autho rity to draw to the attention
of the Pri me Minister any matters it considers appropriate . (66 )
Personnel Security
298 . WE RECOMMEND that the following steps be taken with regard to
the Canadian security screening programme :
(a) Before a person is employed in the public service, whether or not
he is likely to have access to classified material, his name should be
checked against the subversive records and he should be the subject
of a fingerprint check against criminal records . Adverse information
need not result in rejection, but the information should be made
available to the employing department, which can request further
inquiries if they appear to be necessary . (89,90 )
(b) All persons without exception should undergo appropriate security
screening procedures before they have access to classified information
(78 )
or material .
(c) Standards of clearance for access to classified material should be as
follows :
(i) before a person is given access to Secret or Confidential information he should be the subject of comprehensive records check s
106
�(including subversive records, criminal records, all relevant
federal departmental records, credit bureaux records and foreign
records where necessary and possible) . Where written inquiries
to referees or previous employers have not been made as part
of a personnel selection process, this should be done . If these
steps produce no adverse information, access may be granted
to Secret or Confidential information after a formal and
recorded departmental judgment that this access is necessary
and desirable . If however any significant adverse information is
developed, further investigation (including field inquiries)
should be undertaken by the Security Service to confirm or
resolve doubts . After inquiry, the case should be referred by
the Security Service, with a recommendation, to the employing
department for decision ;
(ii) before a person is given access to Top Secret information he
must be the subject of a similar comprehensive records check
and a full field investigation covering a period of at least the
previous ten years of his life or the period from age eighteen,
whichever is shorter, and a formal and recorded departmental
judgment must be made that this access is necessary and
desirable .
(iii) clearances to Secret and Top Secret levels should be formally
up-dated at regular intervals, Secret clearances by means of
records checks and consultation with departmental supervisors,
and Top Secret clearances by means of further field investigations . Security clearances should not be thought of as permanent
and in between these up-datings supervisors of personnel
handling classified matters and departmental security officers
should concern themselves, if necessary in consultation with the
Security Secretariat and the Security Service, with cases in which
possible doubts have come to notice ;
(90 )
(d) Departments and agencies should remain responsible for granting
clearance, but the Security Service should assist by providing
information on individual cases as fully as possible, rather than in
the form of abbreviated reports . In addition, the Security Service
should comment on the validity, relevance and importance of the
information it provides and make a formal recommendation on
whether or not clearance should be granted . (92,94 )
(e) When a department decides to grant a security clearance contrary
to the recommendation of the Security Service, the latter should be
informed, and should be able to bring the department's decision to
the attention of the Security Secretariat . In addition, the Security
Secretariat should itself review departmental security decisions in
order to ensure consistency.
(105 )
107
�(f) Persons in the following categories should not be permitted to enter
a position in the public service where they may have access to classified information or are likely to have opportunities to gain such
access :
(i) a person who is a member of a communist or fascist party or
an organization affiliated with a communist or fascist party and
having a similar nature and purpose ;
(ii) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself to
support a communist or fascist party or an organization affiliated
with a communist or fascist party and having a similar nature
and purpose ;
(iii) a person who, having reasonable grounds to understand its true
nature and purpose, is a member of or supports by his words
or his actions an organization which has as its real objective
the furtherance of communist or fascist aims and policies
(commonly known as a front group) ;
(iv) a person who is a secret agent of or an informer for a foreign
power, or who deliberately assists any such agent or informer ;
(v) a person who by his words or his actions shows himself t o
support any organization which publicly or privately advocates
or practices the use of force to alter the form of government .
(97 )
(g) Persons in the following additional categories should not be permitted
to have access to classified information unless after consideration of
the circumstances the risk appears to be justified :
(i) a person who is unreliable, not because he is disloyal, but
because of features of his character which may lead to indiscretion or dishonesty, or make him vulnerable to blackmail or
coercion. Such features may be greed, debt, illicit sexual
behaviour, drunkenness, drug addiction, mental imbalance or
such other aspect of character as might seriously affect his
reliability ;
(ii) a person who, through family or other close continuing relationship with persons described in sub-paragraph (f) above, is likely
to be induced, either knowingly or unknowingly, to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety and interest of Canada ; it is not the
kind of relationship, whether by blood, marriage or friendship,
which is of primary concern, but the degree of and the circumstances surrounding the relationship, and most particularly the
degree of influence that might be exerted, which should dictate
a judgment as to reliability ;
(iii) a person who, though in no sense disloyal or unreliable, is bound
by close ties of blood or affection to persons living within th e
108
�borders of such foreign nations as may cause him to be subjected
to intolerable pressures .
(98 )
(h) Homosexuality should not always be a bar to employment in the
public service, but should normally preclude clearance to the higher
levels of classification and certainly' preclude posting to sensitive
positions overseas .
(100 )
(i) Security policy concerning separatism should be made clear ; the
federal government should take (and be seen to take) steps to prevent
its infiltration by persons who are clearly committed to the dissolution
of Canada, or who are involved with elements of the separatist
movement in . which seditious activity or . foreign involvement are
factors ; information concerning membership in or associations with
extreme separatist groups should be reported on the same basis as
information concerning other allegedly subversive movements, and
the departmental decision process should be similar. (101 )
(j) Universities should not be immune from the same kind of inquiries
as any other institutions or previous employers . However, these
inquiries in particular should be conducted by mature, experienced
and sophisticated investigators who - should take great care not to
conduct random inquiries concerning student activities, or to interfere with freedom of thought and discussion.
(102,103 )
(k) Definite rules should be established concerning the clearance of
aliens or former aliens . In general, clearance should only be granted
to such individuals when it is possible to obtain adequate data on
which to base a judgment .
(104 )
(1) Fingerprints should be taken from all persons requiring clearance,
including industrial workers .
(91)
(m) Full criminal records should remain available for purposes of securit y
clearance, whatever the decision about "vacating" such records in
other contexts .
(91 )
Review Procedure s
299 . WE RECOMMEND that a Security Review Board be established, consisting of a Chairman and (say) two other members, all nominated by the
Governor in Council, but independent of any government department or
agency . The members of the Board should not be active government officials,
although they would undergo normal security clearance procedures, and
their secretarial support would be provided by the Security Secretariat . WE
ALSO RECOMMEND that :
(114,117 )
(a) The Board should consider protests by public servants, members of
the armed forces or industrial workers against dismissal or transfer
or . against any denial of . promotion or apparent inhibition of career
prospects on security grounds ; protests by such persons as consultant s
109
�or university faculty members where withdrawals of clearance affect
professional careers ; protests by sponsors or nominators against
refusal on security grounds to admit or grant landed immigrant status
to those they have sponsored or nominated ; and protests by applicants for citizenship who have been refused on security, grounds. (114 )
(b) The Board should proceed on the following lines : an individual
entitled to appeal to the Board should be provided with a document
indicating as far as possible the reasons for the adverse decision ;
the Board should interview separately and privately representatives
of the Security Service and of the department concerned, the person
concerned (accompanied by a friend, lawyer or trade union official
if he wishes) and any other individuals whom the persons wishes to
be heard ; the Board may interview these persons as many times as
it wishes, and may also order further inquiries ; the Board's advice,
recommendations, or comments should be communicated to the
Governor in Council and the minister concerned ; a brief record of the
Board's decision should also be communicated to the individual concerned ; when the advice of the Board has been received, any further
action on the case should be considered by the Prime Minister in the
(117 )
light of this advice .
(c) In connection with dismissals, the Board 'should provide the form of
hearing required by section 7(7) of the 1967 . amendments to the
Financial Administration Act . (S .C . 1966-67, c. 74) (114 )
(d) In addition, the Board should receive periodic reports from the Head
of the Security Service (see paragraph 297 (c) above) and should
have authority to draw to the attention of the Prime Minister any
(66 )
matters it considers appropriate .
Immigration
300 . WE RECOMMEND that the following changes be made in the pro-
cedures for the security screening of immigrants :
(a) Wherever possible, data should be acquired about the criminal and
security records of all prospective immigrants to Canada irrespective
of relationship, sponsorship, or country of origin . . (131 )
(b) Significantly adverse security reports on an adult immigrant should
lead to rejection, as should significantly adverse reports on a sponsor
or nominator in those cases where data on the immigrant himself is
(132 )
not available .
(c) Normally, decisions on individual cases should be made in the field
(134)
by the concerned officials .
(d) All cases of rejection of sponsored dependants or nominated relatives ,
and all cases where the officials in the field are uncertain about th e
110
�admission or rejection of any applicant on .security grounds, should be
reviewed jointly in Ottawa by the Department of Manpower and
Immigration and the Security Service, and, at the option of either,
the Security Secretariat . Elements of leniency arising from relationships or humanitarian considerations will thus be introduced into
the decision process in Ottawa during interdepartmental consultation .
(135)
(e) Guidelines should be introduced to take the place of the present
rejection criteria and to assist officials in the field in making 'their
judgments . The following is a draft set of guidelines which relate only
to security, and are not intended to affect judgments of acceptability
in other contexts . These guidelines should be interpreted with mature
judgment by the officials on the spot, according to their understanding
of local conditions, and without regard to elements of leniency arising
from relationships or other considerations . Similar guidelines should
be used in Ottawa in making judgments about sponsors or nominators
on those occasions when no direct check of the applicant'has been
possible, and about applicants already in Canada . In general, persons
in the following classes should be rejected :
(i) persons who are believed on reasonable grounds to have held at
any time an -official position in a communist,' neo-Nazi, neoFascist or other subversive or revolutionary organization, or to
.have held a government, party, public or other senior position
or appointment known to be given only to reliable members of
such an organization ;
(ii) persons who are believed on reasonable grounds to have held
membership within the past ten years in a communist, neo-Nazi,
neo-Fascist or other subversive or revolutionary organization,
unless the applicant can demonstrate that membership was for
trivial, practical, non-ideological or other acceptable reasons ;
(iii) persons who are suspected on reasonable grounds to be or to
have been at any time agents on behalf of a communist, neoNazi, neo-Fascist or other subversive or revolutionary organization, or to have taken part in sabotage or other clandestine
activities or agitation on behalf of such an organization ;
(iv) persons who for unexplained reasons engage in significant misrepresentation or untruthfulness in completing documents for
immigration purposes or during interviews .
(137 )
(f) Independent applicants for immigration should normally not be
accepted from communist-bloc countries, unless they have first
established sufficient residence in a country where a meaningful
security check can be made ; where the prospective immigrant has
a sponsor or nominator, a security screening of the latter should be
carried out, and the potential immigrant rejected if the reports are
111
�significantly adverse, unless humanitarian considerations are over(138 )
riding.
(g) Procedures for admitting Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong
should be extensively revised as a matter of urgency . Some years
residence in Hong Kong itself or in an area where a meaningful
(139 )
security check is possible should be mandatory .
(h) The requirement to provide fingerprints should be levied on all prospective immigrants, both to confirm identity as well as to facilitate
(140 )
criminal records checks .
(i) Persons who have already been formally admitted as landed imniigrants should not be subject to deportation on security grounds
without full judicial appeal before a body such as the Immigration
Appeal Board . (116, 142 )
(j) Sponsors or nominators whose dependants or relatives have been
refused admission or refused landed immigrant status should have
access to the Security Review Board (see paragraph 299 above) . (143 )
(k) Applicants for landed immigrant status who are already in Canada .
should be treated in the same way as if they had applied abroad, and
should have no entitlement to an appeal against rejection on security
grounds ; their sponsors or nominators (if any) should however have
the right to appeal rejections on security grounds to the proposed
Security Review Board . (but not to the Immigration Appeal
Board) .
(141 )
Citizenship
301 . WE RECOMMEND that the grant of citizenship should normally b e
refused on security grounds only if actual illegalities or criminal acts have
been committed and proved in court, and not merely for membership in
subversive associations or even the Communist Party . However, WE
RECOMMEND that ministerial discretion should be retained to deal with
certain cases in which it may remain appropriate to withhold citizenship for
particularly significant security reasons . A ll persons whose applications are
rejected on security grounds should have access to the Security Review
Board .
(155,
156 )
Passports
302 . WE RECOMMEND that :
(a) All applicants for a passport who claim to have been born in Canada
should be required to produce a birth certificate or some other acceptable proof of birth ; all applicants claiming to be naturalized citizens
should continue to be required to produce their citizenship certificates .
(163 )
112
�(b) All applicants should normally be required to appear . personally
before an appropriate official . This will require a further decentralization of facilities for the issuance of passports . (163, 164 )
(c) In the cases of persons who lose more than one passport or where
there is reason to suspect that the "loss" may have been intentional,
the issuance of a further passport should be delayed until the validity
of the original has expired, subject to arrangements for truly urgent
cases .
(166 )
Departmental Security
303 . WE RECOMMEND that :
All Departments and Agencie s
(a) The general policy of departmental responsibility should continue,
but :
(i) each department should create an effective security organization
headed by a trained security officer at a sufficiently senior level
in its own structure ;
(ii) each department should prepare departmental security regulations, based on the regulations issued by the Security Secretariat,
but responsive to departmental requirements ;
(iii) training for departmental security staff and for other selected
senior officers should be provided by the Security Service ; in
addition, security education should be provided within departments on a continuing basis ;
(iv) arrangements should be . made for expert security advice to be
given to departments, including if necessary the secondment of
officers from the Security Service to departments for periods of
time .
(b) Inspection and audit of departmental security measures should be
carried out by aprotective security branch of the Security Service,
and arrangements should be made for appropriate action to be taken
where departmental procedures are inadequate .
(c) As a matter of urgency, the RCMP and the Privy Council Office (or
the new Security Secretariat we have proposed) should, after reexamination of present security regulations and consultation with
departments, prepare new security regulations for promulgation by
the government . When this is done, departments should be allowed a
specified period in which to create adequate and effective security
staffs and structures and to make preliminary efforts at compliance .
On completion of this period their efforts should be audited, and cases
in which the security posture of departments is unsatisfactory should
be brought to the attention of their deputy ministers or ministers .
113
�(d) After this preliminary period, a continuing effort should be made to
ensure that compliance with security regulations continues to reach
reasonable standards . Cases in which the security posture of a department is unsatisfactory should be brought to the attention of deputy
ministers and ministers by the RCMP or the Security Secretariat .
(68-75, 183, 184 )
Department of External Affairs
(e) Consideration should be given to . the establishment of a separate
Security Division in the Department of External Affairs . (237)
( f) It should be made clear that the head of each Canadian mission abroa d
is responsible for the security of all Canadian Government personnel
and offices located in the country to which he is accredited, and that
the post security officer acts on his behalf . (238, 239 )
(g) The function of post security officer should generally be the primary
responsibility of a trained officer of adequate seniority . (240, 241)
(h) Greater attention should be paid to the problem of providing reasonable standards of physical security at missions abroad . (242 )
Department of National Defence
(1 ) The armed forces security investigation service should be responsible
for the investigation only of uniformed personnel or potential recruits
to the forces, and its standards of investigation should be consistent
with those which the Security Service applies to civilians . (250, 251)
(1) Persons currently engaged in separatist activities should not be permitted to join the armed forces, and should be released if they are
found to be members of the armed forces . (252 )
Industrial Security
304 . WE RECOMMEND that the industrial security function be removed
from the Department of Defence Production, and reallocated to the Department of National Defence . Whether or not this recommendation is accepted,
we feel that the following steps should be taken : (270 )
(a) The industrial security function should be recognized as important,
and sufficient numbers of staff of adequate calibre should be allocated
to it . In particular, the industrial security field offices should have
increased numbers of personnel, in order to provide adequate standards of facility inspection, advice and audit . (263, 264, 270 )
(b) The general standard of cooperation between the government industrial security authorities and individual companies should be
(262 )
improved .
(c) Clearance procedures for industrial workers should generally be the
same as those applied to government employees, and should includ e
114
�fingerprint checks . Review procedures for indust ri al workers should
also be identical wi th those available to gove rnment employees .
(272)
(d) Steps should be taken to reduce the delays th at now occur in obtaining clearances for industrial workers .
(274 )
(e) The government should concern itself with the calibre, efficiency and
training of company secu rity officers, and should not "recognize" such
officers until they meet standards acceptable to th e government .
Employment of a "recognized" company secu rity officer should
usually be a condition for the grant of a classified contract . The
government should sponsor security education programmes in firms
with classified contracts .
(275-277 )
(f) Ce rt ain detailed arrangements should be made between Canada and
the United States to expedite industri al security procedures .
(279, 280)
(g) The regulations concern ing the handling and control of classified
documents by industry should be improved and rationalized by the
government in consultation wi th industry.
( 281-284 )
(h) Industrial security procedures and decisions should be subject to the
same audit and enforcement by the Securi ty Secretariat, advised where
necessary by the Security Service, as procedures in other areas .
(270 )
Security of Information
305 . WE RECOMMEND that the following steps be taken :
(a) The use of the classification Restricted (or such equivalents as "For
Official Use Only") should be abandoned, and any documents containing information below the level of Confidential should be unclassified and should be protected only by the normal disciplinary rule
against the unauthorized disclosure of any official information . (195 )
(b) The responsibility for declassifying documents should remain with
individual departments, who should perform this task as the occasion
arises, and in consultation with other authorities where necessary .
(197, 198)
(c) Certain detailed measures should be taken by all departments and
agencies charged with the custody of classified documents, including
the centralization of arrangements for document copying, the physical
separation of highly classified information in special areas to which
access is permitted only to cleared personnel, and the paying of strict
attention to the "need-to-know" principle in the dissemination of
classified documents . (199-201 )
(d) Government policy on the release of official documents for historical
and other research should be clarified and made known by means
of published regulations . (223, 224 )
115
�(e) National policy and procedures concerning the release of classified
information to other nations should be formulated and coordinated
in the Security Secretariat, which should also coordinate exchanges of
unclassified information between government departments and the
communist countri es .
(253, 254 )
(f) Consideration should be given to a complete revision of the Official
Secrets Act .
(213 )
Physical, Technical and Communications Security
Sources and Techniques
3 06 . WE RECOMMEND that :
(a) Any building which contains classified material should be effectively
protected at all times . Steps should be taken as a matter of urgency
to provide security guards where necessary, and consideration should
be given to the establishment of an escort system in more sensitive
buildings during working hours . (227, 228 )
(b) All technical security agencies should be combined and form a section
of the protective security branch of the Security Service .
(229)
(c) In any future legislation concerning the interception of telephon e
conversations and electronic eavesdropping exemptions should be
made for their use for security purposes under proper safeguards .
Interception of telephone conversations should only be conducted
by the Security Service on the authority of its designated minister ;
electronic eavesdropping should be permitted on the authority of the
Head of the Service . (291-293 )
(d) Arrangements should be made to permit the examination of the mail
of persons suspected on reasonable grounds of being engaged in
activities dangerous to the security of the state ; such examination
should be conducted only on the authority of the designated minister .
(294 )
116
�APPENDIX "A"
to Report of
Royal Commission
on Securit y
COMMISSION
appointin g
Maxwell Weir Mackenzie,' Esquire, Yves Pratte, Esquire, and the
Honourable Major James William Coldwell ,
Commissioners under Part I of the Inquiries Act to make a full and
confidential inquiry into the operation of Canadian security methods
and procedures .
DATED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th December, 196 6
. RECORDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16th December, 196 6
Film 197 Document 174
(Sgd .) L. McCnrrrr
FOR DEPUTY REGISTRAR GENERAL OF CANAD A
117
�(Sgd .) GEORGES P. VANIE R
CANADA
ELIZABETH .THE SECOND, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom ,
Canada and Her other Realms and Territories QUEEN, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith .
(Sgd .) E . A . DRIEDGER
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERA L
TO ALL TO WHOM these Presents shall come or whom the same may in
anywise concern,
GREETING :
WHEREAS pursuant to the provisions of Part I of the Inquiries Act, chapter
154 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, His Excellency the Governor in
Council, by Order P .C. 1966-2148 of the sixteenth day of November in the
year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixty-six, a copy of which is
annexed, has authorized the appointment of Our Commissioners therein and
hereinafter named to make a full and confidential inquiry into the operation of
Canadian security methods and procedures and, having regard to the necessity
of maintainin g
(a) the security of Canada as a nation ; and
(b) the rights and responsibilities of individual persons ,
to advise what security methods and procedures are most effective and how they
can best be implemented, and to make such reports for this purpose as they deem
necessary and desirable in the national interest, and has conferred certain rights,
powers and privileges upon Our said Commissioners as will by reference to the
said Order more fully appear.
NOW KNOW YE that, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council for
Canada, We do by these Presents nominate, constitute and appoint Maxwell Weir
Mackenzie, Esquire, of the City of Montreal in the Province of Quebec, Yves
Pratte, Esquire, of Quebec City in the Province of Quebec, and the Honourable
Major James William Coldwell, of the City of Ottawa in the Province of Ontario
to be Our Commissioners to conduct such inquiry .
TO HAVE, HOLD, exercise and enjoy the said office, place and trust unto the
said Maxwell Weir Mackenzie, Yves Pratte and Major James William Coldwell,
together with the rights, powers, privileges and emoluments unto the said office,
place and trust of right and by law appertaining during Our Pleasure .
AND WE DO HEREBY direct that the proceedings of the inquiry be held in
camera and that Our said Commissioners, in conducting their inquiry and in
making their reports, consider and take all steps necessary to preserve
(a) the secrecy of sources of security information within Canada ;
(b) the privacy of individuals involved in specific cases which may be examined ; an d
(c) the security of information provided to Canada in confidence by other
nations .
118
�AND WE DO HEREBY FURTHER direct that Our said Commissioners
follow established security procedures with regard to their staff and the handling
of classified information at all stages of the inquiry .
AND WE DO HEREBY authorize Our said Commissioners to exercise all the
powers conferred upon them by section 11 of the Inquiries Act .
AND WE DO FURTHER authorize Our said Commissioners to sit at such
times and at such places as they may decide from time to time .
AND WE DO FURTHER authorize Our said Commissioners to engage the
services of such counsel, staff and technical advisers as they may require, at rates
of remuneration and reimbursement approved by the Treasury Board .
AND WE DO HEREBY require and direct Our said Commissioners to report
to Our Governor in Council with all reasonable dispatch, and file with the Privy
Council Office the papers and records of the Commission as soon as reasonably
may be after the conclusion of the inquiry .
AND WE DO HEREBY appoint Maxwell Weir Mackenzie of the City of
Montreal in the Province of Quebec to be Chairman of the Commission .
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF We have caused these Our Letters to be made
Patent and the Great Seal of Canada to be hereunto affixed .
WITNESS :
Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved Counsellor, General . Georges P . Vanier,
a member of Our Most Honourable Privy Council ; Companion of Our Distinguished Service Order upon whom We have conferred Our Military Cross
and Our Canadian Forces' Decoration, 'Governor General and Commanderin-Chief of Canada.
AT OUR GOVERNMENT HOUSE, in Our City of Ottawa, this sixteenth
day of December in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixtysix and in the fifteenth year of Our Reign .
BY COMMAND,
(Sgd. )
JEAN MIQUELON
DEPUTY REGISTRAR GENERAL OF CANADA
119
�ORDER IN COUNCI L
P.C. 1966-214 8
Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of. the Committee
of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General
on the 16th November, 1966 .
The Committee of the Privy Council, on the recommendation of the Right
Honourable Lester Bowles Pearson, the Prime Minister, advise
1 . that Mr . M . W. Mackenzie, Montreal, Quebec, Mr . Yves Pratte, Quebec
City, Quebec, and Honourable M . J . Coldwell, Ottawa, Ontario, be appointed Commissioners under Part I of the Inquiries Act to make a full and
confidential inquiry into the operation of Canadian security methods and
procedures and, having regard to the necessity of maintainin g
(a) the security of Canada as a nation; an d
(b) the rights and responsibilities of individual persons .
to advise what security methods and procedures are most effective and
how they can best be implemented, and to make such reports for this
purpose as they deem necessary and desirable in the national interest ;
2 . that the proceedings of the inquiry be held in camera and that the
Commissioners, in conducting their inquiry and in making their reports,
consider and take all steps necessary to preserv e
(a) the secrecy of sources of security information within Canada ;
(b) the privacy of individuals involved in specific cases which may be
examined ; and
(c) the security of information provided to Canada in confidence by other
nations ;
.
3 . that the Commissioners follow established security procedure with regard
to their staff and the handling of classified, information at all stages of the
inquiry ;
4 . that the Commissioners be authorized to exercise all the powers conferred on them by section . 11 of the Inquiries Act ;
5 . that the Commissioners be authorized to sit at such times and at such
places as they may decide from time to time ;
6 . that the Commissioners be authorized to engage the services of such
counsel, staff and technical advisers as they may require, at rates of remuneration and reimbursement approved by the Treasury Board ;
7 . that the Commissioners report to the Governor in Council with all reasonable dispatch, and file with the Privy Council Office the papers and
records of the Commission as soon as reasonably may be after the conclusion of the inquiry ; and
8 . that Mr. M . W . Mackenzie, Montreal, Quebec, be Chairman of the
Commission. •
(Sgd .) R . G . ROBERTSON
CLERK OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
120
�APPENDIX "B"
to Report of
Royal Commission
on Securit y
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Fraser, R . B .'How We Check on Loyalty. Maclean's Magazine . 15 Jan 1952 .
Fraser, R . B . New, Slick, Quiet Soviet Spies in Our Midst. Maclean's Magazine .
25 Jul 1964 .
126
�Fulbright, Sen . J . W . We Must Not Fight Fire with Fire. New York Times
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Fyfe, Sir David M . How Britain Handles Communists . U .S. News and World
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Goodspeed, D . J . Arts of Subversion . Queen's Quarterly 63 :71 . Spring, 1956 .
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Gregor, Richard . Soviet Foreign Policy . EMO National Digest . Feb 1968 .
Grimond, J . Do We Have to Use Stealth? The Observer. 26 Mar 1967 .
Haggart, Ron . Why Do We Track the Kid Radical? Toronto Daily Star . 29 Aug
1963 .
Hamilton, Peter. Espionage in Industry . New Scientist . 1 Dec 1966.
Hand, Learned. A Plea for the Freedom of Dissent . New York Times Magazine .
6 Feb 1955 .
Hess, E . H .,-and J . M. Polt . Pupil Size as Related to Interest Value of Visual
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Hilsman, Roger . Intelligence and Policy Making in Foreign Affairs . World Politics . Oct 1952.
Hoover, J . Edgar . A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Government Employees" . Yale Law Journal . 1949 .
Hoover, J . Edgar. The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports . Syracuse Law Review. .1956 .
Hoover, J . Edgar . Role of the FBI in the Federal Employment Security Program .
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Ioffe, A. Ye . Activities of Foreign Societies of Friendship with the Soviet Union .
U.S. Department of Commerce . Joint Publications Research Service . .6 Jun 1966 .
Jackson, David C . Individual Rights and National Security. Modern Law Review
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Jahoda, Marie and Stuart Cook . Security Measures and Freedom of Thought : An
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James, Robert Rhodes. The Fifty Year Rule . The Spectator. 21 Aug 1964.
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Kaufman, Charlotte A . and Herbert . Some Problems of Treatment Arising fro m
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Kendall, Willmoore . The Function of Intelligence . World Politics . Jul 1949 .
Kennan, George . Rebels Without a Program. New York Times Magazine . 21 Jan
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Knight, K . W . Administrative Secrecy and Ministerial Responsibility . Canadian
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Lear, John . Whither Personal Privacy . Saturday Review . 23 Jul 1966 .
Lefolii, K . What the New Parliament Can Do About the Political Police : Stop
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Lipski, Sam . Security Report : A Dossier on ASIO . The Bulletin, Sydney, Australia . 10 Dec 1966 .
Lohan, Colonel L . G . Why the D Notice System Failed . Security Gazette . Jul
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127
�Lower, Arthur R . M. Is the RCMP a Threat to Our Liberty? Maclean's Magazine . 6 Jul 1957 .
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MacDonald, Dwight . The Lie Detector Era . The Reporter. Jun 1954 .
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1
Jun 1965 .
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1953 .
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27 Aug-2 Sep 1966 .
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Rowat, Donald C . Administrative Secrecy and Ministerial Responsibility : A
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Rowat, Donald C . How Much Administrative Secrecy? Canadian Journal of
•
Economics and Political Science 31 :479 . Nov 1965 .
. The Problem of Administrative Secrecy. Int . Rev. Ad. Sci . 2.
Rowat, Donald C
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Shawcross, Sir Hartley . Communist Security vs . Man's Right to Knowledge.
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Sheeham, Edward R . F. The Rise and Fall of a Soviet Agent . Saturday Evening
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128
�Smith, Burke M . The Polygraph .* Scientific American 216 :25 . Jan 1967 .
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Solomon, Morris . A Statistician Looks at the Employee Security Problem . Personnel Administration . Jul 1955 .
Stacey, C . P . . Some Pros and Cons of the Access Problem. International Journal .
Winter, 1964-65 .
Stewart, H. L . Espionage Shock in Canada . Dalhousie Review 26 :239 . 1946 .
Stewart, Walter. Here's How the Mounties Get Their Man . Canadian Weekly .
20 Sep 1963 .
Sypnowich, Peter . The Mounties : What has Happened to their Image? The Star
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Tanner, Henry . France's Communists Make a Formidable Comeback . New York
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Thompson, Donald . The Committee of 100 and the Official Secrets Act, 1911 .
Public Law . 1963 .
Trevor-Roper, Hugh . The Philby Affair : Espionage, Treason and Secret Services .
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Van Der Haag, Arnest . Controlling Subversive Groups . Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 300 :62. 1955 .
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Watson, W . H . Scientists and State Security . International Journal 10 :171 . Summer, 1955.
Westin, A . F. The Wire-Tapping Problem . Columbia Law Review 52 :165 . 1952 .
Worthington, Peter. Metro Peace Establishment . Parts 1-9 . Toronto Telegram .
27 Jan-6 Feb 1968 .
Yarmolinsky, Adam . How a Lawyer Conducts a Security Case . The Reporter . 2
Mar 1954 .
Official Publications
CANAD A
Report of the Royal Commission appointed to investigate the facts relating to
and the circumstances surrounding the communication, by public officials and
other persons in positions of trust of secret and confidential information to
agents of a foreign power . Hon . Mr. Justice Robert Taschereau and Hon . Mr.
Justice R . L. Kellock, Commissioners. 27 June 1946 .
Report to Minister of Justice on Immigration by Joseph Sedgwick, Q .C. Part I,
April 1965, Part 11, January 1966 .
Commission of Inquiry into complaints made by George Victor Spencer . The
Hon . Mr. Justice Dalton Wells, Commissioner . July 1966.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to one Gerda Munsinger . The Hon . Mr. Justice Wishart Spence, Commissioner . September 1966.
Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda
in Canada. Maxwell Cohen, Chairman . 1966.
Report of the British Columbia Commission of Inquiry into Invasion of Privacy .
R . A . Sargent, Commissioner. 9 August 1967 .
Report No . I of Ontario Royal Commission of Inquiry into Civil Rights . The
Hon . James Chalmers McRuer, Commissioner . 1968 .
129
�BRITAIN
Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries . July 1957
(Cmnd 218) .
Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into the Interception of Communications, October 1957 (Cmnd 283) .
Report of the Royal Commission on the Press, 1949 (Cmnd 770) .
Security Procedures in the Public Service (Radcliffe Report), April 1962 (Cmnd
1681) .
Report of the Tribunal appointed to Inquire into the Vassall Case and Related
Matters, April 1963 (Cmnd 2009) .
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Tribunal appointed to Inquire into the
Vassall Case and Related Matters, June 1963 (Cmnd 2037) .
Lord Denning's Report, September 1963 (Cmnd 2152) .
Report of the Standing Security Commission, July 1965 (Cmnd 2722) .
Report of the Security Commission on the Bossard and Allan Cases, September
1965 (Cmnd 2773) .
Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into "D"
notice matters, June 1967 (Cmnd 3309) .
The "D" Notice System (White Paper), June 1967 (Cmnd 3312) .
Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, August 1967 (Cmnd 3387) .
Report of the Committee on Departmental Records, 1954 (Cmnd 9163) .
Report concerning the disappearance of two former Foreign Office Officials, 1955
(Cmnd 9577) .
Statement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security,
March 1956 (Cmnd 9715) .
UNITED STATES
Atomic Energy Commission
-In the Matter of J . Robert Oppenheimer. Texts of Principal Documents and
Letters, 1954 .
-In the Matter of J . Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing, 1954 .
Bureau of the Budget, "Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government",
A Report to the President, Washington, 20 September 1945 .
Civil Service Commission
-Conducting and Reporting Personal Investigations
-The Educator and the Civil Service Investigator
-Bureau of Personnel Investigations, The Investigative and Suitability Evaluation Programs .
California Senate Judiciary Committee, Report on the Interception of Messages
by the Use of Electronic and Other Devices, 1957 .
Commission on Government Security . Loyd Wright, Chairman . Report, Jun 1957 .
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(Hoover Commission), 1949 : Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs, 1949 :
Foreign Affairs, A Report to Congress, 1949 : Task Force Report, National
Security Organization, 1949.
Department of Defence
-Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information
-Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Progra m
130
�-Industrial Security Operating Manual
-Industrial Security Regulations.
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Central Intelligence Agency . Statement of Laszlo Szabo, 1966.
House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations . Hearings and Reports, 1955-1966 .
(Subjects include : subversion and espionage in defence stablishments and industry, use of polygraphs by the Federal Government, the computer and privacy, etc.) .
Library of Congress, Law Library-Survey of Legislation on Security Safeguards
and Anti-Subversive Measures, 1957 .
New York State Joint Legislative Commission to Study Illegal Interception of
Communications . Report, 1956 .
Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Subcommittee
on Investigations . Report : Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, 1950 .
Senate Committee on the Judiciar y
Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws (Senate Internal Security Subcommittee )
Hearings and Reports, 1952-196 7
(Subjects Include : State Department security, Communist subversion
and penetration in various areas, the communist youth programme,
gaps in internal security laws, passport regulations and safeguarding
of communications facilities, subversion in United States government
departments, activities of United States citizens employed by the
United Nations, etc . )
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
Hearings and Reports, 1966-6 7
(Subjects include : invasion of privacy, telephone interception, computer privacy, the Right of Privacy Act, 1967, etc . )
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
Hearings and Reports, 1958-196 5
(Subjects include : wiretapping, eavesdropping and the Bill of Rights,
the rights of government employees, psychiatric examinations and
psychological tests, etc .) .
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Report of Joint Committee on
Central Intelligence Agency, 1956 .
AUSTRALIA
Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage, 1955 .
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand Royal Commission Report of the administration of security service
so far as it relates to attendance of officers thereof at a university and matters
incidental thereto, 5 August 1966 .
SWEDEN
Report of Royal Commission established to Inquire into the Wennerstrom Affair,
1968 .
131
�APPENDIX "C"
to Report of
Royal Commission
on Security
OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT
1 . Canadian Official Secrets Act (R.S .C. 1952, c . 198 )
II . Extract from Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (S .C. 1966-67, c . 96)
III . Loi sur les secrets officiels ( S.R . du C. 1952, c . 198 )
IV. Extract from Loi sur la reorganization des Forces canadiennes (S. du C .
1966-67, c . 96)
132
�CHAPTER 198 .
An Act respecting Official Secrets.
SHORT TITLE .
1. This Act may be cited as the ' O fficial Secrets Act . Short
t
1939, c . 49, s . 1 .
INTERPRETATION .
2. In-this
Act ,
Definitions.
(a) "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of "Attorne ~
;
General .'
Canada
"Document ."
(b) "document" includes part of a document ;
(c) "model" includes design, pattern and specimen ;
"Model ."
.(d) "munitions of war" means arms, ammunition ; imple- "Munitions
ments or munitions of -war., army, naval- or air stores, of `°8r ~~
or any articles deemed capable of being converted
thereinto, or made useful in the production thereof ;
(e) "offence under this Act" includes - any act, omission, -Offence .
or other thing that is punishable hereunder ; A~;; this
(f) "office under Her Majesty" includes any office or " o ffic e
employment in or under any department or branch of °naeraer
Majesty."
the Government of Canada or of any province, and
any office or employment in, on or under any board,
commiss, on, corporation or other body that is an agen t
of Her Majesty in right of Canada or any province ;
" Prohibited
(g) "prohibited place" means
(i) any work of defence belonging to or occupied place . "
or used by or on behalf of Her Majesty including
arsenals, naval, army or air force establishments
or stations, factories, dockyards, mines, minefields,
camps, ships . aircraft, telegraph, telephone, wireless or signal stations or offices, and places used for
the purpose of building, repairing, . making or storing any munitions of war or any sketches, plans,
models, or documents relating thereto, or for the
purpose of getting any metals, oil or minerals of
use in time of war,
133
�2 Chap . 198.
Official Secrets Act.
(ii) any place not belonging to Her Majesty where
any munitions of war or any sketches, models,
plans or documents relating thereto, are being
made, repaired, gotten or stored under contract
with, or with any person on behalf of, Her Majesty,
or otherwise on behalf of Her Majesty, an d
(iii) any place that is for the time being declared
by order of the Governor in Council to be a pro'hibited place on the ground that information with
respect thereto or damage thereto would be useful
to a foreign power ;
"Sketch ." (h) "sketch" includes apy mode of representing any
place or thing ;
" Senior (i) "senior police officer" means any officer of the Royal
polic e
officer :" Canadian Mounted Police not below the rank of
Inspector ; any officer of any provincial police force of
a like or superior rank ; the chief constable of any city
or town with a population of not less than ten
thousand ; or any person upon whom the powers of a
senior police officer are for the purposes of this Act
conferred by the Governor in Council ;
Reference
to He r
(j) any reference to Her Majesty means Her Majesty in
Majesty . right of Canada or of any province ; an d
Communi- (k) expressions referring to communicating or receiving
cating o r . include ' any communicating or receiving, whether in
receiving
Spying.
whole or in part, and whether the sketch, plan, model,
article, note, document or information itself or the
-substance, effect, or description thereof only is communicated or received ; expressions referring to obtaining or retaining any sketch, plan, model, article, note,
or document, include the copying or causing to be
copied ., the whole or any part of any sketch, plan,
model, article, note ; or document ; and expressions
referring to the communication of any sketch, plan,
model, article, note or document include the transfer
or transmission of the sketch, plan, model, -article,
note or document . 1939, c. 49, s . 2 ; 1950, c. 46, s . 1 .
3 . (1) Every person who, for any purpose prejudicial
to the safety or interests of the State ,
(a) approaches, inspects, passes over, or is in the neighbourhood of, 'or enters any prohibited place ;
(b) makes any sketch, plan, model or note that is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly
or indirectly useful to a foreign power ; o r
(c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word ,
or
134
�Official Secrets Act .
Chap. 198 .
3
or pass word, or any .sketch, plan, model, article, o r
note, or other document or information that is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or
indirectly useful to a foreign power ;
is guilty of an offence under this Act .
(2) On a prosecution under this section, it is not neces- Accused
sary to show that the accused person was guilty of any ~ ~onvmted
particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the if purpose
safety or interests of the State, and, notwithstanding that to tKedsafetq
no such act is proved against him ; he may be convicted if, of the State .
from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or hi s
known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was
a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State ;
and if any sketch, plan, model, article, note, .document or
information relating to or used in any prohibited place, or
anything in such a place, or any secret official code word or
pass word is made, obtained, collected, recorded, published
or communicated by any person other than a person acting
under lawful authority, it shall be deemed to have been
made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests
of the State -unless the contrary is- proved .
(3) In 'any proceedings against a person for an offence oommuniunder this section, the fact that he has been in communi- cation wit h
agent o f
cation with, or -attempted to communicate with, an agent foreig n
is power, etc.,
of a foreign power, whether within or without Canada , sufficient
evidence that he has, for a purpose prejudicial to the evidence .
safety or interests of the State, obtained or attempted t o
obtain information that is calculated to be or might be
or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to a foreign
power.
(4) For the purpose of this section, but without prejudice W hen person
deemed to
to the of the foregoing provision
generality
have been i n
(a) a person shall, unless he proves the contrary, be communi- h
cation wit
deemed to have been in communication with an agent agent of a
foreign
of a foreign power if
power .
(i) he has, either within or without Canada, visite d
the address of an agent of a foreign power or consorted or associated with such agent, o r
(ii) either within or without Canada, the name or
address of, or any other information regarding such
an agent has been found in his possession, or has
been supplied by him to any other person, or has
been obtained by him from any other person ;
(b) "an agent of a foreign power" includes any person "An agent of
who is or has been or is reasonably suspected'of being Poweri 'g"
or having been employed by a foreign power . either
135
defined .
�4 Chap . 198.
Official Secrets Act .
directly or indirectly for the purpose of committing an
act, either within or without Canada, prejudicial to
the safety or interests of the State, or who has or is
reasonably suspected of having, either within or without Canada, . committed, or attempted,to commit, such
an act in the interests of a foreign power ; an d
when
(c) any address, whether within or without Canada,
address
reasonably suspected of being an address used for the
deemed
that of a n
agent of receipt of communications intended for an agent of a
a foreign
foreign power, or any address at which such an agent
p°`°er' resides, or to-which he resorts for the purpose of givin g
or receiving communications, or at which he carries on
any business, shall be deemed to be the address of an
agent of a foreign power, and communications
addressed to such an address to be communications
with such an agent. 1939, c . 49, s . 3.
Wrongful 4. (1) Every person who, having in his possession or
eoF!muni- control any secret official code word, or pass word, or any
oftion'etc' sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information
information. that relates to or is used in a prohibited place or anythin g
in such a place, or that has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or that has been entrusted in
confidence to him by any person holding office under Her
Majesty, or that he has obtained or to which he has had
access while subject to the Code of Service Discipline within
the meaning of the National Defence Act or owing to his
position as a person who holds or has held office under Her
Majesty, or as a person who holds or has .held a contract
made on behalf of Her Majesty, or a contract the performance of which in whole or in part is carried out in a prohibited place, or as a person who is or has been employed
under a person who holds or has held such an office or
contract,
(a) communicates the code word, pass word, .ketch,
plan, model, article, note, document or information to
any person, other than a person to whom he is authorized to communicate with, or a person to whom it is
in the interest of the State his duty to communicat e
it ►
(b) uses the information in his possession for the benefit
of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial
to the safety or interests of the State ;
(c) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or
document in his possession or control when he has no
right to retain it or, when it Is contrary to his dut y
136
�Official Secrets Act .
Chap. 198 .
to retain it or fails to comply with all directions issued
by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof ; or
(d) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan,
model, article, note, document, secret official code word
or pass word or information ;
is guilty of an offence under this Act.
(2) Every person who, having in his possession or con- Communitrol any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or cation of
information that relates to munitions of war, communicates modei,etc .
it directly or indirectly to, any foreign power, or in an y
other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the
State, is guilty of an offence under this Act .
(3) Every person who receives any secret official code Receiving
word, or pass word, or sketch, plan, model, article, note, :etch, etc.
document or information, knowing, or having reasonabl e
ground to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the
code word, pass word, sketch, plan . model, article, note,
document or information is communicated to him in contravention of this Act, is guilty of an offence under this Act,
unless he proves that the communication to him of the
code word, pass word, sketch, plan . model, article, note,
document or information was contrary to his desire .
(4) Every person wh o
(a) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or Retaining
interests of the State any official document, whether a~ument,
or not completed or issued for use, when he has no right etc .
to retain it, or when it is contrary .to his duty to retain
it, or fails to comply with any directions issued by any
Government department or any person authorized by
such department with regard to the return or disposal
thereof ; o r
(b) allows any other person to have possession of any AnoWing
offic ;al document issued for his use alone, or corn- other
municates any secret official code word or pass word so po~wwion .
issued . or, without lawful authority or excuse, has i n
his possession any official document or 'secret official
code word or pass word issued for the use of some person
other than himself, or on obtaining possession . of any
official document by finding or otherwise, neglects or
fails to restore it to the person or authority by whom or
for whose use it was issued, or to a-police constable ; is guilty of an offence under this Act . 1939 ; c . 49, s. 4 ;
1951 (2nd Sess .), c . 7, g. 28 .
137
�6 Chap . 198.
Official Secrets Act.
5. (1) Every person who, for the purpose of gaining
admission, or of assisting any other person to gain admission, to a prohibited place, or for any other purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,
forgeryrtB'
personation (a) uses or wears, without lawful authority, any naval,
and false
Unauthorized use o f
uniforms ;
falsification
documents . army, air force, police or other official uniform or any
uniform so nearly resembliq the same as to be calculated to deceive, or falsely represents himself to be a
person who is or has been entitled to use or wear any
such uniform ;
(b) orally, or in writing in any declaration or application,
or in any document signed by him or on his behalf,
knowingly makes or connives at the making of any
false statement or any omission ;
(c) forges, alters, or tampers with any passport or any
naval, army, air force, police or official pass, permit,
certificate, licence or other document of a similar character, (hereinafter in this section referred to as an
official document), or uses or has in his possession any
such forged, altered, or irregular official document ;
(d) personates, or falsely represents himself to , be a
person holding, or in the employment of a person
hotding, office under Her Majesty, or to be or not to be a
person to whom an official document or secret official
code word or pass word has been duly issued or communicated, or with intent to obtain -an official document, secret official code word or pass word, whether
for himself or any other person, knowingly makes any
false statement ; or
(e) uses, or has in his possession or under his control,
without the authority of the Government department
or the authority concerned, any die, seal, or stamp
of or belonging to, or used, made, or provided by any
Government department, or by any diplomatic, naval,
army, or air force authority appointed by or acting
under the authority of Her Majesty, or any die, seal
or stamp, so nearly resembling any such die, seal or
stamp as to be calculated to deceive, or counterfeits
any such die, seal or stamp, or uses, or has in his
possession, or under his control, any such counterfeited die, seal or stamp ;
is guilty of an offence under this Act .
Unlawful (2) Every . person who, without lawful authority or excuse,
dealing with manufactures or sells, or has in his possession for sale any
dies, seals,
such die, seal or stamp as aforesaid, is guilty of an offence
etc under this Act. 1939, c . 49, s . 5 .
138
�Official Secrets Act .
Chap. 198 .
7
6 . No person in the vicinity of any prohibited place Interferin g
shall obstruct, knowingly mislead or otherwise interfere
with or impede any constable or police officer, or any
f with officers
the police
or members
Her
o
member of Her Majesty's forces engaged on guard, sentry, M
y .e
patrol, or other similar duty in relation to the prohibited foreea •
place, and every person who acts in contravention of, or
fails to comply with, this provision, is guilty of an offence
under this Act . 1939, c . 49, s . 6 .
7 . (1) Where it appears to the Minister of Justice that
such a course is expedient in the public interest, he may,
by warrant under his hand, require any person who owns
or controls any telegraphic cable or wire, or any apparatus
for wireless telegraphy, used for the sending or receipt of
telegrams to or from any place out of Canada, to produce
to him, or to any person named in the warrant, the originals
and transcripts, either of all telegrams, or of telegrams of
any specified class or description, or of telegrams sent from
or addressed to any specified person or place, sent to or
received from any place out of Canada by means of any
such cable, wire, or apparatus and all other papers relating
to any such telegram as aforesaid .
Power to
require the
production
of
telegrams.
(2) Every person who, on being required to produce any Refusing or
g
such original or transcript orpaper ~ refuses neglectin
as aforesaid, to produce
or neglects to do so is guilty of an offence under this Act, original, etc .
and is for each offence, liable on summary conviction to
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not Peaalty
exceeding three months, or to a fine not exceeding tw o
hundred dollars, or to both such imprisonment and fine .
1939, c . 49, s . 7 .
8 . Every person who knowingly harbours any person Harbouring
whom he knows, or has reasonable grounds for supposing, spiesto be a person who is about to commit or who has committed an offence under this Act, or knowingly permits to
meet or assemble in any premises in his occupation or under
his control any such persons, and every person who, having
harboured any such person, or permitted to meet or
assemble in . any premises in his occupation or under his
control any such persons, wilfully omits or refuses to disclose to a senior police officer any information that it is in
his power to give in relation to any such person, is guilty
of an offence under this Act . 1939, c . 49, s . 8 .
9. Every person who attempts to commit any offence Attempts,
under this Act, or solicits or incites or endeavours to per-incitements,
etc
suade another person to commit an offence, or aids or abets
and does any act preparatory to the commission of an
139
�8 Chap . 198.
Official Secrets Act .
offence under this Act, is guilty of an offence under this Act
and is liable to the same punishment, and to be proceeded
against in the same manner, as if he had committed the
off en ce . 1939, c . 49, s . 9 .
10 . E very person who is found committing an offence
without under this Act, or who is reasonably suspected of having
warrant• committed, or having attempted to commit, or being about
to commit, such an offence, may be arrested without a
warrant and detained by any constable or police officer .
1939, c . 49, s . 10 .
Power to
arres t
Search 11 . (1) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by in#orwarrante.
mation on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been or is about
to be committed, he may grant a search warrant authorizing
any constable named therein, to enter at any time any
premises or place named in the warrant, if necessary by
force, and to search the premises or place and every person
found therein, and to seize any sketch, plan, model, article,
note or document, or anything that is evidence of an offence
under this Act having been or being about to be committed,
that he may find on the premises or place or on any such
person, and with regard to or in connection with which he
has reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under
this Act, has been or is about to be committed .
(2) Where it appears to an officer of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police not below the rank of Su p erintendent that
emergency.
the case is one of great emergency and that in the interest
of. the State immediate action is necessary, he may by a
written order under his hand give to any constable the like
authority as may be given by the warrant of a justice under
this section . 1939, c . 49, s . 11 .
In case of
grea t
12 . A prosecution for an offence under this Act shall not
consent of be instituted except by or with the consent of the Attorney
Attorney General ; except that a person charged with such an offence
General' may be arrested, or a warrant for his arrest may be issue d
Prosecution
only with
and executed,'and any such person may be remanded in
custody or _ on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of
the Attorney General to the institution of a prosecution
for the offence has not been obtained, but no further or
other proceedings shall be taken until that consent has been
obtained . 1939, c . 49, s . 12.
Offences 13 . An Act, omission or thing that would, by reason of
committe d
this Act, be punishable as an offence if committed in
outside
Canada Canada, is, if committed outside Canada, an offence against
triabl e
this Act, triable and punishable in Canada, in the following
Canada~n
cases :
140
�Official Secrets Act .
Chap. 198.
.9
(a) where the offender at the time of the commissio n
was a Canadian citizen within the meaning of the
Canadian Citizenship Act ; or
(b) where any code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model,
article, note, document, information or other thing
whatsoever in respect of which an offender is charged
was obtained by him, or depends upon'information that
he obtained, while owing allegiance to Her Majesty .
1950, c . 46, s. 2 .
14. (1) For the purposes of the trial of a person for wt,e, .B
an offence under this Act, the offence shall be deemed to dffem a to
have been committed either at the place in which the same have been .
actually was committed, or at any place in Canada in eOmmittea'
which the offender may be found .
(2) In addition and without prejudice to any powers public
that a court may possess to order the exclusion of the maybe d
exclude
public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings from trial.
before a court against any person for an offence under this
Act or the proceedings on appeal, application is made by
the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any
evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the
course of the proceedings would be prejudicial to the
interest of the State, that all or any portion of the public
shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the court
may make an order to that effect, but the passing of
sentence shall in any case take place in public .
(3) Where the person guilty of an offence under .this Where guilty
Act is a company or corporation, ever director and officer person a
y company or
of the company or corporation is guilty of the like offence corporation.
unless he proves that the act or omission constituting th e
offence took place without his knowledge or consent . 1939,
c . 49, s. 13 .
15 . (1) Where no specific penalty is provided in this Penalties .
Act, any person who is guilty of an offence under this Ac t
shall be deemed to be guilty of an indictable offence and General .
is on conviction punishable bby
imprisonment for a term Indictable
is, >
offence.
not exceeding fourteen years ; but such person may, at th e
election of the Attorney General, be prosecuted summarily Summary
in the manner provided by the provisions of the C riminal conviction..
Code relating to summary convictions, and, if so prosecuted, is punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months,
or by both fine and imprisonment.
141
�10 Chap . 198.
Application
of the
Identification of
Ac~ inals
Official Secrets Act .
(2) Any person charged with or convicted for an offence
under this Act shall, for the purposes of the Identification
of Criminals Act, be deemed to be charged with or convicted of an indictable offence notwithstanding that suc h
person is prosecuted summarily in the manner provided by
the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary
convictions . 1950, c . 46, s . 3 .
EDMOND CLOUTIER, C .M .G . . O .A ., D.S .P .
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1952
142
�.14-15-16 ELIZABETH
11 .
CHAP. 96
An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts
in consequence thereof .
[Assented to 8th May, 1967.]
H
ER
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of th e
Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as
follows :
SHORT TITLE .
1 . This Act may be cited as the Canadian Forces
Reorganization Act .
R .S ., cc .
184, 310;
1952-53, cc .
6, 24 ;
1953-54, cc .
13, 21, 40 ;
1955, c . 28 ;
1956, c . 18 ;
1959, c . 5 ;
1964-65, c . 21 .
Short title .
64. The Acts and portions of Acts set out in Schedule B are repealed or amended in the manner and to the
extent indicated in that Schedule .
SCHEDULE B .
Amendments and Repeals .
Act affected .
. : Repeal or amendment .
Official Secrets Act 1 . Paragraph (d) of section 2 is repealed and
R.S ., c . 198 the following substituted therefor :
"(d) "munitions of war" means arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of
war, military stores, or any articles
deemed capable of being converted
thereinto, or made useful in the production thereof ; "
2. Subparagraph (i) of paragraph (g) of section
2 is repealed and the following substituted
therefor :
«(i)
any work of defence belonging to
or occupied or used by or on behalf
of Her Majesty including arsenals,
143
�42 Chap . 96. Canadian Forces Reorganization. 14-15-16 ELIZ . II .
SCHEDULE B-Continued
Act affected . Repeal or amendment.
armed forces establishments or
stations, factories, dockyards,
mines, minefields, camps, ships,
aircraft, telegraph, telephone, wireless or signal stations or offices,
and places used for the purpose of
building, . repairing, making or
storing any munitions of war or
any sketches, plans, models, or
documents relating thereto, or for
the purpose of getting any metals,
oil or minerals of use in time of
war, "
3 . Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 5
is repealed and the following substituted
therefor :
"(a) uses or wears, without lawful authority,
any military, police or other official
uniform or any uniform so nearly
resembling the same as to be calculated
to deceive, or falsely represents himself to be a person who is or has been
entitled to use or wear any such
uniform ; "
4 . Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section 5
is repealed and the following substituted
therefor :
"(c) forges, alters, or tampers with any
passport or any military, police or
official pass, permit, certificate, licence
or other document of a similar character, (hereinafter in this section referred to as an official document), or
uses or has in his possession any such
forged, altered, or irregular official
document ; "
5 . Paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of section 5
is repealed and the following substituted
therefor :
"(e) uses, or has in his possession or under
his control, without the authority of
the Government department or the
authority concerned, any die, seal, or
stamp of or belonging to, or used, made ,
144
�1966-67 .
Canadian Forces Reorganization.
Chap . 96. 43
SCHEDULE B-Continued
Act affected . Repeal or amendment .
or proyided by any Government department, or by any diplomatic or
military authority appointed by or
acting under the authority of Her
Majesty, or any die, seal or stamp, so
nearly resembling any such die, seal or
stamp as to be calculated to deceive, or
counterfeits any such die, seal or stamp,
or uses, or has in his possession, or under
his control, any such counterfeited die,
seal or stamp ; "
145
�CHAPITRE 198 .
Loi concernant les secrets officiels .
TIRE ABREGE .
1 . La presente loi peut etre citee sous le titre : Loi sur Titre
les secrets officiels . 1939, c . 49, art . 1 . abre°e .
INTERPRETATION .
2 . Dans la presente loi, 1'expression
Definitions .
a) uprocureur general)) signifie le procureur general du ~~ Procureur
;
~e"`ra l . "
Canada
b) ((document)) comprend toute partie d'un document ; Document .,,
c) ccmodele» comprend tout dessin, patron et sp'e'cimen ; ,,Mo(16te .,,
d) umunitions de guerre)) signifie les armes, le materiel,-nTunitions
ou les munitions de guerre, les fournitures de 1'armee, `i° guerre .,,
de la marine ou de 1'aviation ou tout article susceptibl e
d'etre converti en Pun des susdits ou qui peut etre
utilisable dans leur production ;
e) ccinfraetion a la presente lob) comprend tout aete, ;Jn(raction
omission ou autre chose punissable sous le regime de la I'o ;~;,Pr`sente
presente loi ;
f)«fonction relevant de Sa Majeste» comprend toute,,Fonction
charge ou tout emploi dans quelque departement OU relevant de .,,
division du gouvernement du Canada ou d'une province, Sa Majeste
ou qui en releve, ainsi que toute charge ou tout emplo i
dans ou sur un conseil, une commission, un office, une
corporation ou, un autre organisme qui est mandataire
de Sa Majeste du chef du Canada ou d'une province, et
toute charge ou tout emploi relevant d'un tel conseil,
commission, office, corporation ou autre organisme ;
g ) «endroit prohibe» signifie ,Endroit
(i) tout ouvrage de defense appartenant a Sa Ma .jeste pr°nive ."
ou occupe ou utilise par Elle ou pour son compte ,
y compris les arsenaux, les stations ou etablissements de la marine, de 1'armee ou de 1'aviation, les
u.sines, les chantiers de construction maritime, les
mines, les regions minieres, les camps, les navires ,
147
�2 Chap . 198.
Loi sur les secrets officiels .
les a.eronefs, les postes ou bureaux de telegraphe, de
telephone, de radio telegraphie ou de transmission,
et les endroits utilises en vue de la construction, de
la reparation, de la fabrication ou de 1'emmagasinage de munitions de guerre ou des croquis, plans
ou mod'eles, . ou des documents y afferents, ou en
vue de 1'obtention de inetaux, d'huiles ou de mineraux en usage en temps de guerre ;
(ii) tout endroit n'appartenant pas a Sa Majeste, ou
des munitions de guerre ou des croquis, mod'eles,
plans ou documents y afferents sont fabriques, repares ; obtenus ou emmagasines en vertu d'un contrat passe avec Sa Majeste ou avec toute personne
pour son compte, ou, d'autre fagon, passe au nom
de Sa Majeste,, e t
(iii) tout endroit que le gouverneur en conseil, par
arrete, declare pour le moment etre un endroit
prohibe pour le motif que des renseignements It
son egard ou des dommages qu'il pourrait subir
seraient utiles It une puissance etrangere ;
oCroquis .,,
h) «croquis» comprend toute maniere de representer un
endroit ou une chose ;
tlAgent de
police
superieur . -)
i) «agent de police superieurn signifie un officier de la
Gendarmerie royale du Canada dont le grade West pas
inferieur .a celui d'inspecteur ; un membre d'une police
provinciale d'un grade semblable ou superieur ; le chef
de police d'une cite ou ville ayant une population d'au
moins dix mille ames ; ou toute personne It qui le gouverneur en conseil a confere les pouvoirs d'un agent de
police superieur pour les fins de la presente loi ;
Mention de
Sa Maje W
j) toute mention de Sa Majeste signifie Sa Majeste du
I chef du Canada ou d'une province ; .
Communication ou
r6ception .
k.) les expressions se rapportant It la communication ou
It la reception comprennent toute communication ou
reception, qu'elle soit totale ou partielle ou que le
croquis, le plan, le mod'ele, Particle, la note, le document ou .le renseignement meme ou la substance, 1'effet
ou la . description des susdits seulement soit communiquee ou re~ue ; les expressions visant 1'obtention ou la
retention d'un croquis, plan, mod'ele, article, note ou
document comprennent la reproduction ou le fait de
faire reproduire la totalite ou toute partie d'un croquis,
plan, mod'ele, article, note ou document ; et les expressions ayant trait It la communication d'un croquis,
plan, mod'ele, article, note ou document comprennent
le transfert ou la transmission du croquis, plan, mod'ele,
article, note ou document . 1939, c . 49, art . 2 ; 1950,
c . 46, art . 1 .
148
�Lot sur les secrets officiels .
Chap . 198 .
3
3 . (1) Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi qui-Eepionnage .
conque, dans un dessein nuisible a .la securite ou aux interet s
de 1'Etat ,
a) s'approche d'un endroit prohibe, Pinspecte, le traverse,
se trouve dans son voisinage ou y penetre ;
b) prend une note ou fait un croquis, plan ou mod'ele
propre ou destine a aider, ou susceptible d'aider directement ou indirectement a une puissance etrangere ; ou
c) obtient, recueille, enregistre, publie ou -communique
a une autre personne un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe,
ou un croquis, plan, mod'ele, article, note ou autre
document ou renseignement propre ou destine a aider,
ou susceptible d'aider, directement ou indirectement
une puissance etrangere .
(2) Dans une poursuite intentee sous le regime du L'accua 6
present article, il n'est pas necessaire de demontrer que a€~iai~ e
1'accuse etait coupable d'un acte particulier indiquant un CO11pabl e
ei son
dessein nuisible a la securite ou aux interets de 1'Etat, et, dessein eat
bienqued'un tel acte ne soit ass€curitl e a ] a
la reuve
preuve etablie a son n°iaib ~
encontre, il peut etre declare coupable s'il apparait, d'apres de rEtat .
les circonstances de 1'espece, sa conduite ou la preuve d e
sa reputation, que son dessein etait nuisible a la securite ou
aux interets de 1'Etat ; et si un croquis, un plan, un modele,
un article, une note, un document ou un renseignement se
rapportant a un endroit prohibe ou qui y est utilise, ou
quelque chose en cet endroit, ou un chiffre officiel ou mot
de passe est fabrique, obtenu, recueilli, enregistre, publie
ou communique par une personne autre qu'une personne
legalement autorisee, il est cense avoir ete fabrique, obtenu,
recueilli, enregistre, pu'blie ou communique dans un dessein
nuisible a la securite ou aux interets de 1'Etat, a moins de
preuve contraire .
(3) Dans toute procedure intentee *contre une personne Communic
qu'elle catio nuneinfractionauresd'une
P
~
q ent ntarticle,lefaita1ave
communique ou qu'e lle a tente de communiquer avec un Puissanc e
trang~re ,
'
k
agent dune puissance etrangere, au Canada ou hors du etc ., eat
Canada, constitue la preuve qu'elle a, dans un dessein nui- ~~eani~ e
sible a la securite ou,aux interets de 1'Etat, obtenu ou tente
d'obtenir des renseignements propres ou destines a aider ou
susceptibles d'aider, directement ou indirectement une puissance etrangere.
pour
(4) Pour les fins du present article, mais sans prejudice Quand un e
pereonne
de la teneur generale de la disposition precitee,
estcens h
a)- une personne, a moins de preuve contraire, est censee ~ommun~ en
avoir communique avec un agent d'une puissance c ation av ee e
g ent d'un
etrangere V a
,
puissanc e
krang & e.
149
�4 Chap . 198 .
Loi sur les secrets o)Tciels .
(i) si elle a, au Canada ou hors du Canada, visite
1'adresse d'un. agent d'une puissance etrangere ou a
f.requente cet agent ou s'est associee avec lui, o u
(ii) si, au Canada ou hors du Canada, le nom ou
1'adresse, ou tout autre renseignement concernant
cet agent a ete trouve en sa possession, ou lui a
ete fourni par une autre personne ou a ete obtenu
par elle d'une autre personne ;
DLfinition d e
aun agent
b) 1'expression ccun agent d'une puissance etrangere»
d'une comprend toute personne qui est ou a W ou qui est
puissance . raisonnablement soupconnee d 'etre au d' avoir ete a
~
etrangere,,
1'emploi d'une puissance etrangere, directement ou
indirectement, aux fins de commettre, au Canada ou
hors du Canada, un acte nuisible a la securite ou aux
interets de 1'Etat, ou qui a ou est raisonnablement
soupconnee d'avoir, au Canada ou hors du Canada,
commis ou tente de commettre un tel acte dans l'interet
d'une puissance 6t.rang6re ; e t
~~ase c) toute adresse, au Canada ou hors du Canada, raisoneatcens 6e nablement soupgonnee d'etre 1'adresse utilisee pour la
ritre ce lae
recep tion de communications destinees a un agent
d'un agent
d'une
d'une puissance etrangere, ou toute adresse ou demeure
uissanc e
€~trang6 re. cet agent ou dont il se sert pour la transmission ou la
reception de communications, ou a laquelle il exerce
un commerce, est censee 1'adresse d'un agent d'une
puissance etrangere, et les communications envoyees a
-cette adresse sont censees . des communications a cet
agent . 1939, c . 49, art . 3 .
Communication, etc.,
4 . (1) Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi qui-
i•llicite de ren- conque, ayant en sa possession ou controle un chiffre officiel
seignements . ou mot de passe, ou un croquis, plan, mod'ele, article, note,
document ou renseignement se rapportant a un endroit
prohibe ou a quelque chose en cet endroit ou qui y est
utilise, ou qui a ete fabrique ou obtenu contrairement a
la presente loi, ou qui lui a ete confie par une personne
detenant une fonction relevant de Sa Majeste, ou qu'il a
obtenu ou auquel il a eu acces, alors qu'il etait assujeti au
Code de discipline militaire au sens de la Loi sur la defense
nationale, _ou a titre de personne deternant ou ayant detenu
une fonction relevant de Sa Majeste, ou a titre de personne
qui est ou a ete 1'adjudicataire d'un contrat passe pour le
compte de Sa Majeste, ou d'un contrat qui est execute en
totalite ou en partie dans un endroit prohibe, ou a titre de
personne qui est ou a e+e a 1'empl6i de quelqu'un qui
detierit ou a detenu cette fonction, ou est ou a ete 1'adjudicataire du contrat,
150
�Lot sur les secrets officiels .
Chap . 198 .
5
a) communique le chiffre, mot de passe, croquis, plan ,
mod6le, article, note, document ou renseignement a
toute personne autre que celle avec laquelle il est
autorise a communiquer ou a qui il est tenu de le
communiquer dans 1'interet de 1'Etat ;
b) utilise les renseignements qu'il a en sa possession au
profit d'une puissance etrangere ou de toute autre maniere nuisible a la securite ou aux interets de 1'Etat ;
c) retient le croquis, le plan, le mod6le, Particle, la note
ou le document qu'il a en sa possession ou controle
quand il n'a pas le droit de le retenir, ou lorsqu'il est
contraire a son devoir de le retenir, ou qu'il ne se
conforme pas aux instructions donnees par 1'autorite
competente relativement .a sa mise ou a la fagon d'en
disposer ; o u
d) ne prend pas les precautions raisonnables en vue de
la conservation du croquis, du plan, du mod6le, de
Particle, de la note, du document, du chiffre officiel
ou mot de passe ou du renseignement, ou se conduit de
maniere a en compromettre la securite .
(2) Est coupable d'infraction h la presente loi quiconque, Communicatio
nay ntensapos e sion ucontroleuncroquis,plan,mod6le,croquis,plan ,
article, note, document ou renseignement se rapportant am°d6le, etc .
des munitions de guerre, en donne communication directement ou indirectement a une puissance etrangere, ou de
toute autre maniere nuisible a la securite ou aux interets de
I'Etat .
(3) -Si une personne recoit un chiffre officiel ou mot de ReeePtio n
du
passe, ou un croquis, plan, mod6le, article, note, document officchifTre
;el .
ou renseignement, sachant ou ayant raisonnablement lieu eCO4°19, ete•
de croire, au moment on elle le recoit, que le chiffre, le mo t
de . passe, le croquis, le plan, le mod6le, Particle, la note, le
document ou le renseignement lui est communique contrairement a la presente loi, cette personne est coupable
d'infraction a la presente loi, a moins qu'elle ne prouve que
la communication a elle faite du chiffre, mot de passe,
croquis, plan, mod6le, article, note, document ou renseignement etait contraire a son desir .
(4) Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi, quiconqu e
Retention
a) retient, dans un dessein nuisible a la securite ou all X documentade
interets de 1'Etat,, un document officiel, qu'il soit ou officiels, etc .
non complete ou emis pour usage, lorsqu'il n'a pas l e
droit de le retenir ou lorsqu'il est contraire a son
devoir de le retenir, ou ne se conforme pas aux instructions donnees par un departement du gouvernement ou
par toute personne autorisee par ce departement concernant la remise dudit document officiel ou la fagon
d'en disposer ; ou
151
�6 Chap . 198 .
Loi sur les secrets officiels .
Permettre
i d'autre s
b) permet qu'un document officiel emis pour son propre
usage entre en la possession d'une autre personne, ou
de a 'avoir en
sa possession . communique un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe ainsi
emis, ou, sans autorite ni excuse legitime, a en sa
possession un document officiel ou un chiffre officiel
ou mot de passe emis pour 1'usage d'une personne autre
que lui-meme, ou, en obtenant possession d'un document officiel par decouverte ou autrement, neglige ou
omet de le remettre a la personne ou a 1'autorite par
-qui ou pour 1'usage de laquelle il a ete emis, ou It un
agent de police . 1939, c. 49,'art . 4 ; 1951 (2e session),
c . 7, art . 28 .
personnes
Usag~de
5 . (1) Est coupable d'infraction It la presente loi, qui~a tenue, conque, dans le dessein d'avoir acces ou d'aider une autre
falsification
de rapports, personne a avoir acces It un endroit P rohibe, ou pour toute
faux, autre fin nuisible a la securite ou aux interets de I'Etat,
supposition
de ersonne
a) endosse ou porte, sans autorite legitime, un uniforme
. de la marine, de 1'armee, de 1'aviation ou de la police, ou
documents
autre uniforme officiel, ou tout uniforme qui y ressemble au point d'etre susceptible d'induire en erreur, ou
se represente faussement comme etant une personne
qui est ou a ete autorisee a endosser ou porter un tel
uniforme ;
b) verbalement, ou par ecrit dans une declaration ou
demande, ou dans un document signe par lui ou en
son nom, sciemment fait une fausse declaration ou une
omission, ou la tolere ;
c) forge, altere ou falsifie tout passeport ou une passe,
un permis, un certificat ou une autorisation officielle
ou emise par la marine, l'armee, 1'aviation ou la police,
ou tout autre document d'une nature semblable (ciapres designe «document officiel) au present article),
ou qui utilise ou a en sa possession un tel- document
officiel forge, altere ou irregulier ;
d) se fait passer pour une personne ou se represente
faussement comme une personne detenant, ou It 1'emploi d'une personne detenant, une fonction relevant de
Sa Majeste, ou comme etant ou n'etant pas une personne It qui un document officiel ou un chiffre officiel ou
mot de passe a ete dument emis ou communique, ou,
dans 1'intention d'obtenir un document officiel, un
chiffre officiel ou mot de passe, pour lui-meme ou pour
une autre personne, fait sciemment une fausse declaration ; ou
e) utilise ou a en sa possession ou sous son controle,
sans 1'autorisation du departement du gouvernement
ou de 1'autorite en cause, une matrice, un sceau o u
152
�Loi sur les secrets officiels.
Chap. 198.
7
un timbre d'un departement du gouvernement ou appartenant a ce dernier ou utilise, fabrique ou fourn i
par un semblable departement ou une autorite diplomatique, une autorite de la marine, de 1'armee ou de 1'aviation nommee par Sa Majeste ou agissant sous son
autorite, ou une matrice, un sceau ou un timbre qui
y ressemble au point d'etre susceptible d'induire en
erreur, ou contrefait cette matrice, ce sceau ou ce timbre,
ou utilise ou a en sa possession ou sous son controle
une telle matrice, un tel sceau ou un tel timbre contrefait.
(2) Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi quiconque, u 81 =e ivieite
sans autorite ou excuse 1e g' ~ ~l eceaua,matrices,
itime fabri ue ou vend ou a en de etc.
sa possession pour la vente une matrice, un sceau ou u n
timbre de ce genre . 1939, c . 49, art . 5.
6. Nulle personne dans le voisinage d'un endroit prohibe Entraver
ne doit entraver, sciemment induire en erreur, ni autrement lea agent s
r
de
police
contrecarrer ou gener un gendarme ou agent de police ou un on le9 de s
membres
membre des forces de Sa Majeste qui monte la garde, qui forces de
est de faction, qui fait la patrouille ou qui remplit d'autres Sa Maieet6 .
fonctions semblables relativement a 1'endroit prohibe, et si
cette personne contrevient a la presente disposition ou
omet de s'y conformer, elle est coupable d'infraction a la
presente loi . 1939, c . 49, art. 6 .
7.. (1) Lorsqu'il estime qu'une telle mesure s'impose Pouvoirae
dans 1'interet public, le ministre de la Justice peut, par ig pTOa ;etion
mandat, revetu de son seing, requerir toute personne deg t6le- .
possedant ou controlant un cable ou fil telegraphique ou grammes
un appareil de radiotelegraphie, utilise pour la transmission ou la reception de telegrammes a destination ou en
provenance de tout endroit situe en dehors du Canada,
de lui produire ou de produire a toute personne nommee
dans le mandat, les originaux et transcriptions de tous les
telegrammes ou des telegrammes d'une categorie ou description specifiee, ou des telegrammes . transmis par une
personne ou d'un endroit specifie ou adresses a une personne
ou a un endroit specifie, expedies it un endroit situe en
dehors du Canada ou recus de cet endroit au moyen de ce
cable, fil ou appareil, et tous autres papiers se rapportant
a tout semblable telegramme .
(2) Quiconque, etant requis de produire un tel original Refufl on
negligence
ou une telle transcription ou papier comme il est susdit , de prncluire
refuse ou neglige de le faire, est coupable d'une infraction etc°ri,i n at,
a la presente loi et passible, pour chaque infraction, sur
declaration sommaire de culpabilite, de 1'emprisonnement ,
avec ou sans travaux forces, pour une periode d'au plu s
153
�Chap. 198 .
Loi sur les secrets officiels .
Peine .
trois mois, ou d'une amende n'excedant pas deux cents
dollars, ou a la fois de 1'amende et de l'emprisonnement .
1939, c . 49, art . 7.
Wberger des
espions .
8 . Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi, quiconque
heberge sciemment une personne qu'il croit ou qu'il a
raisonnablement lieu de croire etre une personne sur le
point de commettre ou qui a commis une infraction a la
presente loi, ou qui permet sciemment a de telles personnes
de, se rencontrer ou de se reunir dans des locaux qu'il occupe
ou qu'il a sous son controle, ou qui, ayant heberge une telle
personne ou permis a de telles personnes de se rencontrer
ou de se reunir dans des locaux qu'il occupe ou qu'il a sous
son controle, omet ou refuse volontairement de devoiler
a un agent de police superieur des renseignements qu'il
peut fournir a 1'egard de cette personne . 1939, c . 49, art . 8 .
Tentatives, 9 . Est coupable d'infraction a la presente loi, passible
incitations,
des memes peines et sujet aux memes procedures que s'il
avait commis 1'infraction, quiconque tente de commettre
une infraction a la presente loi, ou sollicite, incite ou cherche
a induire une autre personne a commettre une infraction,
ou devient son complice et accomplit tout acte en vue de la
perpetration d'une infraction a, la presente loi . 1939, c . 49,
art. 9 .
Pouvoir
d'arreetatio n
10 . Quiconque est pris sur le fait de commettre une
sans mandat . infraction a la presente loi, ou est raisonnablement soupgonne d'avoir commis, d'avoir tente de commettre ou d'etre
sur le point de commettre une telle infraction, peut We
arrete sans mandat et detenu par un gendarme ou un agent
de police . 1939, c . 49, art . 10 .
Mandatsde
perquieition .
11 . (1) Si un juge de paix est convaincu, sur une plainte
formulee sous serment, qu'il y a raisonnablement lieu de
soupgonner qu'une infraction a la presente loi a ete ou est
sur le point d'etre commise, il peut decerner un mandat de
perquisition autorisant tout agent de police y nomme it
penetrer en tout temps dans les lieux ou 1'endroit indique
dans le mandat, en ayant recours a la force au besoin, a
perquisitionner dans les lieux ou 1'endroit, a fouiller toutes
les personnes qui s'y trouvent et a saisir tout croquis,
plan, mod'ele, article, note ou document, ou tout objet
constituant une preuve qu'une infraction a la presente loi
a ete ou est sur le point d'etre commise, qu'il peut trouver
sur les lieux, dans cet endroit ou sur cette personne, et a
1'egard duquel ou relativement auquel il peut raisonnablement soupgonner qu'une infraction a la presente loi a ete
ou est sur le point d'etre commise .
154
�Loi sur les secrets officiels .
Chap . 198 .
9
(2) Lorsqu'un officier de la Gendarmerie royale du En cas s cirde
otances
Canada dont le grade n'est pas critiques .
inferieur a celui de surin- cn
tendant est d'avis que 1'affaire est extremement urgente e t
que dans 1'interet de 1'Etat des mesures immediates s'im=
posent, il peut, moyennant un ordre revetu de son seing,
conferer a un gendarme la meme autorite que peut donner
le mandat d'un juge de paix sous le regime du present
article . 1939 ; c . 49, art . 11 .
12 . Nulle poursuite pour une infraction a la presente loi POnreuite a
avec ]e conne doit etre intentee, sauf avec le consentement du procu- sentement
reur general ; toutefois, une personne accusee d'une telle du g 6n 6 ral . r
pr°c"ren
infraction peut etre arretee on un mandat d'arrestation
peut etre decerne et execute a'son egard, et cette personn e
peut etre renvo,yee a une autre audience avec detention
provisoire ou admise a caution, malgre que le consentement du procureur general 'a 1'ouverture d'une poursuite
pour 1'infraction n'ait pas ete obtenu, mais il ne doit etre
intente aucune autre procedure avant que ce consentement
ait ete obtenu . 1939, c . 49, art . 12 .
13 . Une action, omission ou chose qui, en raison de la Les infraetions commipresente loi, serait punissable comme infraction si elle avait eeBhore du
lieu au Canada, constitue, lorsqu'elle se produit hors du Canada sont
Canada, une infraction a la presente loi, jugeable et punis- aa e ce pays .
sable au Canada, dans les .cas suivants :
a) lorsque le contrevenant, a 1'epoque on 1'action, omission ou chose s'est produite, etait citoyen canadien au
sens de la Loi sur la citoyennete canadienne;
b) lorsqu'un chiffre, mot de passe, croquis, plan, mod'ele,
article, note, document, renseignement ou autre chose
a 1'egard de quoi un contrevenant est accuse, a ete
obtenu par ce dernier, ou . depend d'un renseignement
par lui obtenu, pendant que le contrevenant devait
allegeance a Sa Majeste . 1950, c . 46, art . 2 .
14. (1) Aux fins de juger une personne accusee d'in- oaP infrace9t eenfraction a la presente loi, l'infraction est censee avoir ete tionavoir 6t €
s~e
commise a 1'endroit ou elle 1'a ete reellement ou a tout c°mmiae•
endroit du Canada ou le contrevenant peut etre trouve .
(2) En sus et sans prejudice des pouvoirs qu'un tribunal Le public
peut posseder pour ordonner 1'exclusion du public de toute Qaiu aue
audience, si, lors d'une poursuite intentee devant un tribunal pr-68•
contre une personne pour une infraction a la presente lo i
ou lors des procedures en appel, le ministere public, pour le
motif que la publication de tout temoignage qui doit etre
renclu ou de toute declaration qui doit etre faite au cour s
155
�10 Chap. 198.
Si la per-
sonne cou-
Loi sur les secrets officiels .
des procedures serait nuisible aux interets de 1'Etat, demande 1'exclusion de la totalite ou d'une partie du public durant
une partie de 1'audition, le tribunal pout rendre une ordonnance dans ce sens, mais le prononce de la sentence doit dans
chaque cas avoir lieu en public .
(3) Lorsque la personne coupable d'une infraction a la
pabie est. une presente loi est une compagnie ou une corporation, chaque
ou corpora- administrateur et fonctionnaire de la compagnie ou corporation. tion est coupable de la meme infraction, a moins qu'il ne
prouve que Facto ou 1'omission constituant 1'infraction a eu
lieu a son insu ou sans son consentement . 1939, c . 49,
art . 13 .
compagn e
Lorsque 15 . (1) Lorsque nulle peine specifique n'est prevue
n~uile~eUee dans la presente loi, toute personne coupable d'une infracg
n QBi pQ ue . tion y visee est reputee coupable d'un acte criminel et est
e~te crimi- punissable, sur declaration de culpabilite, de l'emprisonnement pour une periode n'excedant pas quatorze ans ;
mais cette personne pout, au choix du procureur general ,
Poursuites faire 1'objet de poursuites sommaires de la mariiere que presommaires . voient les dispositions du Code criminel relatives -aux
declarations sornmaires de culpabilite, et, dans le cas de
telles poursuites, elle est punissable d'une amende d'au plus
cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus douze
mois, ou a la fois de 1'amende et de 1'emprisonnement .
(2) Toute personne accusee, ou declaree coupable, d'une
aur i aent~- infraction a la presente loi est, pour 1'application de la
Application
fieat i on des
criminels .
Loi sur l'identification des criminels, reputee accusee, ou
declaree coupable, d'un acte criminel, meme si cette personne
fait 1'objet de procedures sommaires de la maniere que
prevoient les dispositions du Code criminel relatives aux
declarations sommaires de culpabilite . 1950, c . 46, art . 3 .
EDMOND CLOUTIER, C .M .G ., O .A ., D .S .P .
IMPRIMEUR DE LA REINE ET CONTRSLEUR DE LA PAPETERIE
OTTAWA, 195 2
156
�14-15-16
f LISABETH
11 .
CHAP. 96
Loi modifiant la Loi sur la d6fense nationale et, par voie
de cons6quence, certaines autres lois .
[Sanctionn6e is 8 mai 1967 .]
1'avis et du consentement
S6
S laMajest 6 , surdes communes du Canada, dducrknat et de
' Chambre
e:
6
A
TITRE ABRPG~ .
S. R., cc . 184,
310 ;
1952-1953,
cc. 6, 24;
1953-1954,
cc . 13, 21, 40 ;
1955 c . 28 ;
1956, c. 18 ;
1959, c . 5 ;
1984-1985,
c . 21 .
1 . La pr6sente loi peut 9tre cit6e sous le titre : Titre abr5g6 .
Loi sur la r6organisation des Forces canadiennes .
64 . Les lois et les parties de lois 6nonc6es A I'Annexe
B sont abrog6es ou modifi6es de la maniere et dans la mesure
qu'indique cette annexe .
ANNEXE B .
Modifications et abrogations
Abrogation ou modificatio n
Lois vis6es
Loi sur les secrets 1 . L'alinda d) de 1'article 2 est abrog6 et remofficiels, S .R ., c . .198. plac6 par le suivant :
ad) amunitions de guerre)) signifie les armes,
le mat6riel ou les munitions de guerre,
les fournitures militaires ou tout article
susceptible d'etre converti en Fun des
susdits ou qui peut 6tre utilisable dans
leur production ; »
157
�44 Chap. 9 6 . Reorganisation des Forces canadiennes. 14-15-16 P r,ts . II .
ANNEXE B-Suit e
Lois vis 6es
Abrogation ou modificatio n
.2 . Le sous-alin6a (i) de 1'alinda g) de 1'article 2
est abrog6 et remplacrs par le suivant :
cc(i) tout ouvrage de d6fense appartenant
A, Sa Majest6, ou occup6 ou utilisE:
par Elle ou pour son compte, y
compris les arsenaux, les stations ou
6tablissements des forces arm6es, les
usines, les chantiers de construction
maritime, les mines, les regions
miniLres, les camps, les navires, les
a6ronefs, les postes ou bureaux de
t6.lEgraphe, de t6l6phone, de radiot6legraphie ou de transmission, et
les endroits utilis6s en vue de la
construction, de la r6paration, de la
fabrication ou de 1'emmagasinage de
munitions de guerre ou des croquis,
plans ou mod6les, ou des documents
y aff6rents, ou en vue de 1'obtention
de m6taux, d'huiles ou de min6raux
en usage en temps de guerre ;))
3 . L'alinda a) du paragraphe (1) de 1'article 5
est abrog6 et remplac6 par le suivant :
aa) endosse ou porte, sans autorit6 l4gitime,
un uniforme militaire ou de la police,
ou autre uniforme officiel, ou tout
uniforme qui y ressemble au point
d'etre susceptible d'induire en erreur,
ou se reprdsente faussement comme Rant
une personne qui est ou aW autoris6e
A , endosser ou porter un tel uniforme ; »
4 . L'alin6a c) du paragraphe (1) de Particle 5
est abrog6 et remplac6 par le suivant :
«c) forge, alti're ou falsifie tout passeport,
ou une passe, un permis, un certificat
ou une autorisation officielle ou 6mise
par 1'autorit6 militaire ou la police, ou
tout autre document d'une nature
semblable (ci-apr6s d6sign6 udocument
officiel» au pr6sent article), ou qui utilise
ou a en sa possession un tel document
officiel forg6, alt6r6 ou irr6gulier ; »
158
�1966-1967 . . REorganisation des Forces canadiennes .
Chap . 96 . 45
ANNEXE B-Suite
Lois visE;es Abrogation ou modification
5 . L'alin6a e) du paragraphe (1) de Particle 5
est abrog6 et remplacd par le suivant :
ae) utilise ou a en sa possession ou sous son
contr8le, sans 1'autorisation du d &
partement du gouvernement ou de
1'autorith en cause, une matrice, un
sceau ou un timbre d'un d6partement du
gouvernement ou appartenant A ce
dernier ou utilis6, fabriqu6 ou fourni
par un semblable d6partement ou une
autorit6 diplomatique ou militaire nomm6e par Sa Majest6 ou agissant sous son
autoritd, ou une matrice, un sceau ou un
timbre qui y ressemble au point d'@tre
susceptible d'induire en erreur, ou
contrefait cette matrice, ce sceau ou ce
timbre, ou utilise ou a en sa possession
ou sous son contr6le une telle matrice,
un tel sceau ou un tel timbre contrefait ; u
159
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Commissions of inquiry
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Report of the Royal Commission on Security (Mackenzie Commission) (1969)
Subject
The topic of the resource
Commissions of inquiry
Description
An account of the resource
Commission of inquiry created in 1966 in response to a security lapse in a federal institution. Mandated was to inquire into security procedures in government, but it also to examine more broadly Canada’s national security.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
Public document archived at the Library and Archives Canada <a href="http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/mackenzie1969-eng/mackenzie1969-eng.pdf">here.</a>
commission of inquiry
information security
national security