CSIS DDO Directive on Info Sharing (2011)
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>To provide a tool to CSIS’s employees to ensure that they comply with international and Canadian legislation and that decisions to proceed or not with the use of specific information/information exchange “are made at a level commensurate with the possibility that” (1) the information to be used may have been obtained through the use of <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">mistreatment </span></strong>of individuals or (2) the exchange may result, directly or indirectly, in the <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">mistreatment </span></strong>of individuals.</p>
This Directive applies to to information sharing with <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">ALL foreign entities</span></strong>, is guided by the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011)
ATIP
2011
CSIS In-Bound Intelligence Processing protocols
Information-sharing
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Provides questions to consider for use of information that could be derived through mistreatment or torture (how to ensure this is not the case) such as:</p>
<ul><li>Has the country signed and ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment or Punishment?</li>
<li>Does the country adhere to principles of customary international law?</li>
<li>The foreign entity’s record in complying with past assurances</li>
</ul>
Was the detention lawful under local and international law?
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong></p>
<p>“The Service cannot simply rely upon anecdotal information or personal relationships that may exist between special liaison officers and security officials in foreign countries. The Service must always ask what the <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">motivation</span></strong> is of the person who is providing the information. This is particularly the case when countries have poor human rights records, and may be more interested in maintaining a relationship w/ the Service than actually providing truthful information as to the human rights conditions in that country”</p>
<p>“To establish that information was obtained by the use of torture required more than just pointing to the poor human rights records of a given country” (Justice Blanchard – in relation to Mahjoub’s Security Certificate, June 2010).</p>
<p>The Information Sharing Evaluation Committee renders decision re: whether intelligence should be used or not.</p>
<em>International Law Safeguards: International law guards against extreme forms of interrogation. Two broadly ratified international treaties include the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment. The ICCPR Article 7 says that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) includes more detailed prohibitions (Forcese, NSL, 187). </em>
2011
CSIS Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing (2009)
Information-sharing
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Protocol for CSIS to share information with foreign agencies and governments.<br /><br />This document seems now to have been superseded by the 2011 ministerial direction on information-sharing.</p>
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Pursuant to section 17 of the CSIS Act and in accordance with existing Ministerial Directives, CSIS may be authorized to enter into formal information sharing agreements with foreign agencies, <span style="text-decoration:underline;">including those </span>that are generally recognized as having poor human rights records. CSIS is directed to <span style="text-decoration:underline;">not knowingly</span> rely on information derived from torture, and take <span style="text-decoration:underline;">reasonable measures </span>to reduce the risk that its actions could promote or condone torture.</p>
<p><em>CSIS’s review body, the SIRC, reported in its 2004-2005 annual report that at least one of the CSIS foreign arrangements that it audited “did not provide an adequate analysis of potential human rights issues.” It objected to CSIS’s claim that it “ensures” that information exchanged is not the cause or product of human rights abuses….the Service is rarely in a position to determine how information received from a foreign agency was obtained. As Mr. Elcock stated to the Arar Commission, when it comes to information that may have been the product of torture, “the reality is in most cases we would have no knowledge that it was derived from torture. You may suspect it was derived from torture, but tat is about as far as one will get in most circumstances” [Canada, SIRC, Annual Report 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005) in Forcese, NS Law, 487].</em></p>
<em>Justice O’Connor’s recommendation at the Arar Inquiry was that “Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications. Information received from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability” (Forcese, NS Law, 488).</em>
Unknown, but likely late 2000s.
CSIS DDO Directive on Information Sharing with Agencies with Poor Human Rights Records (2008)
Information-sharing
<strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) Directive on Information Sharing with Agencies with Poor Human Rights Records. This directive sets out the principles that guide CSIS’s actions in the sharing, seeking, and use of information from agencies or governments with poor human rights records. The purpose of the Directive is not to curtail information exchange, but to ensure that decisions to exchange are made at a level “commensurate with the potential risks” that the exchange may result in the mistreatment of individuals.
<strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Much of the document is redacted. It seems that the DDO stresses the need to remain sensitive to responsibilities in protecting individuals form mistreatment that could result from CSIS’s action or inaction, but balancing these responsibilities with CSIS’s mandate to protect Canadians poses difficult challenges at times. An <em>employee</em> must <em>believe</em> – on the basis of Human Rights profiles and knowledge of a country/agency – that there is a credible possibility that sharing of information could contribute to the mistreatment of an individual.
2008
Sharing Information in the National Security Context (RCMP)
Information-sharing
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong>Guides the RCMP re: information sharing, including information sharing with foreign entities when there is a substantial risk of mistreatment involved.</p>
ATIP
Unknown, but likely post-2011
CSIS DDO Directive on information sharing with agencies with poor human rights records (2008)
Operational policies
The Directive specifies that international exchange of information and intelligence is vital to safeguarding Canada's national security and public safety. In that context, however, the Service may be required to deal with foreign governments and agencies having poor human rights records. This Directive sets out the principles that will guide our actions in the sharing, seeking and use of information from such agencies or government. This DDO seems likely to have been superseded since it predates the 2011 ministerial directives on information sharing with foreign agencies.
ATIP CSIS 117-2010-7
2008
Memorandum to the Minister: Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities
Ministerial directions
Background memo relating to the 2011 Ministerial direction to CSIS, CBSA and RCMP on international information-sharing in circumstances where there is a risk of maltreatment or torture. Includes "framework for addressing risk of mistreatment in sharing information with foreign entities".
ATIP
2011
Ministerial Direction to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP): Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011)
Ministerial direction
2011 Ministerial direction to the RCMP on international information-sharing in circumstances where there is a risk of maltreatment or torture.
ATIP
2011
Policy on Implementing the Ministerial Direction to the CBSA on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities
Operational policies
CBSA policy to implement the 2011 Ministerial direction on international information sharing in circumstances where there is a risk of torture or maltreatment.
ATIP
Unknown
Memorandum to the CSIS Director: Ministerial Briefing (2014) on the Ministerial directive on information sharing with foreign entities
This document includes data on actual use and implementation of the 2011 ministerial directive on international information sharing in circumstances where there is risk of torture
ATIP CSIS 117-2014-386
2014