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https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/f678b31d54fdccbb47055da3664cd1d6.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=kgcRodTWyhFLFS-O3Yb138NfiopxkOmMHokiwjsnWlTOviEfN3LjIYEyc9y7IViKiPDpaprPqKLeDMbmEk%7EE6Q0rCnU7pWRsVh90XMZ9H0UjFBb%7E7OY%7EvWtKQP0nRcziSKRp3CE9UqKFR%7EzohbHpS4Fa3fEGNgM7R0vlv9NdEmVFQjfcFSJlKG0S%7Es9auCYG1piwR0iScC9S0m9Tf9Vik%7EVOxqDdMoOkpHRBxjmv7fWMm01yFKvTQv4gXCJla8xJG40dqvxR13NexRxbNU62zivBCJCP8HdJe2OT7VO4S-clbX8dCHbxITP7Abgk1siB2lBVlQ5P-5RG7dpER5qrMQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
4fcfeecfcff38091c21a4f45f2eaec03
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Memoranda of Understanding
Subject
The topic of the resource
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between agencies.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
One Vision 1.0 (RCMP-CSIS framework for cooperation) explanatory document
Subject
The topic of the resource
MOUs
Description
An account of the resource
This document describes the original RCMP and CSIS deconfliction protocols and operational approach to intelligence to evidence. It is superseded by 2015's One Vision 2.0, also in this database.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP CSIS A-2014-224
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
Unknown
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Obtained originally by Colin Freeze, Globe & Mail
cooperation
CSIS
Deconfliction
information-sharing
Intelligence-to-evidence
MOU
One Vision
Operational policies
Operations
RCMP
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/28811/archive/files/06c5d5452aac909d6a02ece061b9a86b.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=SxmaNpK4riRMtlJC12RMg6YYh1V%7ETPFssxJGqH%7EwmvW7AZD6zbATmOWGjcZk-kf63Ux9kJQ7Tt4oWa3aF24pNdDUi95vl4vZErmPwRYnIyy69%7EFgedggY1qWnIeP%7Ej%7EI%7Eu1E1wAnW3Hl89omeTWd2clSsPRyfqwRgE2NJXAtqDqjqIbeDiy05kizKXB%7E0HzjSN0vAFtbftAYpKFb6EgLslDvqrniO8p0m99FWPlfHvlCKPlwmcejOFv8mhqqUJeuqflnxALER3fbK25Ly1QtbbQ3JnUFBKf4oQRBAXZYALEg5CeOKZxFdhujYugGCvgGXgIllmH5wpiT2SU3P3%7Euqw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
59990df112a4ac48648db7f5b23e5141
PDF Text
Text
�Threat Management Framework
• Both CSIS and the RCMP share the goal of ensuring the
safety and security of Canadians and protecting Canadian
interests at home and abroad.
• This goal is most effectively accomplished through a sound
and collaborative approach to threat management - the
One Vision framework launched in 2012.
• One Vision 2.0 enhances and codifies the existing
framework for cooperation that guides deconfliction efforts
and the disclosure of CSIS information to the RCMP.
�• One Vision 2.0 is designed to formalize the transition of intelligence into the criminal
justice system. It is recognized that the "intelligence to evidence" issue is complicated and
evolving. It is subject to legislation and judicial precedent; it is informed by commissions of
inquiry; it is affected by our respective policies and procedures; it is guided and assisted by
training and mutual understanding.
• One Vision 2.0 creates a framework for cooperation that can be explained to and defended
before the courts, and that maintains and creates both an appropriate degree of separation
and a functionally operational relationship between CSIS and the RCMP.
�• Approved by the RCMP Commissioner and CSIS
Director on 2015 11 24;
• Codifies - for the first time - the framework and the 5
principles;
• Provides key definitions to clarify the process and the
roles of our respective HQs and Regions / Divisions;
• Serves as the Threat Reduction Activity (TRA)
deconfliction mechanism;
• Formalizes and centralizes record keeping: RODs
produced
and approved by RCMP / CSIS HQ
�Intelligence and Evidence Flow
Region - - - Division
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Parallel
Investigation
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Tactical
Deconfliction
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Formal initiation of
investigation
Strategic case
management
as required
�Principles
• Public safety is paramount.
�Principles
• Always consider the effect of your actions upon the other agency.
�Principles
• Earlier is better when discussing strategy, seeking legal advice, identifying
problems and sharing information.
�Principles
• Focusing the information to be disclosed by CSIS will assist both organizations
and avoid future problems.
�Principles
• Every investigation is different; it is critical to have a consistent process which
will recognize and manage these differences.
�Foandat' onal Criteria for National Security
i
Criminal Investigations
• The initiation of a criminal investigation must be based on a reasonable
suspicion or belief that criminal activity has occurred or may occur. The
following may initiate a disclosure from CSIS to the RCMP:
• Information and intelligence (foundational to the initiation of an
investigation), which may indicate criminal activity ;
• An element of an offence under the Security Offences Act or any other act
of Parliament;
• An imminent threat;
• A pattern or behavior that may constitute a threat to the security of
Canada.
�Assessment Process Prior to Disclosure
Under Section 19, CSIS Act
• CSIS receives information and intelligence.
• CSIS makes an assessment which requires a consideration of:
• The threat to the security of Canada;
• The nature and seriousness of the potential criminal activity ;
• The impact that sharing the information may have on the Service's
investigations (sources, methods and operations, including the
management of third party information);
• The impact of judicial disclosure obligations on a CSIS investigation;
• The merit and impact of involving other stakeholders (e.g. CBSA, CRA,
foreign and domestic agencies).
�Strategic Consultations
• If deemed appropriate by CSIS, CSIS HQ Ops Division will contact the
RCMP to initiate a strategic case management meeting. (RCMP may initiate)
• The process will consist of a meeting( s) between the RCMP and CSIS to
assess the magnitude and scale of the information and intelligence based on
the foundational criteria.
• A decision will be made regarding the need for formal disclosure to the
RCMP via Disclosure or Advisory Letter.
• A ROD will be produced by CSIS, agreed to by both organizations and
retained on our respective files.
• TRA will be deconflicted if applicable (RCMP engagement on a file may
result in TRA being held in abeyance).
�Assessment Process Prior to Disclosure
Under Section 19, CSIS Act
• It is recognized that, depending on the nature of the case, the RCMP will wish
to be informed about the following information:
• The subject of the investigation ("who");
• The activity ("what");
• The time frame ("when");
• The location ("where");
• The motivation, if known ("why")
• The content of disclosures will be discussed at the strategic case management
meeting.
�Disclosure Under Section 19, CSIS Act
• Contingent upon the results of the strategic case management meeting,
CSIS may initiate a disclosure process.
• The RCMP will, upon receipt of the letter, disseminate as deemed
appropriate (SOPs and guidelines being developed).
• As soon as practical, the RCMP will advise CSIS of what investigational
avenue the RCMP will pursue, if any, based on the information and
intelligence CSIS shared.
�During the Criminal Investigation
• Adherence to these guidelines will help ensure that the RCMP criminal
investigation remains separate, distinct and parallel to any CSIS investigation.
• It is recognized that there will be a continuing need for coordination and deconfliction between the two investigations that may lead to disclosure.
�During the Criminal Investigation
• There is a continuing requirement for CSIS to report to government on threatrelated activities and the RCMP can assist in that regard.
• Primacy does not mean exclusivity.
�During the Criminal Investigation
• Ongoing inter-agency dialogue may be appropriate to ensure public safety
concerns are met and all options are explored.
• These will take the form of strategic case management meetings or, as required,
tactical deconfliction.
�uring the Criminallnvestlga Ion
• CSIS, when conducting a parallel investigation, may disclose additional
information and/or intelligence consistent with the One Vision principles.
(Important to maintain the separation of investigations)
• The RCMP will provide CSIS with information and/or intelligence. {No
and allows for more effective de confliction .
• In accordance with policy, CSIS and the RCMP will ensure the retention of
information, intelligence and evidence.
�Post Investigation I Pre-trial Disclosure
(Stinchcombe)
• The responsibility for disclosure belongs to the Crown.
• Ongoing inter-agency (including DO] and PPSC) strategic consultation to
ensure the appropriate use of sensitive national security information and
its protection as required.
• CSIS investigations are separate and distinct from RCMP criminal
investigations. CSIS is normally a third party for disclosure purposes.
�eQuestions?
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Memoranda of Understanding
Subject
The topic of the resource
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between agencies.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
One Vision 2.0 (RCMP-CSIS framework for cooperation) explanatory document
Subject
The topic of the resource
MOUs
Description
An account of the resource
This document (a powerpoint deck) describes the post-Bill C-51 RCMP and CSIS deconfliction protocols and operational approach to intelligence to evidence.
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
ATIP CSIS 117-2016-122
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
Unknown, but c. Feb 2016
cooperation
CSIS
Deconfliction
information-sharing
Intelligence-to-evidence
MOU
One Vision
Operational policies
Operations
RCMP