Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and CBSA
MOUs
<strong>Document Purpose:</strong> Both CSIS and CBSA report to the Minister of Public Safety and fall under the portfolio of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Public Safety). This ‘Framework MOU’ between CSIS and the CBSA sets the terms and conditions as well as the general principles of the administration and management of arrangement between the two organizations, for the purposes of conducting national security investigations, sharing information, and providing mutual assistance. This ‘Framework MOU’ also authorizes CSIS to enter into more specific arrangements with CBSA, as required, without the necessity to seek the Minister of Public Safety’s approval each time.
<strong>Document Synopsis:</strong> The MOU points out that the relationship between the CBSA and CSIS is vital to ensuring the effective administration of the CBSA Act and the CSIS Act; the administration and enforcement of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Customs Act; and maintaining the security of Canada (preamble). The memo outlines the separate responsibilities of both CBSA and CSIS and the scope of their cooperation (section 1, section 3). The MOU establishes Joint Management Teams that consist of executive level members from both agencies to address issues of mutual interest (section 4). The MOU can be amended at any time upon mutual consent of both CBSA and CSIS (section 7). Although the MOU states that funding might be necessary to fully implement the MOU, it does not, in and of itself impose financial responsibilities on either agency (section 6).
ATIP
Unknown
Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and DFAIT (now GAC) (2007)
MOU
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Protocol between DFATD (GAC) and CSIS concerning cooperation re: consular cases involving Canadians detained abroad as part of a national security or terrorism-related case, with an objective to provide greater coordination and coherence in addressing issues that arise when a Canadian is detained as part of such case.</p>
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong>The protocol to balance national security interests with a detained Canadian’s consular and human rights. CSIS and DFATD must work collectively to ensure the delivery of consular services to a Canadian citizen requesting them while abroad and detained as part of a national security or terrorism-related case. Canadian citizens are free to travel abroad (under section 6 of the <em>Charter</em>) and have the right to request consular services pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and the provision of consular services to Canadians abroad is one of DFATD’s core functions. DFATD can request CSIS to approach authorities of a foreign state to help facilitate access to a consular officer to the detained Canadian citizen.</p>
ATIP CSIS 117-2010-7
2007
Agreement between CSIS and the Security Intelligence Review Committee: Access to Certain Documents
MOUs
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong>“The Service initially declined to provide a copy of the 2014 Memorandum regarding a SIRC study that examined CSIS’s use of firearms in dangerous operating environments (DOEs). Following several bilateral discussions, the Service subsequently provided a copy as an exception to this long standing agreement.”</p>
<p>“SIRC conducted a study in 2013-2014 on CSIS Operational Support and its Use Overseas, which examined the Service’s use of firearms in DOEs. Among its findings and recommendations, SIRC’s draft study noted that it was unable to conclude whether CSIS had adequately informed your predecessor of its use of firearms to DOEs outside of Afghanistan, and recommended that CSIS comprehensively justify to you its operational posture in DOEs, including the use of firearms”</p>
<p><strong>Discussion:</strong></p>
<p><em>SIRC has highlighted some of its findings re: CSIS firearms in DOEs here:</em> <a href="http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/2013-2014/sc2-eng.html">http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/2013-2014/sc2-eng.html</a></p>
<p><em>In 2010, CSIS acknowledged publicly that its intelligence officers could carry firearms in dangerous operating environments overseas.</em></p>
<p><em>That same year, SIRC undertook a review of CSIS’s decision-making overseas, which included its use of firearms within Afghanistan. At the time, the Committee found that there were strong measures in place to ensure proper training, accreditation and conditions under which firearms could be used. However, SIRC expressed caution about CSIS’s possible future decision to use firearms outside of Afghanistan. The review concluded with a recommendation that, should CSIS expand its use of firearms abroad, it should be done “after consultation with, and approval of, the Minister of Public Safety.”</em></p>
<p><em>SIRC found that CSIS’s new procedures provide improved direction to employees regarding their roles and responsibilities under the Service’s firearms program, but there appears to be a disparity between policy and its practical application by employees. Furthermore, SIRC learned that not all employees who should have a sound understanding of CSIS’s firearms program had knowledge of the policies or protocols. SIRC also found an instance where CSIS was not strictly following its own protocols on firearms. In light of these observations, SIRC impressed upon CSIS that its policy and protocols must be followed in the strictest possible terms, or be clearly written to indicate where there is latitude for interpretation.</em></p>
<p><em>SIRC also noted that CSIS’s policy on firearms fails to adequately address the issue of an employee’s liability, civil or criminal, under the laws of a foreign country and whether any mechanisms for immunity could be explored or what position the Government of Canada would take on helping to extract an employee from a certain situation. There is also no adequate advice on what course of legal action would be pursued domestically if an employee was believed to have acted negligently within a foreign environment, and consideration is not given on the extent to which certain types of firearms can be regarded as “defensive weapons.” Finally, there is also a lack of adequate advice on possible legal implications for Canada under international law.</em></p>
<p><em>In order to improve CSIS’s management of its firearms program, <strong>SIRC recommended that CSIS develop better guidelines on the sourcing and purchasing of weapons within dangerous operating environments, create a clear responsibility centre for the firearms program and obtain updated legal advice related to the reasonableness and necessity of carrying firearms within dangerous operating environments.<br /><br /></strong><em>It remains unclear what other areas are defined as DOEs outside of Afghanistan; and where else firearm use is permitted for CSIS employees. </em><strong><br /></strong></em></p>
<p><strong><em> ----------</em></strong></p>
<p><em>Other resources: “Undercover CSIS Agents Carry Guns in Foreign Flashpoints” </em></p>
<p><a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/undercover-csis-agents-carry-guns-in-foreign-flashpoints/article4320423/">http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/undercover-csis-agents-carry-guns-in-foreign-flashpoints/article4320423/</a></p>
<p><em>“</em><em>Ottawa's spies are carrying guns in Afghanistan, a new practice for the clandestine civilian agents who are not authorized to bear arms inside Canada.”</em></p>
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ATIP
Unknown, but between 2014-2015
Memorandum of Understanding on between the RCMP and CSIS on cooperation between the RCMP and the CSIS, with respect to the exchange of information and intelligence and the provision of operational support and assistance
MOUs
The purpose of this memorandum of understanding is to facilitate cooperation and consultation between the RCMP and CSIS. This document was acquired in 2015 in an ATIP request asking for current memoranda of understanding. It appears to be a 2012 copy of the memo made in 2006.
ATIP
2006
Memorandum of Understanding between Transport Canada and CSIS on the Passenger Protect Program
MOUs
Memorandum of Understanding between Transport Canada and CSIS for purposes of implementing the Passenger Protect (no-fly) list under the then-Aeronautics Act. The memo was current as of 2015, but I assume it has been since updated to reflect Bill C-51 (2015)'s new Secure Air Travel Act.
ATIP
2007
Memorandum of Understanding btween the
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) on
the provision of Security Assessments under the
Free And Secure Trade (FAST) Commercial Driver Registration Program
MOUs
MOU governing the provision of security assessments by CSIS to CBSA for pre-screened commercial drivers traveling between Canada and the United States under the FAST Commercial Registration Program. Released under ATIP requesting MOUs current as of 2015.
ATIP CSIS A-2015-352
2005
Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and External Affairs (now Global Affairs) (1987)
MOUs
This MOU establishes the basis for a "productive working relationship" between CSIS Security Liaison Officers and Canada's diplomatic heads of mission. It dates to 1987, but was acquired under a 2015 access to information request asking for all current MOUs.
ATIP CSIS A-2015-352
1987
Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and Canada Post (1986)
MOUs
MOU between CSIS and Canada Post identifying the conditions under which Canada Post may release information to CSIS. Obtained as part of a 2015 access request asking for current MOUs.
ATP CSIS A-2015-352
Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (2002)
MOUs
MOU between CSIS and CIC governing information-sharing between the agencies. Obtained as part of a 2015 access request on all current CSIS MOUs.
ATIP CSIS A-2015-352
Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and National Revenue (Customs and Exise) (1986)
MOUs
MOU that sets out conditions under which Revenue Canada would release information to CSIS. Released in 2015 as part of an access request seeking all current CSIS MOUs.
ATIP CSIS A-2015-352
1986