Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and CBSA
MOUs
<strong>Document Purpose:</strong> Both CSIS and CBSA report to the Minister of Public Safety and fall under the portfolio of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Public Safety). This ‘Framework MOU’ between CSIS and the CBSA sets the terms and conditions as well as the general principles of the administration and management of arrangement between the two organizations, for the purposes of conducting national security investigations, sharing information, and providing mutual assistance. This ‘Framework MOU’ also authorizes CSIS to enter into more specific arrangements with CBSA, as required, without the necessity to seek the Minister of Public Safety’s approval each time.
<strong>Document Synopsis:</strong> The MOU points out that the relationship between the CBSA and CSIS is vital to ensuring the effective administration of the CBSA Act and the CSIS Act; the administration and enforcement of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Customs Act; and maintaining the security of Canada (preamble). The memo outlines the separate responsibilities of both CBSA and CSIS and the scope of their cooperation (section 1, section 3). The MOU establishes Joint Management Teams that consist of executive level members from both agencies to address issues of mutual interest (section 4). The MOU can be amended at any time upon mutual consent of both CBSA and CSIS (section 7). Although the MOU states that funding might be necessary to fully implement the MOU, it does not, in and of itself impose financial responsibilities on either agency (section 6).
ATIP
Unknown
Memoranda of Understanding between CSIS and CSE
MOUs
<strong>2011 Document Purpose:</strong> (1) establish an arrangement under which CSIS and CSE will cooperate for the purpose of information and intelligence collection, information sharing, and operational support in accordance with their respective mandates: for CSIS, the CSIS Act and for CSE the National Defence Act. (2) Provide for the disclosure and safeguarding of information shared between CSIS and CSE.
<p><strong>2011 Document Synopsis: </strong></p>
<p>Further to the Minister of Public Safety’s approval, CSIS was authorized to enter into a framework arrangement on cooperation with the CSE.</p>
<p>Under this MOU, CSIS and CSE are to “cooperate to the greatest extent practicable within their respective legal authorities and mandates on the collection and sharing of information or intelligence, without compromising intelligence assets, sources or methods, while recognizing the legal rights of Canadians inside and outside Canada, as well as those of any persons in Canada” “as appropriate within each party’s legislative and policy frameworks, share the most accurate, complete, and timely information and intelligence as it relates to each party’s mandates, intelligence requirements and priorities, including updates and re-assessments of the intelligence to the extent possible”</p>
Also included are other files responsive to a 2015 access request containing many of the same documents, including historical MOUs.
2012
Documents obtained originally by Justin Ling
CSIS OPS-219, Warrant Acquisition (Section 16) (c. 2006)
Surveillance
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Policy deals with the assistance provided by the Service, pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the <em>CSIS Act</em>, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of National Defence <span style="text-decoration:underline;">in the collection of foreign intelligence</span> within Canada relating to Canada’s defence or international affairs.</p>
ATIP
C. 2006.
CSIS OPS-221, CSIS Processing of Information and Communication Collected Under Warrant – Section 16 (2006)
Surveillance
<p><strong>Document Purpose:</strong> Policy deals with the processing of information and communications collected by CSIS and processed by CSE.</p>
ATIP
2006
CSIS OPS-402 Section 17 Arrangements with Foreign Governments and Institutions (2005)
Information sharing
<strong>Document Purpose</strong>: to provide direction for obtaining a foreign arrangement with a foreign government, institution, or international organization for the purpose of enabling CSIS to carry out mandated activities under the CSIS Act.
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Guidelines for foreign arrangements generally establish that:</p>
<p>- Arrangements must be compatible w/ Canada’s foreign policy</p>
<p>- Arrangements are in the interests of Canada’s security</p>
<p>- Arrangements with foreign countries or organizations will only be considered where there is a definite requirement to protect Canada’s security.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Includes OPS-402-1 Standards and Guidelines for Establishing a Foreign Arrangement <strong>(June 6, 2005)</strong> – states that where there is a requirement to enter into a foreign arrangement under Section 17 of the CSIS Act, a request must be submitted to the Director General Foreign Liaison and Visits (DG FLV). Guidelines include (unredacted): describing the rationale for proposed arrangement, assess internal political situation and respect for human rights (by looking at the human rights record of a country and any abuses by security or intelligence organizations).</p>
<p>Section 17 of the CSIS Act:</p>
<p><strong>Cooperation</strong></p>
<p><strong>17</strong> <strong>(1)</strong> For the purpose of performing its duties and functions under this Act, the Service may,</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(a)</strong> with the approval of the Minister, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(i)</strong> any department of the Government of Canada or the government of a province or any department thereof, or</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(ii)</strong> any police force in a province, with the approval of the Minister responsible for policing in the province; or</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>(b)</strong> with the approval of the Minister after consultation by the Minister with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof or an international organization of states or an institution thereof.</p>
<p><strong>Copies of arrangements to Review Committee</strong><strong>
</strong></p>
<p><strong>(2)</strong> Where a written arrangement is entered into pursuant to subsection (1) or subsection 13(2) or (3), a copy thereof shall be given forthwith to the Review Committee.</p>
ATIP
2005
CSIS Foreign Arrangements Policies and Procedures (2004)
Information-sharing
<strong>Document Purpose: </strong>supplements OPS-402 Section 17 Arrangements with Foreign Govts and Institutions
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong></p>
<p>Foreign Arrangements Philosophy (one of the few unredacted parts of this doc): CSIS generally enjoys strong relations with all of its key foreign partners. “Our international image as a viable and non-threatening partner generates a large number of requests for assistance from traditional and non-traditional partner services.”</p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Statistics – Section 17 Foreign Arrangements</strong></p>
<p>1984 (at transition from RCMP) – CSIS inherited 162 arrangements in 107 countries</p>
<p>92-93 – 194 arrangements in 121 countries</p>
<p>97-98 – 214 arrangements in 128 countries</p>
<p>02-03 – 237 arrangements in 134 countries</p>
<p>04-05 253 arrangements in 142 countries as of October 18, 2004</p>
<p> </p>
<p>CSIS does not publicly disclose the agencies it has foreign arrangements with. </p>
<p>CSIS arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies have increased significantly over the years, indicating that CSIS has arrangements with multiple intelligence agencies of various countries, and likely international organizations of states.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>“Preoccupation with maintaining necessary intelligence arrangements go a long way a considerable distance in explaining much Canadian government secrecy – the mere chance that disclosure of an ally’s secret would impair intelligence sharing is a considerable source of concern for security officials” (Forcese and Roach, 143). </em></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><em>CSIS told a Federal Court in 1996 that the information it receives is “invariably provided in confidence and on the explicit or implicit understanding that neither the information nor its source will be disclosed without prior consent of the entity which provided it.” This principle is widely recognized within the policing and security intelligence communities (Forcese, NS Law, 482). </em></p>
<p> </p>
<p>In emergency circumstances, CSIS can cooperate with foreign intelligence organizations where no arrangement exists. If the Minister is unavailable to approve an arrangement, the Director can undertake “whatever exchanges or cooperation are necessary” to address such an urgent requirement.</p>
<p>Records relating to foreign arrangements will be maintained.</p>
ATIP
2004
CSIS DDO Directive on Info Sharing (2011)
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>To provide a tool to CSIS’s employees to ensure that they comply with international and Canadian legislation and that decisions to proceed or not with the use of specific information/information exchange “are made at a level commensurate with the possibility that” (1) the information to be used may have been obtained through the use of <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">mistreatment </span></strong>of individuals or (2) the exchange may result, directly or indirectly, in the <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">mistreatment </span></strong>of individuals.</p>
This Directive applies to to information sharing with <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">ALL foreign entities</span></strong>, is guided by the Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011)
ATIP
2011
CSIS In-Bound Intelligence Processing protocols
Information-sharing
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Provides questions to consider for use of information that could be derived through mistreatment or torture (how to ensure this is not the case) such as:</p>
<ul><li>Has the country signed and ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment or Punishment?</li>
<li>Does the country adhere to principles of customary international law?</li>
<li>The foreign entity’s record in complying with past assurances</li>
</ul>
Was the detention lawful under local and international law?
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong></p>
<p>“The Service cannot simply rely upon anecdotal information or personal relationships that may exist between special liaison officers and security officials in foreign countries. The Service must always ask what the <strong><span style="text-decoration:underline;">motivation</span></strong> is of the person who is providing the information. This is particularly the case when countries have poor human rights records, and may be more interested in maintaining a relationship w/ the Service than actually providing truthful information as to the human rights conditions in that country”</p>
<p>“To establish that information was obtained by the use of torture required more than just pointing to the poor human rights records of a given country” (Justice Blanchard – in relation to Mahjoub’s Security Certificate, June 2010).</p>
<p>The Information Sharing Evaluation Committee renders decision re: whether intelligence should be used or not.</p>
<em>International Law Safeguards: International law guards against extreme forms of interrogation. Two broadly ratified international treaties include the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment. The ICCPR Article 7 says that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) includes more detailed prohibitions (Forcese, NSL, 187). </em>
2011
CSIS memos re new Ministerial direction on CSIS Section 17 Liaison Arrangements w/ Foreign Govts
Information-sharing
<strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Memo to get the Minister’s approval for the new Ministerial Directive which includes guidelines for managing CSIS’s foreign liaison arrangements (Dec. 2001). Prior to the MD guidelines, CSIS needed to consult with DFAIT/officially request Ministerial approval when seeking to enhance level of cooperation/exchanges w/ agencies with which CSIS has Section 17 Liaison Arrangements. After the new MD, the Director has authority to approve requests to enhance the level of cooperation between CSIS and foreign agencies (subject to any conditions imposed by the Minister).
<p><strong>Document Synopsis: </strong>Contains MD; Annex D; Appendix 1 (Standards and Guidelines for Establishing a Foreign Arrangement); and Annex F (Joint Operations, Operational Assistance and Investigative Activity Outside Canada) which includes guidelines for joint operations within and outside of Canada. It highlights that CSIS investigative activity outside of Canada will: conform to the CSIS Act, hold potential benefit for Canada and its national interests, and be considered for its impact on Canadian foreign policy interests.</p>
ATIP
2001
CSIS Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing (2009)
Information-sharing
<p><strong>Document Purpose: </strong>Protocol for CSIS to share information with foreign agencies and governments.<br /><br />This document seems now to have been superseded by the 2011 ministerial direction on information-sharing.</p>
<p><strong>Document Analysis: </strong>Pursuant to section 17 of the CSIS Act and in accordance with existing Ministerial Directives, CSIS may be authorized to enter into formal information sharing agreements with foreign agencies, <span style="text-decoration:underline;">including those </span>that are generally recognized as having poor human rights records. CSIS is directed to <span style="text-decoration:underline;">not knowingly</span> rely on information derived from torture, and take <span style="text-decoration:underline;">reasonable measures </span>to reduce the risk that its actions could promote or condone torture.</p>
<p><em>CSIS’s review body, the SIRC, reported in its 2004-2005 annual report that at least one of the CSIS foreign arrangements that it audited “did not provide an adequate analysis of potential human rights issues.” It objected to CSIS’s claim that it “ensures” that information exchanged is not the cause or product of human rights abuses….the Service is rarely in a position to determine how information received from a foreign agency was obtained. As Mr. Elcock stated to the Arar Commission, when it comes to information that may have been the product of torture, “the reality is in most cases we would have no knowledge that it was derived from torture. You may suspect it was derived from torture, but tat is about as far as one will get in most circumstances” [Canada, SIRC, Annual Report 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005) in Forcese, NS Law, 487].</em></p>
<em>Justice O’Connor’s recommendation at the Arar Inquiry was that “Canadian agencies should accept information from countries with questionable human rights records only after proper consideration of human rights implications. Information received from countries with questionable human rights records should be identified as such and proper steps should be taken to assess its reliability” (Forcese, NS Law, 488).</em>
Unknown, but likely late 2000s.